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Robert B. Reich — What Is a Nation?

Alexander Moens — President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah

James J. Wirtz — Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War

Aaron L. Friedberg — The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security

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Book Reviews

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ROBERT B. REICH reflects on the meaning and purpose of nationhood in a world in which economic borders are ceasing to have much significance. He suggests that the emerging global division of labor is driving a wedge between high-skilled professionals and low-skilled workers within the same nation – rewarding the first group with ever higher wages, while reducing the real incomes of the latter. He calls for the better-off citizens to think about what they should be doing to help the less well off.

ALEXANDER MOENS challenges the conventional argument that Jimmy Carter's decision-making process during the fall of the shah of Iran broke down because of intense conflict between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. He argues that there was a flaw in the decision-making process that led to a lack of options, a premature consensus, and the absence of critical evaluation of the failed policy.

JAMES J. WIRTZ demonstrates how organizational imperatives shaped the controversy within the American intelligence community over estimates of Viet Cong strength on the eve of the 1968 Tet offensive. He argues that the military had the stronger position in the bureaucratic debate, which was replayed during the *Westmoreland v. CBS* litigation.

AARON L. FRIEDBERG looks at four aspects of the changing relationship between economics and national security: the impact of defense spending cuts, the effect of economic change on the power of individual states, the potential uses of economic statecraft, and the national pursuit of "economic security."

SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND analyses the expanding relationship between party leaders and the large number of informal caucuses in the American Congress.

WILLIAM SPINRAD examines the attribution of "charisma" as an explanation of a political leader's popularity. Discussing specific examples that appear in the literature, he surmises that designating the nature of a political leader's personality as charismatic adds little to understanding political success.

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN reviews a collection of essays on democratic theory and public choice, edited by Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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What Is a Nation?

ROBERT B. REICH

History is replete with examples of people wishing to secede from alliances with certain other people. In the nineteenth century, the American southern states tried to secede from the Union. Centuries before, Martin Luther led a secession from the Holy See. In 1991, Lithuanians, Latvians, and many others are attempting much the same from the Soviet empire. Staten Island would like to secede from New York City. Secession is also common to high-tech engineers, investment bankers, and lawyers, who often defect from their business associates to form their own firms. Many working women these days are able to secede from unhappy or unrewarding marriages. While the reasons for such withdrawals vary, where an economic motive exists it is usually because the defectors conclude that they will do better on their own. The union is unnecessarily costly or constraining, and the defectors no longer wish to subsidize partners who fail to pull their own weight. Secession need not be explicit. It does not require a declaration of war nor even a formal revocation of contract. It can happen quietly, almost imperceptibly, as in a marriage whose partners slowly drift apart. One day the players awaken to a new reality. They discover they are no longer part of the same team.

Something of this sort has been occurring in the United States. America's highest income earners (whom I have labeled "symbolic analysts" in light of the problem-solving functions they perform in the emerging global economy, usually by manipulating numerical or verbal symbols) have been seceding from the rest of the nation. The secession has taken many forms, but it is grounded in the same emerging economic reality. This group of Americans no longer depends, as it

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ROBERT B. REICH, a former official in both the Ford and Carter administrations, teaches political economy and management at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. This article is drawn from his most recent book, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism*, published by Alfred A. Knopf.

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once did, on the economic performance of other Americans. Symbolic analysts are linked instead to global webs of enterprise to which they add value directly as engineers, lawyers, management consultants, investment bankers, research scientists, corporate executives, and other deployers of abstract analysis.

The secession is occurring gradually, without fanfare. For many symbolic analysts (including me and, perhaps, you), it has been taking place without explicit knowledge or intent. While symbolic analysts pledge national allegiance with as much sincerity and resolve as ever, the new global sources of their economic well-being have subtly altered how they understand their economic roles and responsibilities in society.

One form of secession takes the form of a decreasing tax burden on symbolic analysts and an increasing tax burden (including Social Security payroll taxes, sales taxes, user fees, property taxes, and lottery fees) on lower-income Americans. Corresponding with this shift in the tax burden has been a withdrawal of government funding from programs that would make the less fortunate four-fifths of the population more productive by improving their skills and helping them transport themselves and their products to market.

The two phenomena—the shift of the tax burden from wealthier to poorer Americans and the withdrawal of public funding—are of course related, since poorer Americans cannot afford to pay more taxes to support public programs even if the programs would improve their earnings over the long term. Tax revolts by middle and lower-income Americans whose real earnings have slowly declined are only to be expected when tax burdens shift further in their direction.

In the early postwar years, government expenditures on education, training, highways, and other "public improvements" were justified to the more fortunate by pointing to their salutary effects on the the nation as a whole. Alexis de Tocqueville's logic of "self-interest properly understood" lay behind many of the initiatives of the era. But in more recent years, as symbolic analysts have come to depend less on other Americans, the traditional justification has apparently lost some of its potency.

Consider infrastructure. Many of America's symbolic analysts transmit their concepts through the air via private telecommunications systems and transport their bodies through the air via private airlines. Most other workers rely primarily on public highways, bridges, ports, trains, buses, and subways in order to add much economic value. Yet in the United States, spending to maintain and upgrade these latter sorts of facilities has declined steadily. In the 1950s, the nation committed itself to building a modern transportation system. Infrastructure then absorbed around 6 percent of the nation's nonmilitary federal budget each year, or just under 4 percent of gross national product (GNP), where it remained through most of the 1960s. Public spending on the nation's transportation system declined in the 1970s and declined even more sharply in the 1980s to the point where the nation was spending only 1.2 percent of its nonmilitary budget (about 3 percent of GNP) on building and maintaining infrastructure. Hence the specter of collapsing bridges and crumbling highways. In 1989, the U.S. Department of

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Transportation estimated that simply to repair the nation's 240,000 bridges would require an expenditure of $50 billion; to repair the nation's highways, $315 billion. Spending on *new* infrastructure has fallen even more dramatically, from 2.3 percent of GNP in 1963 to only 1 percent in 1989.[1]

The federal government's withdrawal has been especially precipitous. By the end of the 1980s, Washington was annually investing about the same amount of money in infrastructure (in constant dollars) as it invested thirty years before, although the gross national product had grown 144 percent in the interim. Physical capital investment dropped from over 24 percent of total federal outlays in 1960 to less than 11 percent in 1991.[2] And much of what the federal government has underwritten in recent years has been dedicated to downtown convention centers, office parks, research parks, and other amenities utilized mostly by symbolic analysts.

Expenditure on public elementary and secondary education has shown a similar pattern. Many politicians, business leaders, and many average citizens are quick to claim that the crisis in public education is unrelated to a lack of public funding. A premise of their argument—that there are many means of improving American schools that do not require large public outlays—is surely correct. Pushing responsibility for what is taught and how it is taught down to teachers and parents, and away from educational bureaucracies, is one such step (analogous to the shift in responsibility within the corporation from high-volume hierarchies to high-value webs). Giving parents some choice over which school their child attends is another, so long as the poorest children, whose parents are least likely to be able or willing to shop, do not get left behind in the worst schools. But to claim that these types of reforms will be sufficient is being less than ingenuous. In order to have smaller classes and attract better qualified teachers, more money is also necessary.[3]

Controlled for inflation, public spending on primary and secondary education per student has increased since the mid-1970s, but not appreciably faster than it did during the fifteen years before. Between 1959 and the early 1970s, annual spending per student grew at a brisk 4.7 percent in real terms—more than a full percentage point above the increase in the gross national product per person.

[1] See calculations by Brian Cromwell, "Corporate Subsidies and the Infrastructure Crisis," *Economic Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, March 1989.

[2] Figures from David Aschauer, "Is Public Expenditure Productive?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 17 (March 1989): 177–200; and from Alicia Munnell, "Productivity and Public Investment," *New England Economic Review* 17 (January–February 1990): 3–22.

[3] That smaller classes and better qualified teachers result in a better education is one of the few propositions on which most educational researchers agree. See, for example, David Cord and Alan Krueger, "Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the U.S." (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 3358, May 1990). See also R. Eberts, E. Schwartz, and J. Stone, "School Reform, School Size, and Student Achievement," *Economic Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 26, June 1990.

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Since 1975, annual spending per pupil has continued to rise about 1 percent faster than the rate of growth of GNP per person. But there are several reasons for believing that the more recent increases have been inadequate. First is the comparative measure of what other nations are spending. By the late 1980s, America's per-pupil expenditures (converted to dollars using 1988 exchange rates) were below per-pupil expenditures in eight other nations—Sweden, Norway, Japan, Denmark, Austria, West Germany, Canada, and Switzerland.[4]

Comparisons aside, the demands on public education in the United States have significantly increased during the past fifteen years due to growing numbers of broken homes, single parents, immigrants (both legal and illegal), and poor children. There is also the undeniable fact that talented individuals are no longer drawn to teaching as readily as they were two decades ago. Previous generations of American school children benefited from limited career options available to talented women, other than teaching. By the late 1980s, that free ride was over. Talented women (and men) were in demand in a wide range of occupations. The law of supply and demand is not repealed at the schoolhouse door: if talented people are to be attracted to teaching, teachers must be paid enough to attract such individuals. Yet average teacher salaries in 1990 (adjusted for inflation) were only 4 percent higher than in 1970, when career choices were far more limited.

Finally the average figures on per-pupil expenditure in the United States disguise growing disparities among states and among school districts. During the 1980s, federal support for elementary and secondary education dropped by a third. States and localities picked up the bill, but for some of them the burden has been especially heavy. Although per-pupil expenditures increased in wealthier states and school districts, many poorer states and districts—already coping with the most intractable social problems—have barely been able to fund even a minimum quality public education.

Meanwhile, even as tax-free day care for children of symbolic analysts has become a de rigueur provision of law firms, management consulting companies, and investment banks, public funding for preschool education for poor children has appreciably dwindled. In 1989, fewer than a fifth of poor three and four-year-olds were able to participate in Head Start—a pre-school program costing approximately $4,000 per child—whose graduates are more likely to gain a high

[4] International comparisons are hazardous, not only because of differences in the measurements used by different countries, but also because different societies may have different objectives for their educational systems. There is also the question of how the measurements are to be done, given different exchange rates. Using a 1985 exchange rate, when the dollar was at its height in comparison with the currencies of other industrialized nations, puts the United States in fourth place. But this comparison obviously is skewed by the abnormally high dollar at the time. For these and related calculations see *Digest of Educational Statistics* (National Center for Education Statistics, United States Department of Education, Washington, DC, 1988). See also, M. E. Rasell and L. Mishel, "Shortchanging Education: How U.S. Spending on Grades K–12 Lags Behind Other Industrialized Nations," Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC, January 1990.

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school diploma, attend college, and find employment than comparable children not enrolled in the program.[5] By contrast, nearly two out of three four-year olds whose families have incomes over $35,000-a-year attended preschool in 1989.[6] In 1991, the Bush administration proposed increased funding to permit most poor four-year-olds to participate in Head Start. This is a welcome initiative, but even with this boost the program still will serve less than a third of all eligible children.[7]

Also because of government cutbacks, many capable young people in the United States no longer receive the federal dollars that were their only hope of affording a college education. Tuitions at public and private universities rose during the 1980s by 26 percent on average (adjusted for inflation), while the incomes of families in the middle and lower ranks of American households declined. Instead of filling the growing gap, however, the government helped widen it. During the 1980s, guaranteed student loans fell by 13 percent, marking yet another previous commitment reneged upon.

In 1965, the nation decided that all students qualified to attend college should have access to higher education. The resulting Higher Education Act established a system of grants and loan guarantees for low-income students, thus increasing from 22 to 26 percent the portion of university students from families with incomes at or below the median. But by 1988, with grants and loan guarantees drying up, the proportion of low-income university students fell back below 20 percent.[8] For the first time in the nation's history, the proportion of the population attending college has begun to decline; younger men, aged 25 to 34, are now less likely to have completed four years of college than were the baby boomers just ahead of them. The high costs of education have helped push them out.[9]

Public funding to train and retrain workers, meanwhile, dropped by more than

[5] For an assessment of the Head Start program, see R. Darlington and T. Lazar, "The Lasting Effects After Preschool," U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1979).

[6] Figures from the Children's Defense Fund, Washington, DC.

[7] See "Competitive Assessment of the President's Fiscal Year 1991 Budget," (Washington, DC: Council on Competitiveness, May 1990), 6–7. Where preschool programs for poor children have had more teachers and social workers than in the typical Head Start program, children have shown even larger gains. See Jean Layzer, "Evaluation of New York City Project Giant Step," (Cambridge, MA: Apt Associates, April 1990). See also Amy Stuart Wells, "Preschool Program in New York City is Reported to Surpass Head Start," *New York Times*, 16 May 1990.

[8] Data from the American Higher Education Research Program, American Council on Education, 1989. See also, Barbara Vobejda, "Class, Color, and College: Higher Education's Role in Reinforcing the Social Hierarchy," *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, 15–21 May 1989, 6.

[9] Until the 1990s, each generation of Americans had been better educated than the generation preceding it. In 1980, 25 percent of men age 35 to 44 had completed four years of college; by 1990, 31 percent of men within this age group had done so. But by 1990, *younger* men were less educated than the generation before them: 25 percent of them had completed four years of college, compared to 27 percent of the same age group in 1980. Younger women were becoming slightly better educated, however: in 1990, 24 percent of women age 25–34 had completed four years of college; 23 percent of women age 35–44 had done so. Ibid.

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50 percent during the 1980s from $13.2 billion to $5.6 billion.[10] Private training, the costs of which corporations deduct from their taxable income, has hardly made up the difference. American corporations claim to spend some $30 billion a year training their employees, but most of these funds have been used on what is termed, euphemistically, executive training.[11] Such training is, of course, available only to the most dedicated and already valuable employees. College graduates are 50 percent more likely to be trained by their corporations than are high school graduates; employees with post-graduate degrees within high-tech industries are twice as likely as mere college graduates.[12] Training, then, is typically provided to those who need it least.

The official reason given for why America cannot invest more money in infrastructure, education, and training is that we cannot afford it. In his inaugural address, George Bush noted regretfully, "We have more will than wallet"—a frequent lamentation. But only excessive politeness should constrain one from inquiring: Whose will? Whose wallet? Even if the necessary funds cannot be reallocated from elsewhere in the federal budget—surely an heroic assumption, given the number of B-1 bombers and other military exotica being created to ward off communists, most of whom no longer exist (as such)—the claim that America cannot afford to spend more on the productivity of all its citizens remains a curious one.

In 1989, Americans had about $3,500 billion to spend after paying taxes. The lower four-fifths of the population received a little under half of this sum (about $1745 billion), which did not permit them any more consumption than a decade earlier; their belts were as tight as before.[13] The top fifth of the population, mostly comprising symbolic analysts, received the rest (about $1755 billion)—more than the other four-fifths of the population combined. Accordingly, symbolic analysts loosened their belts considerably. Their incomes have been increasing on average by 2 to 3 percent a year after inflation (and if they are in the most fortunate tenth of earners, faster than this), even as the incomes of other Americans have stagnated or declined.

[10] Figures from "Unprotected: Jobless Workers," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC, 1989.

[11] While the precise content of this elusive process is difficult to determine, I have personal experience that may shed some light. On more than one occasion I have been hired to lecture to a group of executives who, after two intellectually strenuous hours with me, proceed through a similarly rigorous day-long schedule: a sumptuous lunch, followed by an afternoon of tennis and golf, culminating with top-shelf cocktails and five-course dinner.

[12] L.A. Lillard and H.W. Tan, "Private Sector Training: What Are Its Effects?" Report to the Department of Commerce, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1986.

[13] Contrary to popular wisdom about Americans saving too little and spending too much, actual consumption by the bottom four-fifths of the American population hardly increased at all during the 1980s. Only the fortunate fifth of households experienced growth of real consumption during these years. See Robert R. Blecker, *Are We On A Consumption Binge? The Evidence Reconsidered* (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, January 1990).

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While average working Americans may justly feel that they have been surrendering a larger percentage of their earnings in taxes (including Social Security payroll taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes), tax burdens on Americans *overall* have not increased since the mid-1960s. Total tax receipts amounted to 31.1 percent of gross national product in 1969, 31.1 percent in 1979, and 32 percent in 1989. It is just that the burden has been shifted from relatively wealthier Americans to relatively poorer Americans.

Were the tax code as progressive as it was even as late as 1977, symbolic analysts would have paid at least $93 billion more in taxes than they in fact paid in 1989.[14] Between 1990 and 2000, they would have contributed over a trillion dollars more. This tidy sum, when added to the money released from making relatively modest cuts in defense spending[15] would yield approximately $2 trillion—a significant down payment on the productivity of the rest of the population.[16]

I am not aware of a groundswell of support among business leaders or politicians for increasing the taxes on the top fifth of American earners. In fact, the administration currently in Washington has sought instead to reduce tax rates on appreciating capital assets. The apparent justification for lowering, rather than raising, federal taxes on wealthy individuals (who own most of these capital assets) is that such a step would motivate them to invest their savings in new enterprise. Profit-seeking, resolutely self-interested individuals, it is assumed, will spur the American economy forward. Should there come to be substantial fiscal savings due to the collapse of Soviet communism and a concomitant difficulty of finding dangerous enemies against whom we must arm, the administration (in cooperation with a coterie of economists, business lobbyists, and conservative pundits) has signaled its determination to apply such savings to further tax cuts and reductions in the federal budget deficit rather than to public investments in education, training, and infrastructure.

What is the role of a nation within the global economy? Rather than increase the profitability of corporations flying its flag or enlarge the worldwide holdings of its citizens, a nation's economic role is to enhance its citizens' standard of living by increasing the value that they add to the world economy. The concern over national competitiveness is often misplaced. It is not what we own that counts; it is what we do.

[14] Almost all of this sum would have been paid by the top 10 percent of income earners. Calculations from *Inequality and the Federal Budget Deficit* (Washington, DC: Citizens for Tax Justice, March 1990).

[15] Were military spending steadily reduced through the decade of the 1990s by about 50 percent, the total savings by the year 2000 would come close to $1 trillion.

[16] I have not included the costs of the current savings and loan bailout in my calculations, since the bailout is nothing more than a huge transfer of money from American taxpayers to other Americans. The bailout does not actually use up scarce resources.

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Viewed in this way, America's problem is that while some Americans are adding substantial value, most are not. In consequence, the gap between those few in the first group and everyone else is widening. To improve the economic position of the bottom four-fifths will require that the fortunate fifth share its wealth and invest in the wealth-creating capacities of other Americans. Yet as the top becomes ever more tightly linked to the global economy, it has less of a stake in the performance and potential of less fortunate compatriots. Thus our emerging dilemma.

History rarely proceeds in a direct line, however. Those who project that today's steady improvement (or deterioration) over yesterday's will become even more pronounced tomorrow often end up embarrassed when the future finally arrives. In the intervening moments a new leader will come, or an earthquake, a potent idea, a revolution, a sudden loss of business confidence, a scientific discovery—reversing the most seemingly intransigent of trends and causing people to wonder how they could ever have been deluded into believing that any other outcome was ever remotely possible. The predictable failure of all prediction notwithstanding, the public continues to pay attention to stock analysts, trend-spotters, futurologists, weather forecasters, astrologers, and economists. Presumably, such respect is due less to the accuracy of their prophesies than to their bravery in making them.

The reader of these pages is duly warned. A simple extrapolation of the past into the future would show a continuing rise in the fortunes of symbolic analysts and a steady decline in the fortunes of almost everyone else. The costs of worldwide transportation and communications will continue to decline and create an ever larger market and burgeoning demand for the services of America's symbolic analysts. But this will simultaneously generate an ever larger supply of unskilled workers. In consequence, America's symbolic analysts will become even wealtheir; routine producers will grow poorer and fewer in number; and with the enhanced mobility of world labor and the dexterity of labor-saving machinery, in-person servers (unskilled local service workers) will become less economically secure.

The fortunes of the most well-off and the least will thus continue to diverge. By 2020, the top fifth of American earners will account for more than 60 percent of all the income earned by Americans; the bottom fifth, for 2 percent. Symbolic analysts will withdraw into ever more isolated enclaves within which they will pool their resources rather than share them with other Americans or invest them in ways that improve other Americans' productivity. An ever smaller proportion of their incomes will be taxed and thence redistributed or invested on behalf of the rest of the public. Government spending on education, training, and infrastructure will continue to decline as a proportion of the nation's total income; any savings attributable to a smaller defense budget will result in further tax reductions and the diminution of the fiscal deficit. Poorer cities, townships, and states will be unable to make up the difference.

Distinguished from the rest of the population by their global linkages, good

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schools, comfortable lifestyles, excellent health care, and abundance of security guards, symbolic analysts will complete their secession from the union. The townships and urban enclaves where they reside and the symbolic analytic zones where they work will bear no resemblance to the rest of America; nor will there be any direct connections between the two. America's poorest citizens, meanwhile, will be isolated within their own enclaves of urban and rural desperation; an even larger proportion of their young men will fill the nation's prisons. The remainder of the American population, growing gradually poorer, will feel powerless to alter any of these trends.

It is not that simple, of course. Other events will likely intervene to set this trajectory off course. Not the least is the inability of symbolic analysts to protect themselves, their families, and their property from the depredations of a larger and ever more desperate population outside. The peace of mind potentially offered by platoons of security guards, state-of-the-art alarm systems, and a multitude of prisons is limited.

There is also the possibility that symbolic analysts will decide that they have a responsibility to improve the well-being of their compatriots, regardless of any personal gain. A new patriotism would thus be born, founded less upon economic self-interest than upon loyalty to nation. What do we owe one another as members of the same society who no longer inhabit the same economy? The answer will depend on how strongly we feel that we are, in fact, members of the same society.

Loyalty to place—to one's city or region or nation—used to correspond more naturally with economic self-interest. Individual citizens supported education, roads, and other civic improvements, even when the individual was unlikely to enjoy but a fraction of what was paid out in the short term, because it was assumed that such sacrifices would be amply rewarded eventually. Civic boosterism, public investment, and economic cooperation were consistent with Tocqueville's principle of "self-interest rightly understood." As one group of citizens grew wealthier and more productive, the other citizens benefited by their ability to give more in exchange for what was offered them. And as one group resisted opportunistic behavior, so did the other, with the result that all benefited. The resulting networks of economic interdependence induced the habits of citizenship.

Between 1950 and the early 1970s, the American economy as a whole began to exemplify this principle. Labor, business, and the broader public, through its elected representatives, tacitly cooperated to promote high-volume production; the resulting efficiencies of scale generated high profits; some of the profits were reinvested to create even vaster scale, and some were returned to production workers and middle-level managers in the form of higher wages and benefits. As a result, large numbers of Americans entered the middle class ready to consume the output of this burgeoning system.

But as the borders of cities, states, and even nations no longer come to signify special domains of economic interdependence, Tocqueville's principle of enlightened self-interest is less compelling. Nations are becoming regions of a global economy; their citizens are laborers in a global market. National corporations

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are turning into global webs whose high-volume, standardized activities are undertaken wherever labor is cheapest worldwide, and whose most profitable activities are done wherever skilled and talented people can best conceptualize new problems and solutions. Under such circumstances, economic sacrifice and restraint exercised within a nation's borders is less likely to come full circle than it was in a more closed economy.

The question is whether the habits of citizenship are sufficiently strong to withstand the centrifugal forces of the new global economy. Is there enough of simple loyalty to place—of civic obligation unadorned by enlightened self-interest—to elicit sacrifice nonetheless? We are, after all, citizens as well as economic actors; we may work in markets, but we live in societies. How tight is the social and political bond when the economic bond unravels?

The question is, of course, relevant to all nations subject to global economic forces, which are reducing the interdependence of their own citizens and simultaneously separating them into global winners and losers. In some societies, the pull of the global economy notwithstanding, national allegiances are sufficiently potent to motivate the winners to continue helping the losers. The we're-all-in-it-together nationalism that characterizes such places is founded not only on enlightened self-interest but also on a deeply ingrained sense of shared heritage and national destiny. The Japanese, Swedes, Austrians, Swiss, and Germans, for example, view themselves as cultures whose strength and survival depend to some extent on sacrifices by the more fortunate among them. It is a matter of national duty and pride. Partly as a result, the distribution of income within these nations has been among the most equal of any countries, although the global division of labor is driving a wedge between their rich and poor, and testing their commitments to equality. These nations, incidentally, experienced during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s among the most spectacular records of economic growth of all industrialized nations, benefiting all their citizens.[17]

Could such sentiments be nurtured in America? Should they be? Nationalism is a hazardous sentiment. The same we're-all-in-it-together attitude that elicits mutual sacrifice within a nation can easily degenerate into jingoistic contempt for all things foreign. Indeed, the two emotions tend to reinforce one another. It is a commonplace notion in Britain that the nation's citizens never again dis-

[17] Much has been written about the developmental state of modern Japan. South Korea and Hong Kong, once touted by orthodox free marketers as models of laissez-faire economic individualism, on closer inspection look remarkably like their more advanced neighbor to the north. See, for example, Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and M. Castells and L.Tyson, "High Technology and the Changing International Division of Production" in R. Purcell, ed., *The Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989). Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden represent a different path, of course, but these nations also are characterized by systems of internal bargaining that soften adjustment for their least fortunate citizens and elicit sacrifices from their most fortunate. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

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played such virtue and solidarity as when they fought Hitler. America's cold war with the Soviet Union inspired and provided justification for billions of dollars of public expenditure on highways, education, and research. The willingness of talented Japanese citizens to work long hours and receive relatively low incomes for the honor of doing their part for their country is fueled by the same set of emotions that makes it difficult for the Japanese to open their borders to foreign products and immigrants.

History offers ample warning of how zero-sum nationalism—the assumption that either we win or they win—can corrode public values to the point where citizens support policies that marginally improve their own welfare while harming everyone else on the planet, thus forcing other nations to do the same in defense. Armaments escalate; trade barriers rise; cold wars turn hot. National allegiances, once unleashed, can lead to much worse. The same social discipline and fierce loyalty that have elicited sacrifices among Germans and Japanese have also in this century generated mind-numbing atrocities.

Unbridled nationalism can cause civic values to degenerate at home. Nations grow paranoid about foreign agents in their midst; civil liberties are restricted on grounds of national security. Neighbors begin to distrust one another. Tribal allegiances can even tear nation-states apart. The violence that periodically erupts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Albanians and Serbs, Flamands and Walloons, Vietnamese and Cambodians, Israelis and Palestinians, Sikhs and other Indians, Tamils and Sinhalese, and Lebanon's Christian and Moslem sects is grim evidence of the costs of tribal loyalty.

The argument against zero-sum nationalism, and in favor of a larger and more cosmopolitan perspective, seems especially strong in light of the growing inequalities in the world. The gap between the top fifth and bottom four-fifths of incomes within the United States is negligible in comparison with the gap between the top fifth and bottom four-fifths of the world's population. North America, Western Europe, and East Asia—together comprising the top fifth—account for three-quarters of gross world product and 80 percent of the value of world trade. As these wealthy regions have become uncoupled from the rest of the world, much of what remains behind is sinking precipitously into hopeless poverty. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of undernourished people in developing nations (excluding China) increased from 650 million to 730 million. Since 1980, economic growth rates in most of these nations have slowed, and real wages have dropped further. In Africa and Latin America, per capita incomes were substantially lower in 1990 than in 1980. Commodity prices have plummeted; indebtedness to global banks has crippled many underdeveloped economies, as more than $50 billion is transferred each year to advanced nations. The ravages of deforestation, erosion, and large-scale farming have taken their toll on much of the Third World. Meanwhile, the world's poor populations are giving birth at a much higher rate than are the world's rich. Sixty percent of the 12,000 children born into the world each hour join families whose annual per person incomes are lower than $350. In 1990, just over 5 billion human beings lived on the planet;

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their number is expected to reach 8 billion by 2025, and 16 billion by the end of the 21st century. The number of impoverished people has grown dramatically in Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Jamaica, Peru, and the Philippines. Life expectancy has declined in nine sub-Saharan African countries; deaths from malnutrition among infants and children have increased.[18]

A focus on national well-being is also dangerously narrow in relation to other problems on which global cooperation is essential: acid rain, the depletion of the ozone, the pollution of oceans, the use of fossil fuels and global warming, the destruction of species-rich tropical rain forests, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the assimilation of refugee populations, the drug trade, the spread of AIDS, international terrorism. Nationalist attitudes render solutions to these and other transnational crises all the more difficult to achieve.

Zero-sum nationalism also endangers global economic prosperity. The neomercantilist premise that either they win or we win is simply incorrect. As one nation's workers become more insightful and educated, they are able to add more wealth to the world. Everyone on the planet benefits from smaller and more powerful semiconductor chips regardless of who makes them.

It is true, of course, that the nation whose workers first gain the insights are likely to benefit disproportionately. This advantage may cause other nations' citizens to feel relatively poorer, notwithstanding their absolute gain. Sociologists have long noted the phenomenon of relative deprivation, whereby people evaluate their well-being in light of others' wealth. The average citizen of Great Britain is far better off than twenty years ago, but feels poorer now that the average Italian has pulled ahead. When I ask my students whether they would prefer living in a world in which every American is 25 percent wealthier than now and every Japanese was much wealthier than the average American, or one in which Americans were only 10 percent wealthier but still ahead of the average Japanese, a large number usually vote for the second option. Thus, people may be willing to forego absolute gains to prevent their perceived rivals from enjoying even greater gains. While understandable, such zero-sum impulses are hardly to be commended as a principle of international economic behavior. Since economic advances rarely benefit the citizens of all nations in equal proportion, such an approach, if widely adapted, would legitimize the blocking of most efforts to increase global wealth.

Economic interdependence runs so deep, in fact, that any zero-sum strategy is likely to boomerang, as the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries discovered in the 1970s when their sky-high oil prices plunged the world into recession and reduced the demand for oil. Today no nation's central banker can control its money supply or the value of its currency without the help of other nations' central bankers; nor can a nation unilaterally raise its interest rates or run large budget surpluses or deficits without others' cooperation or acquiescence. These days, every advanced nation depends on others as a market for and

[18] See *Global Outlook 2000* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1990).

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source of its goods. The Japanese need a strong and prosperous America as a market for their goods and a place to invest their money. If any step they might take were to precipitate a steep economic decline in the United States, the results would be disastrous for the Japanese as well.

But what if foreigners dominate a major technology, as it seems likely the Japanese soon will with advanced semiconductors, high definition television, and dozens of other gadgets? Again, we should beware zero-sum assumptions. The Japanese mastery of particular technologies will not foreclose technological progress in the United States or elsewhere. Technologies are not commodities for which world demand is finite, nor do they come in fixed quantities that either they get or we get. Technologies are domains of knowledge. They are like the outer branches of a giant bush on which countless other branches are growing all the time. While Americans need direct experience in researching, designing, and fabricating technologies on outer branches if they are to share in future growth, these need not be exactly the same branches as occupied by another nation's work force.

The cosmopolitan man or woman with a sense of global citizenship is thus able to maintain appropriate perspective on the world's problems and possibilities. Devoid of strong patriotic impulse, the global symbolic analyst is likely to resist zero-sum solutions and thus behave more responsibly (in this sense) than citizens whose frame of reference is narrower.

But will the cosmopolitan with a global perspective choose to act fairly and compassionately? Will our current and future symbolic analysts—lacking any special sense of responsibility toward a particular nation and its citizens—share their wealth with the less fortunate of the world and devote their resources and energies to improving the chances that others may contribute to the world's wealth? Here we find the darker side of cosmopolitanism. For without strong attachments and loyalties extending beyond family and friends, symbolic analysts may never develop the habits and attitudes of social responsibility. They will be world citizens, but without accepting or even acknowledging any of the obligations that citizenship in a polity normally implies. They will resist zero-sum solutions, but they may also resist all other solutions that require sacrifice and commitment. Without a real political community in which to learn, refine, and practice the ideals of justice and fairness, they may find these ideals to be meaningless abstractions.

Senses of justice and generosity are learned. The learning has many roots, but significant among them is membership in a political community. We learn to feel responsible for others because we share with them a common history; we participate with them in a common culture; we face with them a common fate. "We think of ourselves not as human beings first, but as sons, and daughters . . . tribesmen, and neighbors. It is in this dense web of relations and the meanings which they give to life which satisfies the needs which really matter to us."[19]

[19] Michael Ignatieff, *The Needs of Strangers* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985), 29.

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That we share with others nothing more than our humanity may be insufficient to elicit much sacrifice. The management consultant living in Westchester County, New York, commuting to a steel and glass tower on Park Avenue, and dealing with clients all over the world, may feel slightly more responsibility toward a poor family living 3,000 miles away in East Los Angeles than to a poor family of Mexicans living 3,200 miles away in Tijuana. But the extra measure of affinity is not enough to command his or her energies or resources. A citizen of the world, the management consultant feels no particular bond with any society.

Cosmopolitanism can also engender resignation. Even if the symbolic analyst is sensitive to the problems that plague the world, these dilemmas may seem so intractable and overpowering in their global dimension that any attempt to remedy them appears futile. The greatest enemy of progress is a sense of hopelessness; yet from a vantage point that takes in the full enormity of the world's ills, real progress may seem beyond reach. Within smaller political units like towns, cities, states, and even nations, problems may seem soluble; even tiny improvements can seem large on this smaller scale. As a result, where the nationalist or localist is apt to feel that a sacrifice is both valorous and potentially effective, the cosmopolitan may be overcome by its apparent uselessness.[20]

The reader has only to reflect upon personal experience. Nothing more surely stills reformist zeal than a faithful reading of *The New York Times* or other great newspapers of the world, in which the global dimensions of hunger, disease, racism, environmental depredation, and political injustice are detailed daily. It should not come as a surprise, then, that all great social movements have begun locally. Those who aim to reform the world in one great swoop often have difficulty signing up credulous recruits.

In short, while a cosmopolitan view provides a useful and appropriate perspective on many of the world's problems and avoids the pitfalls of zero-sum thinking, it may discourage the very steps necessary to remedy the problems it illuminates. It is not clear that humanity is significantly better off with an abundance of wise cosmopolitans feeling indifferent or ineffective in the face of the world's ills than it is with a bunch of foolish nationalists intent on making their society Number One.

But must we choose between zero-sum nationalism and impassive cosmopolitanism? Do these two positions describe the only alternative modes of future citizenship? Unfortunately, much of the debate we hear about America's national interest in the global economy is framed in just these dichotomous terms. On one side are zero-sum nationalists, typically representing the views of routine producers and in-person servers, urging that government advance America's economic interests, even at the expense of others around the globe. In their view, unless Americans become more assertive, foreigners will continue to increase their market shares at America's expense in industry after industry—exploiting

[20] Jonathan Glover, "It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It," *Supplemental Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1975.

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American openness, gaining competitive advantage, ultimately robbing Americans of control over their destinies. On the other side are laissez-faire cosmopolitans, usually representing the views of symbolic analysts, arguing that government should simply stay out. In their view, profit-seeking individuals and firms are far better able to decide what gets produced where; governments only mess things up. Free movement of all factors of production across national boundaries ultimately will improve everyone's lot.

What is being lost in this debate is a third, superior position: a positive economic nationalism, in which each nation's citizens take primary responsibility for enhancing the capacities of their countrymen for full and productive lives, but who also work with other nations to ensure that these improvements not come at others' expense. This position is not that of the laissez-faire cosmopolitan, because it rests on a sense of national purpose—of principled historic and cultural connection to a common political endeavor. It seeks to encourage new learning within the nation, to smooth the transition of the labor force from older industries, to educate and train the nation's workers, to improve the nation's infrastructure, and to create international rules of fair play for accomplishing all these things. The sources and objectives of such investments are unambiguously public.

Neither is this the position of a zero-sum nationalist: here the overarching goal is to enhance global welfare rather than to advance one nation's well-being by reducing another's. There is not a fixed amount of world profit to be divided or a limited market to be shared. It is not their corporations against ours in a fight for dominance of world commerce. We meet instead on an infinitely expanding terrain of human skills and knowledge. Human capital, unlike physical or financial capital, has no inherent bounds.

Indeed, these nationalist sentiments are likely to result in greater global wealth than will cosmopolitan sentiments founded upon loyalty to no nation. For like villagers whose diligence in tending to their own gardens results in a bounteous harvest for all, citizens who feel a special obligation to cultivate the talents and abilities of their compatriots end up contributing to the well-being of compatriots and noncompatriots alike. One nation's well-being is enhanced whenever other nations improve the capacities of their own citizens. To extend the metaphor, while each garden tender may feel competitive with every other, each also understands that the success of the total harvest requires cooperation. While each has a primary responsibility to tend his own garden, each has a secondary responsibility to ensure—and a genuine interest in seeing—that all gardens flourish.

Thus positive economic nationalism would eschew trade barriers against any workforce's labors, as well as obstacles to the movement of money and ideas across borders. Even were such obstacles enforceable, they would only serve to reduce the capacity of each nation's work force to enjoy the fruits of investments made in them and in others. But not all government intervention would be avoided. Instead, this approach would encourage public spending within each nation in any manner that enhanced the capacities of its citizens to lead full and productive lives—including pre- and postnatal care, preschool preparation,

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excellent primary and secondary education, access to college regardless of financial condition, training and retraining, and good infrastructure. Such investments would form the core of national economic policy.

Positive nationalism also would tolerate—even invite—public subsidies to firms that undertook within the nation's borders high value-added production (complex design, engineering, fabrication, systems integration, and so forth), so that the subsidy-granting nation's work force could gain sophisticated on-the-job skills. But it would draw no distinctions based on the nationalities of the firm's shareholders or top executives. To ensure against zero-sum ploys in which nations bid against one another to attract the same set of global firms and related technologies, nations would negotiate appropriate levels and targets of such subsidies. The result would be a kind of GATT for direct investment—a logical extension of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that the United States sponsored after World War II—setting out the rules by which nations could bid for high value-added investments by global corporations. Barred would be threats to close the domestic market unless certain investments were undertaken within it, for such threats would likely unravel into zero-sum contests. Instead, the rules would seek to define fair tactics, depending upon the characteristics of the national economy and the type of investment being sought. For example, the amount of permissible subsidy might be directly proportional to the size of the nation's work force but inversely proportional to its average skills. Thus nations with large and relatively unskilled work forces would be allowed greater leeway in bidding for global investment than nations with fewer and more highly-skilled workers.

Other kinds of subsidies would be pooled and parceled out to where they could do the most good, as the European Community has begun to do regionally. For example, nations would jointly fund basic research whose fruits were likely to travel almost immediately across international borders—projects such as the high-energy particle accelerator, the human genome, and the exploration of space. (Single governments are unlikely to support many of such projects on their own, given that the entire world so easily benefits from them.) How such funds were apportioned and toward what ends would of course be subject to negotiation.

Positive economic nationalism also would ease the transition of a work force out of older industries and technologies in which there was worldwide overcapacity. This might take the form of severance payments, relocation assistance, extra training grants, extra unemployment insurance, regional economic aid, and funds for retooling or upgrading machinery toward high value-added production. Since every nation benefits when overcapacity anywhere is reduced, these subsidies might come from a common fund established jointly by all nations. Payments into the fund could be apportioned according to how much of that particular industry's capacity lay within each nation's borders at the start.

Finally, positive economic nationalism would seek to develop the capacities of the work forces of the Third World—not as a means of forestalling world communism or stabilizing Third World regimes so that global companies can

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safely extract raw materials and sell products within them—but as a means of promoting indigenous development and thereby enhancing global wealth. To this end, the shift of high-volume, standardized production to Third World nations would be welcomed; and markets in advanced economies would be open to them. Advanced nations would reduce the Third World's debt burden and make new lending available.

The pressures of global change have fragmented the American electorate. Blue collar and local service workers—tending toward zero-sum nationalism—fear that foreigners, the Japanese in particular, are taking over the nation's assets and secretly influencing American politics. They resent low-wage workers in Southeast Asia and Latin America who are inheriting many of America's routine production jobs and seem to be swarming into American cities. Many symbolic analysts—tending toward laissez-faire cosmopolitanism—feel no particular urgency about the economic plight of other Americans, and feel ineffectual and overwhelmed with regard to many of the larger problems facing the rest of the world.

Neither constituency, in other words, is naturally disposed to positive nationalism. Those who are threatened by global competition feel that they have much to lose and little to gain from an approach that seeks to enhance world wealth, while those who are benefiting the most from the blurring of national borders sense that they have much to lose and little to gain from government intervention intended to spread such benefits.

The direction we are heading is reasonably clear. If the future could be predicted on the basis of trends already underway, laissez-faire cosmopolitanism would become America's dominant economic and social philosophy. Left to unfold on its own, the worldwide division of labor will not only create vast disparities of wealth within nations, but may also reduce the willingness of global winners to do anything to reverse this trend toward inequality—either within the nation or without. Symbolic analysts, who hold most of the cards in this game, could be confident of "victory." But what of the losers?

The forces of history have presented us with a rare moment in which the threat of worldwide conflict seems remote and the transformations of economics and technology are blurring the lines between nations. The 1991 Persian Gulf war is notable for not aggravating global tensions or extending beyond Iraq and Kuwait. The modern nation-state, some 200 years old, is no longer what it once was: vanishing is a nationalism founded upon the practical necessities of economic interdependence within borders and security against foreigners outside. There is thus an opportunity to redefine who we are, why we have joined together, and what we owe each other and the other inhabitants of the world. The choice is ours to make. We are no more slaves to present trends than to vestiges of the past. We can, if we choose, assert that our mutual obligations as citizens extend beyond our economic usefulness to one another and act accordingly.

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

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President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah

ALEXANDER MOENS

The death in 1989 of Iran's leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, put the seal on ten years of profound change. Just over a decade ago Iran turned from a relatively stable American ally into a radical anti-American Islamic republic. Even without Khomeini, Iran seems unlikely to alter its course. It is now difficult to think of Iran as an American strategic strongpoint in the Persian Gulf area, yet until 1979 that vision of Iran was commonplace. Iran has of course received tremendous attention during this past decade. First of all, the Iranian hostage crisis was the high drama that drove the nails into Jimmy Carter's electoral coffin. Then Ronald Reagan skirmished with the Iranians throughout his term, culminating in the self-inflicted and devastating Iran-contra affair.

While the original "loss" of Iran has received lots of attention, a complete picture of the decision-making process is not easily found.[1] Besides Carter administration memoirs, some larger-scope academic books on Iran deal in part with the American handling of the revolution in 1978 and 1979. Usually the findings of these books fall into two categories. Some deal with the crisis in a deterministic fashion, arguing that the shah had made his country thoroughly ripe for revolution by modernizing roughshod over Islamic values and by creating innumerable

[1] Two very thorough accounts exist in Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewis, "Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story," *Washington Quarterly* 3 (Spring 1980); and Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).

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enemies with his security force, SAVAK. Others conclude that the outcome was a classical example of Jimmy Carter's vacillation.

This study focuses on the decision process. It challenges the conventional argument that Carter's process broke down because of intensive policy conflict between National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Instead, it shows that the process itself was badly flawed and can explain, to a large extent, the ambiguous and ineffective American handling of this crisis. While the United States had a major interest in Iran's political stability, as well as considerable influence in Iranian politics, it failed to provide clear guidance for the shah and lost a militarily and economically important ally.

The decision functioned poorly for the following reasons. First, most of Carter's chief advisers agreed too quickly that the shah should concentrate only on liberalizing his regime so as to ease the demonstrations against him. None of the major advisers initially offered a critical look at this consensus. Brzezinski, responsible for an orderly interagency process, was the only one to offer strong dissent. As a result, Carter received lopsided advice on the one hand and procedural manipulation by an isolated security adviser on the other hand. What the two opposing camps did agree on was the need to hang on to the shah—for the liberals to continue reforms, for Brzezinski to crack down on the revolt. This bureaucratic compromise did in fact not constitute a policy and contributed to Carter's inability to make a decision. When the shah eventually did fall, the administration was exposed as having no direction. As much as Carter is to blame, this study shows how the faltering decision-making process provided Carter with a critical lack of help to do a good job.

It would be absurd to suggest that the Iranian revolution could either be made or undone in Washington. Yet American influence in Iran was considerable, which the United States had shown in handling the 1953 Mossadegh crisis. Strategically, Iran was an important regional strong point to the United States, and American industry had a significant interest in Iranian oil. Indeed, American influence in Iran dates back to World War II.[2] In 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union divided the country into two virtual spheres of influence, installing Mohammed Reza, the young son of the recently exiled shah, as the head of a new puppet government. It was this de facto rule by the United Kingdom and the USSR that prompted Iranian leaders to ask for American help in gaining indepen-

[2] The historical information in this article is based on the following sources: Habib Ladjevardi, "The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15 (May 1983): 225–239; Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979); Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Rouhallah K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Christos P. Ioannides, *America's Iran* (New York: University Press of America, 1984); Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Michael A. Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debacle* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981); A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iranian Revolution: Its Origins and Dimensions," *International Studies* 18 (April-June 1979): 129–161.

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dence. During the 1943 Teheran conference, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised the Iranians that he would support their independence as soon as the war was won. He got Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin to agree that all Allied forces would be withdrawn from Iran six months after the Axis powers surrendered. Roosevelt hoped thereby to make Iran an example of great power cooperation.

However, with the dawn of the cold war, Iran became one of the tension points between the United States and the USSR. Soon after the Allied victory, the USSR appeared reluctant to withdraw from Iran. It created "friendly republics" in the north and increased its troops. In response, the United States began to help the Iranian government by sending economic and military aid. Also, it warned the USSR that it intended to guarantee, by force if necessary, Iran's independence. In late 1946, the Soviets finally withdrew.

Soon after, the Iranians asked the United States to mediate in their dispute with the British over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). While the United States put some pressure on the British to compromise, it did not want to challenge them in an area that was traditionally acknowledged as their sphere of influence. The resulting stalemate over the nationalization of oil production gave rise to the radicalization of Iranian politics.

In 1952, the strong nationalist tide in the Majlis, the Iranian parliament, forced the shah to appoint the leader of the National Front coalition, Mohammad Mossadegh, as the new prime minister. Mossadegh, supported by a large popular outcry against British colonialism, attempted to increase his power base. When he demanded full control over the Iranian army, the shah threatened to go into exile. Afraid of a communist takeover, the Eisenhower administration instructed the CIA to support a coup to oust Mossadegh. The coup was quick and bloodless, and it appeared that without a significant outpouring of popular support for the shah, the coup could not have succeeded.

With increased American assistance, the shah now took firm control of the government. As his powers grew and American military and economic advisers began to enter the country, many Iranians believed the British presence had simply been replaced by American influence. Yet American military aid remained quite small during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.[3]

Upon his restoration, the shah set two goals: to develop Iran economically at the fastest pace possible and to transform the country into a regional military giant. He also embarked upon a social and economic development program, which he called the White Revolution. The Shiite leaders, the mullahs, saw the White Revolution as a large-scale import of western values. They resisted the shah's land and social reforms. In 1963, massive riots led by Khomeini were put down violently by the shah and his newly formed intelligence and security agency, SAVAK. Khomeini was exiled and the unrest abated.

The Nixon administration identified Iran as the key state in the region. Now

[3] Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 128.

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the United States was willing to arm Iran at a rapid pace. In fact, the shah received carte blanche to buy whatever he wanted, while the United States saw a large number of its petrodollars return. During this time, American interests in Iran increased greatly. Iran had become a crucial buffer against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Furthermore, it was now America's most important link in the protection of the oilfields of the entire gulf region. The United States helped Iran build a navy to patrol the Persian Gulf. Finally, in the era of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations, Iran became a valuable location for American intelligence gathering concerning Soviet missile testing in Central Russia. This considerable military and economic cooperation depended heavily on the shah. But at the same time, the secular nationalist and Shiite groups opposed the strong links between the United States and Iran.

By the mid-1970s, however, several voices in Washington started to question the good relationship between America and the shah. In spite of having achieved overwhelming military superiority in the gulf region by 1975, the shah did not reduce his program of purchasing American weaponry. Some American critics argued that this superiority was destabilizing, while others feared that sensitive military technology might some day fall into the hands of the Soviets. Also, the shah grew more assertive in his relations with the United States. When questioned about his shopping list for American arms, he threatened to go to the Europeans or even to the Soviets if his demands were not met.

Several critics in the United States became more outspoken about the lack of political reform under the shah and the alleged human rights abuses of SAVAK. In 1975 the shah reduced the parliamentary process to a one-party system, thereby further consolidating his autocratic rule. It is in this context—firm American-Iranian relations based on many shared interests, as well as increasing criticism about this relationship—that Carter assumed the presidency in 1976. The Carter administration had no initiatives on Iran and expected to continue the close strategic relationship established during the previous administrations.[4] Carter agreed with the assessment that Iran was a strategic stronghold in the Middle East, worthy of American support: "I continued, as other Presidents had before me, to consider the shah a strong ally."[5] However, Carter's human rights and arms transfer policies soon became the testing ground of his relations with the shah.

While some analysts have claimed that Carter's human rights policy undermined the rule of the shah, and although the shah himself was uneasy about Carter's election, a careful study of Carter's words and actions concerning this issue shows that he went out of his way to exempt the shah from harsh criticism allotted to strategically less important countries.[6] The administration did not

[4] Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Random House, 1985), 24.

[5] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 435; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 357.

[6] Coral Bell, *President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue* (Canberra: Australian

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formulate an official human rights policy until February 1978. Even then, the policy remained a rather vague directive that could be applied strictly or loosely, depending on the administration's other priorities and interests.[7] Briefly, the policy directive stated that the United States intended to emphasize civil and political rights and that it would consider these factors in the allocation of economic and military aid, as well as in arms sales. Of course, the administration had made several pronouncements on this issue before the promulgation of this directive. However, these were usually directed at the USSR and strategically less important right-wing dictatorships such as Paraguay.[8]

The shah, in effect, had preempted Carter on this issue by announcing several political and judicial reforms that somewhat increased political freedom in Iran. Carter praised the shah publicly for these actions,[9] and exempted the shah from a crucial aspect of his overall human rights policy: in meetings with the shah, Carter emphasized that he did not intend to link human rights to the shah's arms purchases.[10] Ironically, it appears that the opposition forces in Iran initially took courage from Carter's human rights pronouncements.[11] But during his 1977 visit to Iran, Carter praised the shah as an "island of stability" in a troubled region and refused to meet with the opposition group. This put to rest whatever hope they had in him. From then on, the opposition perceived Carter as firmly allied with the shah.[12]

In his presidential election campaign, Carter had promised "significant restraints in arms transfers."[13] In May 1977, he publicly announced his new directive, which stated that the administration intended to make arms sales the exception rather than the rule among its foreign policy tools.[14] Also, the onus was now on those who favored the sale to make their case, rather than on those who opposed it. The United States would no longer be the first to introduce a new weapon system into a region, nor would it develop or produce weapons merely for export. Finally, it would consider the sale of arms in light of the purchaser's human rights record and ability to pursue domestic economic development.[15]

National University, 1982), 52. For the shah's worries, see Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 91; Anthony Parsons, *The Pride and the Fall* (London: Butler and Tanner, 1984), 47.

[7] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 126.

[8] Ibid., 127.

[9] Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 316; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 79; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 23.

[10] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 318; Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 196.

[11] Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, 231; Ioannides, *America's Iran*, 27.

[12] Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, 353; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 437.

[13] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 80.

[14] See Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter's First Years* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 132–133.

[15] For the contents of PD-13 see Sarkesian, *Defense Policy*, 132–133; Roger P. Labrie, et al., *U.S. Arms Sales Policy* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1982). See also Vance, *Hard Choices*, 319.

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Carter also announced that he would sell fewer arms in fiscal year 1978 than in the previous year and that he would personally review major arms sales.[16]

As in the case of human rights, Carter exempted Iran from this policy directive. While Carter did review the arms contracts with Iran and did make public statements indicating his plans to reduce the large volume of purchases, the record shows no substantial changes. In the first two years of his administration, Carter fought a bitter fight with Congress to sell the shah seven Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplanes.[17] In contradiction to his own arms sale directive, the president became the first to introduce this advanced radar system into the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, he approved nearly all the shah's requests for advanced aircraft, tanks, and other matériel. He also agreed to sell Iran several nuclear power plants.[18] Carter's 1978 fiscal year arms sales budget exceeded 1977 by some $4 billion. Arms sales to Iran accounted for a large share of the total.[19]

Besides the strategic importance of Iran to the United States, Carter had other reasons not to alienate the shah, who had offered to support one of Carter's prized projects—a Middle East peace accord. Moreover, the shah was willing to help Carter establish an overall energy policy for the United States by reducing sudden price hikes in crude oil. When Carter asked the shah to moderate an expected OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) price increase in 1978, he indeed seemed instrumental in avoiding a steep price rise.[20]

In spite of the publicly charged debate on human rights, the first two years of the Carter administration show that the president made a considerable effort to have good personal relations with the shah and to seek the shah's cooperation for his own projects. There is ample evidence that Carter did not want the regime of the shah to fall and no evidence that he worked directly with the opposition.[21] Yet the shah's memoirs reveal a very suspicious man, always given to fear another American conspiracy around the corner. But with Carter, the shah's concerns seemed magnified. They grew when Carter, in the eyes of the shah, responded weakly to the war in the Ogaden and the 1978 Soviet-inspired coup in Afghanistan.[22]

Prerevolutionary Iran

In Spring 1978, Iran witnessed massive riots and demonstrations such as had not been seen since the unrest of 1963. The riots were spurred by a mix of economic

[16] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 25.

[17] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 435; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 320.

[18] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 84; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 45; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 317.

[19] Labrie, *US Arms Sales*, 11; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 84.

[20] *Washington Post*, 25 October 1980, 12; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 322.

[21] John D. Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 91. See also James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 1978," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Winter 1978–1979): 338.

[22] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 85, 93, and 95–96.

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dissatisfaction and religious opposition to the shah's social and economic policies.[23] As in 1963, the shah reacted initially by a violent suppression of the rioters. However, fearing American criticism, he also announced further political reforms.[24] This poorly coordinated carrot-and-stick policy came to characterize the shah's response throughout the entire crisis. Unlike the 1963 riots, the shah was now confronted by opposition from both the secular nationalists and the Shiite leaders. The Shiite forces responded to the shah's bloody crackdown with more demonstrations, mourning the victims after a forty-day interval, as their religion prescribed. This led to a self-perpetuating cycle of unrest.[25] The secular forces were less willing to challenge the shah's security forces but were emboldened to keep up their demands, which appeared to produce political concessions.[26]

The Carter administration did not respond to the unrest in Iran until Fall 1978.[27] Several reasons explain this slow response. First, virtually all intelligence reports during Spring and Summer 1978 concluded that the riots did not pose a real challenge to the shah. In August, the CIA reported to Carter that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation."[28] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyses predicted that the shah's rule was stable for at least another decade.[29] The reports from the American embassy in Teheran were equally optimistic.[30] Second, the administration during this time was preoccupied with three of its major policy initiatives: the Camp David peace talks, the normalization of relations with China, and the SALT negotiations. During Summer and Fall 1978, rapid progress on all three issues overtaxed the resources of the decision makers in the administration.[31] Finally, nobody seriously believed that the shah could not deal adequately with the unrest. There were no plans or policy guidances in the administration on what to do if the shah was threatened.[32]

The American embassy in Teheran had long before become cautious about its intelligence gathering among the opposition forces, as the shah had indicated his displeasure with the practice. Also, several sources have claimed that the CIA depended largely on SAVAK analyses of political unrest.[33] Whatever the final

[23] Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 102; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 34.

[24] Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, 48–49. See also Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, 356.

[25] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 34; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 324.

[26] Ioannides, *America's Iran*, 29.

[27] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 357.

[28] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], January 1979). For the quote, see Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 438.

[29] *Washington Post*, 27 October 1980, 12; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 359; Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 209.

[30] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 46.

[31] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 358; David S. McLellan, *Cyrus Vance* (New York: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), 129.

[32] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 42.

[33] William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: Norton, 1981), 144; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 124; Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Iran* report, esp. 1, 2.

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verdict on this will be, many people in government believed the intelligence to have been of poor quality.[34] Therefore, since nobody could conceive of the shah's fall, nobody bothered sounding the alarm, in spite of the worsening situation in Iran. Furthermore, since the shah announced in August that he planned to hold free elections in 1979, most administration officials believed the opposition had already achieved more than it had hoped possible.[35]

In late summer, the American embassy reported that a recent violent clash between demonstrators and police had visibly shaken the shah. Now, according to National Security Council (NSC) Staff Aide Robert Hunter, Brzezinski began to smell some trouble. "In August and September of 1978, Zbig was pressing for better intelligence analyses, for options. He was having to energize the system to produce things. It is hard to foresee crises in areas that have been stable. But Zbig's antennae indicated we had to take a hard look at this."[36] However, besides asking for better information, the administration did not really initiate a comprehensive look at the Iranian issue. Instead, Vance and Brzezinski merely recommended to Carter that he phone the shah to express his support. On 10 September, Carter did so and "wished the Shah the best in resolving these problems and in being successful in his efforts to implement reforms."[37] The shah responded by imposing martial law in certain areas of the country and releasing several political prisoners. Again, the mixed response did little to stop the unrest.[38] Throughout early October, Carter both privately and publicly repeated his message of support for the shah.[39] Meanwhile, the administration did nothing to initiate a policy debate on how it should deal with the situation.

To make matters worse, administration officials were receiving contradictory reports on how the shah was coping personally with the crisis. American embassy reports, as well as personal accounts of visitors to Iran, pictured the shah as alternately highly confident and optimistic, or depressed and out of control. Unknown at the time, these mood swings of the shah may have been caused by the treatment he was receiving for lymphoma.[40]

On 24 October, the Department of State produced the first memorandum on how the United States should deal with the crisis.[41] It argued that the shah was in for a very challenging period unless he moved rapidly toward political reforms. It also proposed that the United States should be steadfast in its opposition to a military takeover in Iran. Finally, it recommended that the United States step

[34] Author's interview with David Newsom, under secretary of state, 12 September 1989.

[35] Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1985), 187–188; Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 108.

[36] Author's interview with Robert Hunter, 11 September 1989.

[37] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 438; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 326; Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 118.

[38] Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 119.

[39] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 346.

[40] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 361, 362; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 146; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 155.

[41] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 59; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 328.

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up its contacts with the opposition forces, including the mullahs led by Khomeini. The memo was sent to the NSC as well as to Ambassador William H. Sullivan. Sullivan agreed with all its points, except the recommendation for increased contacts with the opposition. He concluded: "Our destiny is to work with the Shah, who is prepared to accept a truly democratic regime if it is achieved responsibly."[42] Brzezinski did not believe that additional concessions by the shah would improve the situation. Instead of calling a meeting to discuss the memo or sending the memo to Carter, he shelved it permanently. Sick reports that "Carter never saw it" and observed: "Strange as it may seem, by the end of October, there still had not been a single high-level policy meeting in Washington on this subject."[43]

Unexpectedly, Sullivan dropped the bombshell that set the decision-making process in full motion. On 2 November he sent a cable asking for instructions within forty-eight hours.[44] The cable came as a shock to the administration, as it stated that the shah was thinking about stepping down and forming a civilian coalition or military government in his place. The shah wanted to know what the United States wanted him to do. After briefing Carter on the cable, Brzezinski called an emergency Special Coordination Committee (SCC) meeting.

Besides Brzezinski, Warren Christopher (deputy secretary of state), Harold Brown, (secretary of defense) General David Jones (chairman Joint Chiefs of staff, General George Brown's successor), Stansfield Turner (director CIA), David Aaron (deputy director NSC), and Gary Sick attended the meeting.[45] Vance was too busy with the Middle East negotiations to attend. Brzezinski opened the meeting by stating that the United States should send a message of full support for the shah, urging him to stay on. Furthermore, the United States should indicate that further liberalization efforts should be postponed until "decisive action to restore order" had been undertaken. Brzezinski did not believe that a civilian coalition government under the shah would help. He added that the Iranian ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, agreed with his analysis. Christopher, supported by Turner, responded that Zahedi could not be trusted as an objective observer of Iranian politics, since he was closely associated with the shah.[46] However, Christopher agreed that the United States should indicate its support for the shah and that Vance shared this belief. But he believed that the shah could best enhance his position by further political reforms, even a civilian coalition government under him, which could include members from the opposition. Aaron added that the United States should be careful not to give the shah the impression that it favored liberalizations over his rule. Brown commented that if the shah opted for a military government, the United States should encourage him to form such a government under him, and not without him.

[42] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 362; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 439.

[43] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 60.

[44] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 362; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 63.

[45] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 363–364; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 67–68; Herman Nickel, "The U.S. Failure in Iran," *Fortune*, 12 March 1979, 99–106.

[46] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

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Brzezinski continued to probe the other participants for a message that would give the shah the green light to crack down on the opposition and restore order by force. Brzezinski was the earliest and at that time only advocate of force.[47] All the other advisers were opposed and believed the United States should send a message indicating preference for a civilian government. The meeting ended with the decision to write up a message that constituted a compromise between Brzezinski's option and that of the others. In four points, it stated American support for the shah, recognition for decisive action to restore order, agreement with either a civilian or military government under the shah, and, finally, the hope that liberalization efforts would continue.[48] Carter, who was busy with other issues, approved the vague statement the same day.

Dissatisfied with what he perceived to be a weak message, Brzezinski obtained Carter's approval to reiterate the message in a phone call to the shah the next day. During this conversation, he tried subtly to tilt the American position towards support for military action to stop the unrest. In pursuit of this objective, Brzezinski promises the shah that "the U.S. would back him to the hilt."[49] The shah correctly perceived this message as a preference for military action. However, the next day, when he asked Sullivan for a confirmation of the message, Sullivan responded that he had no instructions to recommend that course of action to the shah.[50] Moreover, in a press conference on 3 November, Vance indicated that the United States considered further political liberalization just as important as the restoration of order. Also, it hoped such a restoration could occur without widespread bloodshed.[51]

These various messages left the shah baffled. As a result, he continued his unsynchronized policy of some liberalization and some crackdowns, even though it had proven unsuccessful. On 6 November, he appointed a military government. Yet half of its members were civilian, and it actually reduced the amount of violence used to restore order. Moreover, it announced more reforms, including the release of prominent political prisoners. In addition, the shah had several well-known corrupt officials, including the head of SAVAK, arrested.

The remainder of November saw a partial return of calm to the country. However, it was feared that the Shiite holy month that covered most of December would bring new unrest. Now fully alert to the Iranian situation, Brzezinski ordered a new CIA analysis. As the opposition forces slowly perceived that the

[47] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 12 May 1989; author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[48] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 329; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 364; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 159.

[49] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 365; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 72; Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, 91; *Newsweek*, 28 April 1980, 24; Ledeen and Lewis, "The Inside Story," 22.

[50] M. Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), 165; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 191–192; Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, 91.

[51] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 73; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 329.

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military government was not going to crack down violently, they gathered forces for another round.[52]

Weighing the Options

Up to this point, the debate in Washington was confined to one question: how can we strengthen the rule of the shah? Nobody had yet thought, or at least not openly expressed another: what can we do if the shah falls? The debate on how to strengthen the shah centered on two different options and perspectives. Brzezinski argued that American interest in the rule of the shah was so great that the United States could not risk undermining him. Christopher and Vance believed that more importantly the United States had the responsibility to promote democratic values. Brzezinski also disagreed with Vance, Turner, and Vice President Walter Mondale on how to deal with massive uprisings in general. Brzezinski believed that revolutions were only won because of tactical errors or concessions by the ruling elite. Therefore, he recommended that the shah stop his carrot-and-stick policy and crack down on the opposition. The others, however, believed that the unrest was caused by the shah's excessive power and that he could only disarm or defuse the rebels by implementing large-scale political reforms.

Finally, Brzezinski disagreed with the others on the extent to which the United States should become involved in the crisis. Vance, Christopher, and Mondale all believed that the United States could not assume the responsibility for a bloodbath in Iran. Brzezinski, however, argued that since the shah appeared so weak, the United States "had no choice but . . . to make the decision for him."[53] Carter was personally much closer to the Vance group than to Brzezinski. Yet he also wanted the shah to survive. In essence, Carter was faced with a difficult set of contradictions. Carter's was a moral presidency if nothing else. A bloody and forceful use of foreign and military policy to further American interests was repugnant to Carter. In fact, the only time he resorted to this was during the desperate and failed rescue attempt of the American hostages in Teheran. We know that Vance opposed such use of force on principle and that many of his assistant secretaries agreed with him.[54] Yet Carter could not afford to lose the shah. Moreover, he knew that the shah might be looking for strong directions from the United States, as he had done in 1953.[55]

What the decision process failed to do during the initial stage was to address these contradictions. Sick notes, "Whatever the reasons, Carter did not engage himself actively in the day-to-day policy-making during the Iran crisis in the same way that he did in many other policy issues."[56] Carter, notes Sick, had his heart

[52] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 367; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 80.

[53] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 397; Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 290.

[54] Jerel Rosati, *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 112, 113.

[55] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.

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in the Camp David talks at the time. As a result, the debates were not settled and no clear positions were formulated. Carter must carry some responsibility for this failure. But fundamentally it falls to his advisers, especially the national security adviser, to put pressure on the president to face the difficult question involved in any issue.

It is the national security adviser's task to identify policy issues that require the administration's attention. Although Brzezinski was hampered in this task by poor intelligence reporting and an overloaded agenda, he was also reluctant to raise the issue, fearing that it would lead to an American response that would undermine the shah. A major piece of evidence for this failure is the way in which Brzezinski treated the 24 October memorandum from the State Department. Rather than use the document as a basis for debate within the administration, he played down its message. He failed to give all reasonable options a fair hearing, and he failed to elevate the substantial disagreement between the advisers and himself to the president.

By refusing to circulate or discuss the memo, perhaps just confining it to the Friday foreign policy breakfasts, Brzezinski prevented the administration from having an open debate on the crisis at the earliest available time.[57] Forced to act by Sullivan's cable of 2 November, Brzezinski called an SCC meeting at last. During the meeting, he was alone in advocating a military crackdown to restore order in Iran. While his option could have improved the decision-making process had Carter been involved in the debate, Brzezinski made no effort to elevate the conflict to his attention.

Furthermore, Brzezinski more often than the others relied on information that was seriously suspect. Zahedi did not have a reputation for objective reporting on events in Iran. Indeed, Harold Brown characterized Brzezinski's independent channels as "behind-the-scenes activities."[58] Unfortunately for the decision process, separate information sources do not enhance good policy discussions but instead lead to distrust.

Partly because of Brzezinski's maneuvering, a clear policy choice was never made. Instead, a compromise was forged that resulted in an ambiguous and confusing message to the shah. To make matters worse, Brzezinski engaged personally in the implementation of policy by phoning the shah. The phone call was, to be sure, authorized by Carter, but was nevertheless an attempt by Brzezinski to emphasize his preferred version of the otherwise clumsy message delivered to Iran. It was not customary for Brzezinski to execute policy personally. Surely Carter and Brzezinski's frustration with Sullivan must have contributed to Brzezinski's attempt to execute policy. Brzezinski remembered that Carter was unhappy about the "misstatements and rather ambivalent behavior of our

[56] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 173. See also Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 439.
[57] See *Washington Post*, 7 November 1978, 16; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 366.
[58] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.

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ambassador there."[59] However, his stake in policy put additional pressure on his evenhandedness as process manager. When the national security adviser attempts personally to run the various agencies or personally relays the president's will to foreign officials, he is likely to compromise his own ability to process information fairly and is prone to discredit or block other officials in their attempt to implement policy.[60]

The Fall of the Shah

On 9 November, Sullivan sent a cable titled "Thinking the Unthinkable," which called for a change in the debate in the administration from how to support the shah to what the United States could do if the shah fell. The manner in which Sullivan worded his arguments further widened the gap between the White House and the American ambassador, as David Newsom recalls:

> Then he [Sullivan] came in with his blockbuster telegram which infuriated the President and Brzezinski. Brzezinski took the position that if Bill Sullivan felt the situation was so bad why had he not said so before—well he had, but Brzezinski was not prepared to listen to it. My sympathies obviously are with Bill. If he made a mistake, it was in losing his cool with the White House. We tried to stop that telegram from getting to the White House, but it went automatically. There was an automatic distribution. Bill may have sent it in the channel in which he wanted it to reach the White House. It said something like, "If the President had only listened to me, he would not be in the mess he is in now."[61]

Sullivan reported that support for the shah in Iran was eroding quickly. Instead of merely stating its support for the shah, the United States should improve its contacts with the moderate nationalist opposition. Sullivan believed that these moderates could govern if the Khomeini forces were allowed to play a constructive role in Iran as well. He believed that the junior officers in the army would accept Khomeini as a symbolic figurehead in an Islamic republic. Moreover, such a republic, if governed by the moderate nationalists, would not be hostile to the United States. Though he did not state it explicitly, Sullivan wanted the United States to ease the shah out of office.

However, none of Carter's senior advisers agreed with Sullivan.[62] Though Vance favored the idea of more contacts with the moderate opposition, he agreed with Brzezinski, Mondale, and Brown that Carter should not undermine the shah's rule by contacting Khomeini, Harold Brown reasoned:

> My position was that yes, we ought to support the shah insofar as he was willing to be tough. I did not take as strong a position on that as either Brzezinski or [Energy Secretary

[59] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 12 May 1989.

[60] David K. Hall, "Implementing Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council: 1947–1980" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1982), 717–720, 724.

[61] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[62] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 86; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 204; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 330.

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> James] Schlesinger. On the other hand, I was not prepared . . . just to let things play themselves out: let us stand back, let the shah be overthrown, and hope whoever came after would not be too mean to us.[63]

Unlike Sullivan, these Washington officials thought the shah still had an important role to play. As a result, Carter rejected Sullivan's advice, stating that "the key to stability was the monarch himself supported by the military."[64] Again, Brzezinski urged Carter to tell the shah to use the military to restore order, but as Brzezinski himself noted: "Carter became skeptical when I painted a grim picture of the strategic consequences for us of Iran's and the Shah's tragedy."[65]

Also, fearing that Sullivan wanted personally to see the end of the shah's rule, Brzezinski increased his private contacts with Zahedi, who in turn urged Brzezinski to convince Carter of the need for military action.[66] All in all, Sullivan had completely failed to change the topic to a post-shah, post-revolution Iran and how the United States should prepare to safeguard its interests in the longer term.

However, as the riots increased in early December, the administration did not offer any alternatives to Sullivan's option. Meanwhile, Khomeini, from his exile in Paris, urged his followers to sacrifice themselves in their protest against the shah. Massive riots and a general strike ensued. The moderate forces, now gauging Khomeini's strength, distanced themselves from any coalition government proposal from the shah. The shah responded by jailing several of their leaders and releasing them again as their imprisonment caused further riots.[67] Throughout all this, the American administration was losing time to influence the events. Sullivan complained that: "We drifted through the remainder of November into December with no guidance from the Department of State or Washington in general."[68]

In the last week of November, Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal visited the shah. Upon his return, he told the administration that the shah looked desperate and needed American help.[69] Brzezinski agreed with Blumenthal's suggestion that an outside adviser should come in to do an independent study of the crisis. The administration selected George Ball, a senior Department of State official during the Kennedy years.[70]

During Ball's study, Carter made a public slip of the tongue that made the

[63] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.
[64] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 440.
[65] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 382.
[66] Ibid., 370; Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 214; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 193.
[67] Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 115–118; Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 290.
[68] Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 204.
[69] Ledeen and Lewis, "The Inside Story," 6.
[70] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 330; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 160; George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 461–475.

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situation considerably worse. On 7 December during a breakfast meeting with reporters, Carter responded to a question concerning whether he thought the shah could survive by saying:

> I don't know, I hope so. It is in the hands of the Iranian people. The U.S. has no intention to intercede in the internal affairs of Iran. . . . We primarily want an absence of violence and bloodshed. We personally prefer that the Shah maintain a major role in the government, but that is a decision for the Iranian people to make.[71]

Several officials winced at this mishap. Sick reports that it was perceived in Iran as a decision by Carter "to dump the shah," even though Carter had not made such a decision.[72] In fact, Carter's real policy sought in various ways to maintain the shah's rule.

On 13 December, an SCC meeting was convened to discuss the results of Ball's report.[73] Ball stated that he thought the shah was damaged beyond repair. He proposed that the shah assume immediately the lesser role of a constitutional monarch, as prescribed by the 1906 constitution, while handing over power to a council of notables. This council should be composed of a cross-section of Iranian politicians and could rule until the 1979 elections. By all means, the shah should be discouraged from using military force to consolidate his position. Vance agreed with this analysis and indicated his strong support for a political solution to the crisis.[74] Brzezinski, supported by a CIA report of 30 November, argued that the moderate forces were too weak to rule the country.[75] Though Ball believed that the army was not capable of governing, Brzezinski, supported by Schlesinger, argued in favor of a military government. Brzezinski cited the stable military regimes of Turkey and Brazil as evidence for his argument. Brown took a middle position, arguing merely that the military was becoming the most important factor in the Iranian political system.

After the meeting, Brzezinski prepared a memorandum for Carter that summarized the options and the discussion. The next day, Ball met with Carter and Brzezinski to discuss his proposal. Now sorry that he had invited Ball, Brzezinski argued strongly against Ball's proposal. Carter liked the idea but was reluctant to accept any proposal that might indicate that he did not support the shah. Instead, he instructed Vance to have Sullivan mention Ball's suggestion to the shah and ask for his opinion. During the meeting, Brzezinski also mentioned to Carter that either he or Schlesinger should go to Iran to boost the shah's confidence. To Brzezinski's chagrin, Ball was able to convince Carter that such a visit would be a blatant sign of American interference and would only provoke more unrest. Ball also informed Vance that Brzezinski, via Ambassador Zahedi, who

[71] As quoted in Sick, *All Fall Down*, 110; *Time*, 5 February 1979, 9.
[72] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 164.
[73] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 114–116; Ball, *The Past*, 459-460; *Washington Post*, 28 October 1980, 10.
[74] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 330.
[75] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 115; *Washington Post*, 28 October 1980, 10.

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had recently returned to Iran to advise the shah, was putting pressure on the shah to crack down on the rioters. He also advised Vance to become more involved in the decision-making process, since Brzezinski was presenting the survivability of the shah in overly optimistic terms. Moreover, Ball believed that Brzezinski was not giving several advocates in the Department of State a fair hearing for their options.[76]

Sullivan discussed the Council of Notables concept with the shah but found him unenthusiastic. In fact, Sullivan himself did not think it was a good idea, since most of these notables were hardly on speaking terms. Instead, the shah told Sullivan that he considered forming a civilian government composed of National Front leaders, while he would only maintain control over the military. Yet before doing so, he wanted a clearer indication of what the United States wanted him to do.[77]

During this time, Henry Precht (Department of State desk officer for Iran) proposed another option to Brzezinski.[78] In a personal meeting, Precht complained that he had tried to put his option forward since late October. However, the interagency process had failed to give him a chance. He was now prepared to put his job on the line, simply to be heard. He argued that the United States should immediately remove the shah from the throne. Moreover, it should not waste its time with civilian governments composed of National Front leaders, since this group had no longer any real power. Instead, the United States should seek a modus vivendi with the Khomeini forces. Precht believed that Khomeini would prove to be a moderate with whom the United States could work. Precht saw the American role now as "finding a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount of credit in doing so."[79] Sick was more skeptical about the moderate nature of a future government under Khomeini, but agreed with Precht that the time had come to abandon the shah. Brzezinski denies that these overt calls for abandoning the shah were made:

> I had Precht come over to my office to lay out the case, but he did not do it directly. The people who were against the Shah tended to plead for democracy, for transitions, for interim arrangements, but they never explicitly said, "You've got to get rid of the Shah because he is untenable."[80]

Nevertheless, Brzezinski was not impressed with Precht's argument. Again, he refused to treat a proposal as a discussion paper within the administration.[81] David Newsom notes that Brzezinski put Precht outside the very process: "Henry

[76] Ball, *The Past*, 458, 462; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 328; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 193; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 162.

[77] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 118.

[78] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 119–121; *Washington Post*, 29 October 1980, 20; *Newsweek*, 28 April 1980, 25.

[79] Rubin, *Secrets of State*, 190.

[80] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinksi, 12 May 1989.

[81] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 122.

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Precht, who was trying to bring home the reality of the events in Iran, was subsequently excluded from SCC meetings by Brzezinski."[82]

Frustrated by the lack of American initiative, the shah proposed three possible options to Sullivan.[83] He could continue to try forming a coalition government with the National Front. He could appoint a government similar to that proposed by Ball. Last, he could order his military to crack down. The last option he called the "Iron Fist." Furthermore, the shah wondered whether the United States wanted him to step aside or even leave the country. On 26 December, Sullivan informed Washington of the shah's proposed solutions. Sullivan added that the shah was reluctant to try the Iron Fist unless he could be assured of complete American backing.[84]

On 28 December, Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, Turner, and Schlesinger met to discuss the shah's proposals.[85] Vance, with Turner's support, argued that the United States should state its firm opposition to the Iron Fist. While the shah's departure per se would be no solution, he must try a coalition government. Vance reasoned that the army was no longer able to restore order and that it would probably break up if it tried to do so. Brzezinski and Schlesinger disagreed. They believed that there should be no contacts with the opposition, and that the shah should be free to decide his course, including the Iron Fist solution. In this meeting, Schlesinger was as forceful an advocate for the Iron Fist option as Brzezinski.

With Carter at Camp David and the advisers not able to resolve their differences, they agreed to write up a compromise message to Sullivan. Brzezinski again tried his best to make the message subtle enough to allow the shah to employ the Iron Fist option. The message stated that the United States preferred a coalition government. However, it went on to say that if there was uncertainty about the underlying orientation of such a government or its capacity to govern, or if the army was in danger of becoming more fragmented, "then a firm military government under the Shah may be unavoidable."[86] Vance took the message to Camp David for Carter's approval. This time it was his turn for an end-run on the president. Carter, at Vance's urging, changed the language so that the shah would not apply his Iron Fist option. Instead of recommending a "firm military government," the message now advised "a government which would end disorder, violence and bloodshed." Vance was satisfied that this message was less ambiguous: "The Shah could not fail to see from this message that we would support a military government only to end bloodshed, but not to apply the Iron Fist to

[82] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[83] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 331.

[84] Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 290; Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, 150; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 193.

[85] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 332; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 375; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 125–126.

[86] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 332.

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retain his throne."[87] The message further noted that if the shah did not think either option feasible, he could form a regency council government, similar to that of Ball's proposal.

The shah, however, failed to see any guidance in the message. On 29 December the shah asked again whether he should leave. Sullivan told him that he had no instructions on that question, but he was sure the shah would be welcome in the United States.[88] The same day, the shah announced that he had asked a prominent National Front leader, Shapour Bakhtiar, to form a civilian government. He also indicated that he might leave the country for a "vacation."[89]

Bakhtiar accepted the shah's offer on 2 January 1979. At the same time, the other National Front leaders broke with him and joined the Khomeini camp. Khomeini reacted to the news by attacking Bakhtiar as vehemently as he had attacked the shah. As a result, January saw only more riots and strikes. On 2 January, Sullivan sent another cable to Washington.[90] He reported that while the shah had appointed Bakhtiar, he intended to keep significant powers himself. Moreover, the shah was trying to stall his departure. Sullivan believed that if the shah failed to leave, the military might try by means of a coup d'etat to reinstate him. Also, as long as the shah stayed in the country, the Bakhtiar government would not receive any credibility in Iran. Sullivan concluded by adding that in his opinion the Bakhtiar government had not much chance of surviving. Therefore, the United States should open contacts with Khomeini.

Throughout this time, Brzezinski continued to give Carter a more optimistic assessment of the shah's situation than did Vance. It seemed as though Brzezinski was prodding the shah to implement his Iron Fist option.[91] Meanwhile, Sullivan became increasingly frustrated with the unwillingness on the part of the administration (read Brzezinski) to ease the shah out. At one time, he complained to Newsom on the secure phone, though quite sure that White House operators were listening: "Damn it, do you have to speak Polish to get the message across?"[92]

On 3 January, a full National Security Council meeting considered the questions raised by Sullivan.[93] Carter asked his advisers whether he should tell the shah to leave. Vance thought so. The United States should now help consolidate the Bakhtiar government and tell the shah to step aside. Certainly it should not give the military the impression that it could stage a military coup with American blessing. Brzezinski did not think that the United States should tell the shah to

[87] Ibid., 333. See also *Washington Post*, 29 October 1980, 20; Sick, *All Fall Down*. 126.

[88] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 126.

[89] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 376; Parsons, *Pride and Fall*, 121; Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 238.

[90] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 334; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 443; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 131.

[91] Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 295; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 162; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 178; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 360.

[92] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[93] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 376–377; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 335.

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leave. Carter stated that he would phrase the request so as to make it appear an American concurrence in a decision made solely by the shah. Brzezinski noted that such a statement might not be very credible to the Iranians, especially to those who counted on American support. However, Carter had made up his mind. He decided that the Bakhtiar government might have a better chance if the shah left the country, even though Sullivan had warned that the Khomeini forces did not support Bakhtiar. However, Carter "thought there was a chance for their relationship to improve."[94]

Next, the Department of Defense official present (Charles Duncan) recommended that the United States send a top military official to Teheran to provide support for the Iranian military. Brzezinski supported this move. It was agreed that General Robert Huyser (deputy to American NATO Commander Alexander Haig) would go. His instructions were in the form of three prioritized items. First, he was to assure military support for the Bakhtiar government. Second, he was to assure that the military remained united. Last, in case the civilian government collapsed and widespread civil disorder followed, he should help the military restore order.[95]

In the following days Bakhtiar took over the reins of power, Huyser went to Iran, and the shah stated that he would leave on 16 January.[96] It soon became clear, however, that the NSC meeting of 3 January had not resolved all differences within the administration. Throughout January, while the State Department's Hodding Carter kept carefully articulating, "We continue to support the shah," three divisive issues impeded the administration in its attempt to manage the crisis in Iran.

First, Sullivan kept pressing Washington to start talking with Khomeini. Vance backed Sullivan on this point, but Brzezinski warned Carter that this step would undermine the Bakhtiar government.[97] Carter first sided with Brzezinski but in the middle of January authorized the American embassy in Paris to start indirect talks with Khomeini. The talks never led to any agreement. Sullivan replied to Carter's decision with open criticism. This in turn made Carter wonder if Sullivan was supporting the Bakhtiar government adequately. It was even reported in Washington that Sullivan had already established contacts with Khomeini's assistants, without Carter's approval. At one point, Carter considered firing Sullivan. However, Vance was able to persuade him that such a move would only weaken American influence in Iran.[98]

[94] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 443.

[95] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 139; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 229; *Newsweek*, 28 April 1980, 25; *Washington Post*, 11 January 1979, 21; *Time*, 12 February 1979, 34.

[96] Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 118; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 445; *Time*, 15 January 1979, 22-25.

[97] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 337; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 381; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 443; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 233; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 133.

[98] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 446; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 214; Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 168; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 140.

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Second, Brzezinski and Schlesinger interpreted Huyser's mission differently than did the other advisers.[99] Since the unrest in Iran only increased, Brzezinski believed that the time had come to implement Huyser's third instruction: to restore order by military force. When rumors arose that several generals might forcefully prevent the shah's departure, Brzezinski urged Carter to implement Huyser's final option. However, Carter would have none of it. On 18 January, Brzezinski made a final attempt in a long private memorandum to Carter.[100] Again, Carter refused. Like Sullivan's independent actions, Brzezinski's persistence in advocating a military coup eroded the president's confidence in him: "I suspected that my urging of a coup . . . was undermining my credibility with the president, who found my advocacy of a coup morally troublesome as well as irritating."[101]

Third, Huyser, upon his arrival in Teheran, had set up an independent communications channel with the Department of Defense. His analysis of the events in Iran differed substantially from Sullivan's reports to the Department of State.[102] As Brown recalls: "There was a lot of argument about who was going to communicate with whom in Teheran. This business of sending Huyser created two channels with Huyser and Sullivan both. I was on the phone every day with Huyser. Vance was with Sullivan. They gave conflicting advice."[103] While Sullivan reported that the Bakhtiar government was losing control and that the army was rapidly disintegrating, Huyser believed the military was still influential and should continue to support Bakhtiar. These conflicting reports reduced further the administration's ability to influence the course of events in Iran. In fact, the decision process was in shambles at this time.[104] Moreover, Vance, aware of Brzezinski's contacts with Zahedi and advocacy for a military coup, instructed Sullivan to discard any "unauthorized communications."[105] Again Brown: "By this time the personal relations between Vance and Brzezinski were bad enough so that that contributed to the distortion of the process."[106]

Toward the end of January, events in Iran overran the administration's ability to keep up with them, let alone influence them. On 1 February, Khomeini returned to Iran and set up an alternative government. The subsequent stand-off lasted until 11 February, when the army command ordered its troops back into the barracks and Bakhtiar fled the country. Carter supported the Bakhtiar govern-

[99] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 379; *Newsweek*, 28 April 1980, 24; *New Republic*, 3 February 1979, 12.

[100] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 385.

[101] Ibid., 382.

[102] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 145; Sullivan, *Mission in Iran*, 239; Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, 247.

[103] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.

[104] Ramazani, *United States and Iran*, 139.

[105] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 338.

[106] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.

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ment publicly until 5 February. From then on, the Americans concentrated on the evacuation of their citizens and the protection of the embassy and other facilities. The revolution was completed. At a final SCC meeting on 11 February, most participants realized that the United States had lost control of the situation. Meanwhile, Huyser, fearing for his safety, had left Iran.[107]

Assessing the Options and Outcome

Some analysts have argued that the events in Iran could not have been influenced by the shah or anybody else, because the revolution was inevitable.[108] Jerold D. Green, for example, applies the development gap thesis of Samuel P. Huntington to the crisis: since the shah allowed only economic and social development and thwarted all political development, an inevitable gap of expectations caused political decay. The shah's economic and social reforms had alienated nearly all strata of the population. The shah was simultaneously faced with an Islamic revolt against western-style modernization, a nationalist revolt against American influence in Iran, a social revolt against his economic programs, and a political revolt against his monarchical dictatorship. However, the administration could not easily have seen the overall picture and did not have the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, as Harold Brown recalls, nobody in government in Fall 1978 saw the fall of the shah as inevitable. Instead, as David Newsom suggested, when one sees a friendly regime slipping, all one can do is go down the list of options, trying to salvage as much as possible.[109]

Actually, the administration considered only a few alternative options. The first option, initially favored by Sullivan and most of Carter's senior advisers, advocated extensive political reforms and liberalizations to appease the shah's opponents. Eventually, the proposal of a civilian government with or without the shah was added when the political reforms did not quell the unrest. Ball's council of notables was a variation on the same theme. The second option, initially favored by Brzezinski and later supported by Schlesinger, Jordan, and Powell, called for an end to political reforms and suggested a violent military crackdown to stop the revolt.[110] Harold Brown became more sympathetic toward Brzezinski's line of argument as time went on, but he had less confidence that the Iranian army could actually stop the unrest. Brzezinski never suffered from these doubts.

[107] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 341; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 450; Sick, *All Fall Down*, 154–155.

[108] Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981); Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions*, chap. 9; Jerold D. Green, *Revolution in Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1982). See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Decay," *World Politics* 27 (April 1965): 386–430.

[109] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989; author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[110] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 1989.

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Right up to the last weeks, he insisted that a well-trained army of 300,000 should be able to quell a rebellion.[111]

Carter as well as Vance and Mondale rejected the Iron Fist option. Brzezinski notes that they felt "that the U.S.—and notably the President himself—should not assume the responsibility for plunging another country into a bloody and cruel confrontation."[112] Although Carter favored the first option, he never accepted it fully either. Instead, he preferred political reforms only as long as they did not undermine the shah's position. Moreover, he complicated his position further by asking the shah for political reforms while simultaneously indicating that he did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. Thus Carter signaled to the shah that he wanted more reforms but did not want to tell the shah what to do.

Henry Precht, as well as Ambassador Sullivan toward the end of the crisis, advocated a third option—drop the shah at once and begin relations with Khomeini. To some extent, dropping the shah was as difficult for Carter as sending in the Iranian troops. The main attempt by the State Department to send an emissary to meet with Khomeini in Paris ran into heavy resistance from Brzezinski. Partly because of this resistance—Brzezinski undoubtedly urged Carter not to accept this proposal—and partly because Brzezinski kept this line of thought out of the SCC deliberations, it never received appropriate evaluation in the decision process. Toward the latter stages of the crisis, when the departure of the shah was imminent, the first option began to resemble Precht's option. However, the advocates of the first option remained reluctant to see Carter actively push the shah out. Ball mainly focused on the nature of the reforms needed and did not perceive the strength of the Khomeini forces. In the end, Ball did not offer any real alternative advice.

All of the advisers in favor of the first option found it difficult to tell the president outright to drop his support for the shah, if indeed they wanted that. Brzezinski, while he disagreed completely with their calls for reform, at least agreed with the notion of supporting the shah. From the beginning, the compromises between Brzezinski and Vance and others were exactly based on this shared goal of maintaining the shah. Unfortunately for Carter, his advisers agreed only on the means, not the end. Vance and Ball held on to the shah to achieve stable reforms, while Brzezinski held on to get him to call in the army. Neither side got its way, and Carter was left without a policy.

Toward the end of the crisis, the rapid pace of developments in Iran deprived the United States of any real ability to steer the direction of events. Also, it seemed Washington had lost sight of its objectives. For instance, many in Iran saw the eventual American concurrence with the shah's departure as a useful conciliatory move. Yet, the abrupt "replacement" of the shah by General Huyser completely undermined the gesture of goodwill. Also, Carter gave Huyser—

[111] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[112] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 396; see also Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, 255.

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reflecting the division within his camp and perhaps in his own mind—a vague outline for military intervention, which he would never consider anyway.

If we leave aside the chaos of the last month or so, what can be said about the feasibility of Carter's options? Early on in the crisis, it became evident that the shah's reforms did not satisfy his opponents. His concessions were perceived as signs of weakness and served only to fuel the revolutionary forces. Meanwhile, the shah's position continued to weaken. Also, since the Shiite forces, beginning in late Fall 1978, demanded the complete overthrow of the shah, the administration should have realized that it should think about contingency plans just in case the reforms would be too little too late. Moreover, since Carter did not want political reforms at the risk of losing the shah, his policy was clearly counterproductive. Concessions may have worked before the unrest. However, at that time Carter was more interested in close cooperation with the shah than in pushing reforms. Brzezinski, who argued that revolutions only succeed when the ruling elites start making concessions, may have been correct up to this point.

Carter made his policy even more ineffective by not strongly responding to the shah's calls for guidance. However, this was no easy task. In his communications with Washington, the shah often appeared to seek guidance. Yet his emphatic expressions for support and guidance often coexisted with his overt suspicion of Washington. It was thus often difficult from the policy maker's point of view to gauge the shah's real thoughts. Indeed, the shah interpreted the absence of American instructions as evidence of a lack of support.[113] It appears that the administration did not read the shah well. Harold Brown said: "He [the shah] turned out to be a lot weaker than we thought. He'd been rescued in 1953 essentially without doing anything. And I think maybe he was looking for that again. But 1978–9 was not 1953. He may not have realized that. But we knew it."[114]

If the Americans had wanted to guide the shah more clearly, could the Iron Fist option have worked? The shah had a large army that was well equipped and was roughly half nonconscript. Moreover, the army's command was fiercely loyal to the shah and remained united well into December. However, the army was not well prepared to stop a civilian challenge. Instead, it was trained and armed to fight foreign wars. Worse yet, the command of the army had been monopolized to such an extent by the shah himself that it was incapable of acting without him. Harold Brown said:

> What always kept me from urging strong military action, either supported by or even involving the U.S. was the sign of weakness in the Iranian military. Now to a large extent this may've been the Shah's own fault. I remember one conversation with him. He wanted a command and control system. So I explained how our command and control system worked, with the unified and specified commanders. . . . No, no; he did

[113] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 34; Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, 170; Ledeen and Lewis, "The Inside Story," 25.

[114] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989.

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not want that. He wanted personal control, which meant that none of the senior military people was willing or able to take strong action in the absence of strong action from the Shah.[115]

Nevertheless, some have argued that until the end of October the army could have put down the revolt without much bloodshed. It could still have stopped the revolution in December, although at this time with considerable bloodshed.[116] Others claim, however, that the revolution was so widespread and the demonstrations so massive that any attempt at using the army to its full extent would have led either to widespread desertions or to a large-scale slaughter.

The Precht option was premised on the belief that Khomeini and his followers were neither anti-American nor antidemocratic. Indeed, Khomeini's assistants throughout early 1978 portrayed his plans as moderate in nature. Sick notes that Khomeini's assistants, especially Ibrahim Yazdi, deliberately misled western public opinion about Khomeini's true intentions. Precht and others believed that Khomeini would merely play a figurehead role in a future Islamic republic.[117] Brzezinski scornfully remembers that they thought of Khomeini as a "Gandhi-like figure."[118] Also, since Precht believed that the shah could not survive, and since the Shiites were as anti-Soviet as the shah, why would the United States not quickly shift its allegiance and thereby ensure the continuation of American-Iranian friendship?

Just like the Iron Fist, Precht's option to dump the shah might have worked had it been implemented early in the crisis. While it is admittedly difficult to help dispose of a loyal friend, the administration failed to see that its interests stretched beyond one person. Indeed, the postrevolutionary hatred of all things American makes one wonder whether the Khomeini factions were at all prepared to sit down with the Americans. Yet there is still no way of knowing whether early American feelers to the Islamic camp could have forged better relations. The administration badly miscalculated the actual weakness and unimportance of the secular opposition. The error cost precious time. As a result, by December 1978 the question of opening relations with Khomeini might already have been moot.

Surely the policy makers were not helped by the American intelligence system.[119] The lack of good information about the opposition forces in general impeded the United States in recognizing the extent of Iranian dissatisfaction with the shah. As a result, the administration did not perceive the seriousness of

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 153, 176; Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 299; Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, 254.

[117] James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of 1978," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Winter 1978–1979): 323–342; Adda B. Bozeman, "Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tradition of Persian Statecraft," *Orbis* 23 (Summer 1979): 387–402.

[118] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 12 May 1989.

[119] See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, *U.S. Policy Towards Iran* (Washington, DC: GPO, 18 January 1979); Sick, *All Fall Down*, 106.

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the situation until well into the crisis and did not properly assess the strength of the Shiite opposition. The Shiite forces were underestimated and misunderstood throughout the crisis.[120] Finally, nobody in the United States government knew that the shah had terminal cancer.[121] This disease had transformed the strong-willed leader into a depressed, moody, and indecisive man.

Conclusion

The question whether a different course of American action could have prevented the "loss of Iran" is now hypothetical. However, far from speculative is the assessment that Carter's advisory process functioned poorly. Whether Carter as a person may or may not have had the strength or will to make a clear choice does not make an analysis of his advisory process redundant. Indeed, such an analysis shows a process at the edge of collapse. The interagency procedures of gathering and debating various options, which had characterized the early years of the administration, had virtually broken down. Sick notes: "There were sporadic high-level meetings, but nothing of a continuing basis, nothing that really forced the issues to be raised, identified, refined, argued out and carried back and forth to the president on a regular basis."[122] Several analysts of this issue have blamed Carter for a lack of leadership and an unwillingness to bring the various perspectives together into a clear policy choice.[123] Indeed, he failed to give the shah any clear guidance. The various messages authorized by Carter were ambiguous and eroded the shah's confidence in U.S. support. Moreover, Carter failed to reconsider his stand in the face of ample indications that the shah could not hold. When asked point-blank whether Carter's policy was a failure, Brzezinski responded that the perception was in part due to implementation problems with Sullivan, but then said: "At the same time, it is probably true that Carter was not prepared to bite the bullet. He was willing to support the Shah. He was not willing to be explicit in saying to the Shah, 'use the army' or later on to the army, 'use force.' He always wanted that last decision to be made by the Iranians."[124]

Rather than just focus on Carter as an indecisive man, it is beneficial to see the lack of help around him. Vance and others had ruled out American support for Iron Fist actions, regardless of the arguments in favor of such action. Had there been credible advisers to argue Brzezinski's line, it might have been possible for Brzezinski to stay more neutral and perform his procedural tasks. In this

[120] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 165–66; Ioannides, *American's Iran*, 32, 61.

[121] Author's interview with Harold Brown, 8 September 1989; author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.

[122] Gary Sick in *The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic* (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1982), 167.

[123] Rubin, *Secrets of State*, 189; Stempel, *Iranian Revolution*, 301; Ledeen and Lewis, "The Inside Story," 26.

[124] Author's interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, 12 May 1989.

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instance, neutrality would mean that someone insist on a fair process and an informed president who would make a clear decision.

There were plenty of contradictions and much conflicting information, and making a decision would not be at all easy. To further complicate matters, Carter did not have an NSC staff in this case that was sufficiently distant from the advocacy process to help him sort out the policy alternatives. The problem was not that Brzezinski failed his role completely, but that from the beginning he believed that the revolution was reversible. Had Brown and Schlesinger lobbied hard for better analyses, Brzezinski might have arbitrated more objectively. But he was a lone voice. Moreover, this was a crisis of great proportions. As Newsom notes, Brzezinski, because of his chairmanship of the SCC, took firm control of the crisis: "He [Brzezinski] recognized his coordinating role, but it was coordination plus. It was not coordination of the Scowcroft type what I understand it to be, where the President is presented with an explanation of the options and positions. It was coordination supplemented by personal advocacy."[125] His "coordination plus" caused him finally to be less than scrupulous about other people's advocacy *and* about implementing policy. As in the case of the 24 October memorandum from the Department of State, Brzezinski failed to give Precht's option a fair hearing in the administration. Thus he deprived the administration of a viable alternative in dealing with the crisis.

During the 28 December meeting of Carter's principal advisers, Brzezinski wrote up a compromise decision because of the deadlock among them. Like the 3 November message to the shah, the result was ambiguous and counterproductive to the American position in Iran. An assistant secretary of state commented that "it failed to clarify the role of the U.S."[126] And no wonder. The message represented a stalemate between the two options. Brzezinski was responsible for forcing the process through to get Carter to make a clear decision. He did not do so, because he was simply too committed to one option to play his role credibly.

This crisis also reveals that Brzezinski went far beyond alerting Carter to a missing option. Indeed, Brzezinski's continuous prodding proved counterproductive. He kept urging Carter to tell the shah to use his Iron Fist option, even though Carter had rejected it many times. Indeed, by December there was no need for Brzezinski to promote this option, since Schlesinger did so on a continual basis.

Finally, the national security adviser exceeded his role by engaging in the implementation of policy. In the 3 November phone call to the shah, he attempted to change Carter's policy in a subtle manner. Later on, with the help of Zahedi, he attempted to get the shah to crack down. Sullivan, meanwhile, continued to tell the shah that Carter did not want to take responsibility for such action. The resulting confusion to the shah is described by Ledeen and Lewis: "The Shah could never get the same story from the White House and the State Department;

[125] Author's interview with David Newsom, 12 September 1989.
[126] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 128.

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the one kept assuring him that the U.S. was solidly behind him, while the other kept reminding him that force was not acceptable."[127]

These distortions in the decision process help explain why Carter did not always receive all options so as to have a full debate, was not always alerted to the bureaucratic settlement of policy conflicts among his advisers, was not compelled to make a clear policy choice, was not optimally informed about the growing seriousness of the situation in Iran, and was not privy to the various conflicts involved in the implementation of his policy. Indeed, these malfunctions explain why Carter wavered so long and handled the crisis with so much ambiguity. None of this means that Carter was not spending time and effort on this crisis. Indeed he was. Nor does this mean that Carter could not have acted more decisively. Indeed, he should have. But he lacked the necessary thrashing out of difficult issues and the focus that careful staff work can produce. Finally, he lacked a team that was united in its zeal to serve the president. They were working against one another instead of for Jimmy Carter.

[127] Ledeen and Lewis, *Debacle*, 143; see also Vance, *Hard Choices*, 328; William H. Sullivan, "The Road Not Taken," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980): 175–186.

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Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War

JAMES J. WIRTZ

Although dozens of interservice and bureaucratic disputes occurred during the Vietnam war, one relatively minor debate has emerged to take a major place in the mythology of the conflict. A controversy over the contents of the Enemy Order of Battle—an intelligence report that identified enemy units and estimated North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (VC) troop strength—continued decades after the original confrontation between analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and officers working at the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). At the heart of the debate stood the allegation made by a CIA analyst, Sam Adams, that a "conspiracy at the highest levels of American military intelligence" prevented an increase in the estimates of enemy strength contained in the Order of Battle, thereby contributing to the surprise and setbacks suffered by U.S. forces during the 1968 Tet offensive.[1] The charges, fully articulated by Adams in an article published in *Harper's* in May 1975, were repeated during hearings held by the Pike Committee in December of

[1] This is how Mike Wallace characterized the gist of Adams's charges. See "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," transcript of 23 January 1982 broadcast on CBS Television Network, 1, listed as Joint Exhibit #1 in *Vietnam: A Documentary Collection—Westmoreland v. CBS* (New York: Clearwater Publishing, 1985), (hereafter referred to as *Westmoreland*).

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the same year.[2] His claims captured widespread attention, however, when they served as the basis of a CBS News documentary.[3] The assertions made in the program led General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of MACV at the time of the controversy, to take legal action which ultimately resulted in the *Westmoreland vs. CBS* litigation.[4] Even today, these allegations continue to exert a pull on the imaginations of interested Americans.

Given the notoriety attained by the Order of Battle controversy and the place it has achieved in the literature on the Vietnam war, the purpose of this article is to offer some judgments not only about the charges leveled by Adams but also about the conditions that existed within the American intelligence community on the eve of the Tet offensive.[5] In part one of the analysis, both the MACV and CIA positions on the Order of Battle question will be identified. The events that marked the course of the debate also will be described, including the compromise over estimates that was eventually produced.

In part two, an evaluation of each side's position, based upon evidence uncovered during the Tet offensive, will be undertaken. Additionally, this section will evaluate the evidence supporting Adams's charges of conspiracy and the presence of a similar problem, the "intelligence to please" syndrome. This syndrome can occur when intelligence analysts are directly pressured by policy makers to produce estimates that support an ongoing program or a preferred initiative, a situation similar to the conspiracy alleged by Adams. Conversely, the syndrome also can be linked to less diabolical causes: intelligence analysts sometimes supply

[2] Sam Adams, "Vietnam Coverup: Playing War With Numbers," *Harper's*, May 1975, 41-73; and Proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94 Cong. 1st sess., *U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1975), 683-692. Although Adams's charges of conspiracy gained the most notoriety and were greeted with the most skepticism by senior government officials, many working-level officials at the CIA, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and even MACV initially found his estimates of enemy strength to be credible. I am indebted to George Allen for emphasizing the importance of this observation.

[3] "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," transcript of 23 January 1982 broadcast on CBS Television Network, 1, Joint Exhibit #1 in *Westmoreland*.

[4] For a description of the litigation and the issues raised about the role of the media in the controversy, see Renata Adler, *Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland vs. CBS et al.; Sharon vs. Time* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Bob Brewin and Sydney Shaw, *Vietnam on Trial: Westmoreland vs. CBS* (New York: Atheneum, 1987); T. L. Cubbage, "*Westmoreland vs. CBS*: Was Intelligence Corrupted by Policy Demands" in Michael Handel, ed., *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), esp. 138-164; and Michael A. Hennessey, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception Revisited" in David A. Charters and Maurice A. J. Tugwell, eds. *Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Context* (London: Brassey's 1990), 373-392.

[5] Because of the gravity of the accusations leveled by Adams, even scholars who doubted the veracity of his claims address his charges. See Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 131. Neil Sheehan's almost gratuitous reference to Adams's efforts to change the MACV Order of Battle is an example of how the incident has entered the mythology of the war. See Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 696.

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estimates that support a given course of action because they simply desire to please policy makers.[6] Three questions will be addressed by this section of the analysis: Whose Order of Battle estimates appear to be more accurate in hindsight? Did a conspiracy exist to prevent the higher estimates championed by CIA analysts from reaching senior policy makers? Did a desire to please policy makers lead analysts to produce estimates that demonstrated that ongoing efforts were succeeding?

Part three explains the imperatives that drove MACV and the CIA to contest this issue bitterly. Drawn from the bureaucratic politics literature, the explanation asserts that the Order of Battle debate, which was driven by organizational definitions of who constituted an enemy combatant, was used as an instrument by CIA analysts to challenge the prevailing assumptions that governed the debate over America's policy in Southeast Asia. Finally, the conclusion will offer some judgments not only about the controversy created by the Order of Battle debate, but also about some of the problems that plagued American intelligence on the eve of the Tet offensive.

Who Was the Enemy?

Order of Battle estimates are an important part of the intelligence product available to commanders. Not only do they keep track of specific enemy units, but they also provide an approximation of the number of forces that could be faced in battle. By monitoring the combat histories and positions of particular units, analysts can estimate the quality of the forces arrayed on a given area of the battlefield. This type of information would help in planning an offensive: attacks could be directed against places held by "green" units or forces that have recently suffered heavy casualties. Conversely, the movement of well rested or battle-hardened units to a given sector could be an indication that an opponent is preparing an offensive. In any event, history suggests that disaster is the likely outcome when commanders conduct operations without an accurate estimate of the forces facing them.[7]

As important as these estimates always have been to commanders, Order of Battle intelligence was even more important to U.S. officers during the Vietnam

[6] For a discussion of the intelligence-to-please syndrome see Ariel Levite, *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 16–17; Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 208–209; Handel, ed., *Leaders and Intelligence*, 5.

[7] During the fall of 1944, for example, the British 1st Airborne Division conducted a parachute assault against the Rhine River crossing near the city of Arnhem. The division was virtually wiped out, however, when the 9th SS Panzer Division, which was resting in the vicinity of Arnhem, engaged the lightly equipped British paratroopers. Senior British commanders "underestimated" the German presence near Arnhem. For the complete story see Cornelius Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).

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war. In part, this importance was generated by the drive to monitor the conflict through quantitative measures: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's well-known predilection toward systems analysis was accommodated in the effort to measure progress in the war.[8] Although they were resisted initially by the military, quantitative measures—the best known is the infamous and unreliable body count—were used to evaluate a variety of programs. Progress in the pacification effort, for example, was measured with the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), a questionnaire completed periodically by commanders as a basis for judging progress in winning the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese peasants.[9] Because of this emphasis on quantitative analysis, Order of Battle estimates, which traditionally incorporated a numerical component, held a place of prominence in the overall intelligence picture developed by analysts working at MACV.

Order of Battle estimates also were important because they measured progress in achieving one of the fundamental objectives set for American forces during the February 1966 Honolulu conference. To "attrit, by year's end, VC/NVA [North Vietnamese Army] forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field," was the goal adopted by senior military and political officials who attended this meeting.[10] Westmoreland, in his general order issued for 1967, also emphasized the attrition objective embodied in U.S. military strategy.[11] Even though the adoption of this goal appears to be a recipe for stalemate, the objective was pursued vigorously by the American military. Order of Battle estimates—which summarized the results of the body count, estimates of North Vietnamese infiltration, VC recruitment, and the status of specific enemy units—were used to measure progress in achieving the attrition objective.

In developing Order of Battle estimates, analysts at MACV monitored four different types of enemy units: NVA forces, VC main force units, VC local force

[8] The epitome of this fascination with numbers and the use of systems analysis not only to monitor but to prosecute the war more effectively (that is, generate high body counts) can be found in Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Hunt, *Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974). For a fine critique of this emphasis on quantitative measures, see Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 252–254.

[9] For a discussion of the HES, see Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 248–249; and Timothy J. Lomperis, *The War Everyone Lost—And Won* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 70–71.

[10] For the attrition objective set at the 1966 Honolulu Conference, see "1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military Operations and Anticipated Results Thereof," (drafted by Bill Bundy and John McNaughton) Joint Exhibit #215D in *Westmoreland*. For a description of the importance of this memo in terms of the American ground strategy for the war, see "Letter from Westmoreland to E. H. Simmons, 27 May 1978," Joint Exhibit #215B, 3, in *Westmoreland*; William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 160–161; and "BDM Study Vol VI," Joint Exhibit #318A, 3–26, 3–27 in *Westmoreland*.

[11] MSG, COMUSMACV, 241227Z Jan 67, Subj: Command Guidance, in Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, *Command History 1967* vol. I (San Francisco: Headquarters USMACV, 1968), 326.

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units, and VC irregular forces (which included guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense forces).[12] These forces were placed into categories according to which element of the communist command hierarchy controlled them and also according to their function: combat units (sometimes called maneuver units); combat support units; administrative service units; irregular units; and units that served as the VC political infrastructure.[13] Even though hundreds of pages of intelligence were produced every month to monitor changes in dozens of specific enemy units, the overall results of this analysis were presented in a few lines contained in the Monthly Order of Battle Summary (see Table 1).

Although the exact numbers presented in the Monthly Order of Battle Summaries give an impression of accuracy and seem innocuous enough, to analysts and officers working at MACV, these calculations contained both hidden problems and far-reaching implications. Analysts would have identified two limitations that called into question the accuracy of these apparently exact results. First, the conservative methodology adopted to monitor infiltration and to identify newly formed VC units—at least two captured documents and/or two prisoner interrogation reports had to confirm the existence of the unit before it was added to the Order of Battle—tended to skew estimates. Delays of two to three months or even longer might occur between the time an NVA unit entered the country and the time its presence was reflected in the official estimate of enemy strength.

[12] The American intelligence community accepted the following definitions for these units: VC main force (MF) units were directly subordinate to Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) or VC HQ, a VC military region HQ, or subregion HQ; VC local force units were directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operated only within a specified VC province or district; NVA units were formed, trained, and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit and were composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese; irregulars were organized units composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense forces subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations that performed a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities. The irregulars also served as a manpower base for both NVA and VC combat units. Guerrillas were full-time forces organized into squads or platoons that did not always stay in their village or hamlet. They usually engaged in tax collection, propaganda, terrorism, sabotage, or the protection of village party committees. Self-defense forces were paramilitary units that defended hamlets and villages controlled by the VC. These forces did not leave their home areas, and they performed their duties (propaganda, construction, and home area defense) on a part-time basis. Secret self-defense forces were a clandestine VC organization that conducted the same type of operations in villages under the control of the government of Vietnam (GVN) that were conducted by self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. See USMACV Ac of S J-2, *PERINTREP* [Periodic Intelligence Report], (February 1967), vi–vii. (hereafter referred to as *PERINTREP* and date).

[13] The American intelligence community accepted the following definitions for these categories. "Maneuver units: infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements from platoon level upward, regardless of subordination. Combat support units: fire support, anti-aircraft, and technical service units organized at battalion level and above and not classified under administrative services. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support. Administrative service units: military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military subregion, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters." *PERINTREP* February 1967, vi.

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TABLE 1

(Missing Extracts Unavailable)

Extract from Monthly Order of Battle Summary as of 31 July 1967

Maneuver	*Combat Support*	*Administrative Service*	*Irregulars*	*Political*	*Grand Total*
108,757	12,235	24,863	112,760	39,175	297,790
(46,125)*	(8,660)	(400)			(55,185)

Extract from Monthly Order of Battle Summary as of 31 August 1967

Maneuver	*Combat Support*	*Administrative Service*	*Irregulars*	*Political*	*Grand Total*
105,822	12,705	25,653	112,760	39,175	296,115
(43,920)	(8,410)	(400)			(52,730)

Extract from Monthly Order of Battle Summary as of 31 October 1967

Maneuver	*Combat Support*	*Administrative Service*	*Irregulars*	*Political***	*Grand Total*
102,397	14,155	38,000	81,300		235,852
(44,040)	(9,660)	(400)			(54,100)

Extract from Monthly Order of Battle Summary as of 31 December 1967

Maneuver	*Combat Support*	*Administrative Service*	*Irregulars*	*Political***	*Grand Total*
100,651	14,505	37,725	71,700		224,581
(44,539)	(10,010)	(125)			(55,674)****

Extract from Monthly Order of Battle Summary as of 31 January 1968

Maneuver	*Combat Support*	*Administrative Service*	*Irregulars*	*Political***	*Grand Total*
100,836	14,180	37,725	72,605		225,346
(45,684)	(9,935)	(125)			(55,744)****

* NVA Strength shown in parentheses.

** Political category dropped from Order of Battle.

*** In addition to those NVA in NVA units there are approximately ten to twelve thousand NVA in VC units.

Source: "Extract from MACV Order of Battle Summary August 1–31, 1967," Joint Exhibit #198P; "Extract from MACV Order of Battle Summary October 1–31, 1967," Joint Exhibit #198RR; "Extract from MACV Order of Battle Summary December 1–31, 1967," Joint Exhibit #198S; "Extract from MACV Order of Battle Summary January 1–31, 1968," Joint Exhibit #198TT, all contained in *Vietnam: A Documentary Collection—Westmoreland v. CBS* (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., Inc. 1985).

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Enemy casualties, however, were quickly deducted from the Order of Battle. Second, many members of the intelligence community, including analysts at MACV, would have admitted that secrecy and the continuous metamorphosis taking place within VC irregular units and the VC infrastructure reduced the accuracy of their assessments of these forces. In contrast, analysts believed that their estimates of the strength of combat, combat support, and administrative support units were reasonably accurate. Since they were organized along conventional military lines, it was easier to monitor changes in these units.[14]

In terms of the far reaching implications raised by the Order of Battle, estimates produced after June 1967 carried a message that is not apparent to contemporary readers: they could be interpreted as evidence that the United States was winning the war. Colonel Daniel Graham, an analyst assigned to MACV J-2 (intelligence) demonstrated in his controversial Crossover Memo that the "crossover point" had been reached during June 1967. Numerous claims had been made previously about attaining the crossover point, but following Graham's work, analysts and officers at MACV generally accepted the notion that enemy losses exceeded replacements gained from recruitment and infiltration. Graham's Crossover Memo formed the basis of the June Measurement of Progress Report (MOP) which stated officially that the crossover point had been reached in South Vietnam.[15]

[14] These are the major weaknesses of Order of Battle estimates that were identified by members of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, MACV, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and officers attached to the HQ of the Commander in Chief Pacific. See "Report of the Honolulu Conference to Standardize Methods for Developing and Presenting Statistics on Order of Battle, Infiltration Trends and Estimates, 6–11 February 1967," Joint Exhibit #227, 8, contained in *Westmoreland*. For an insightful discussion of the problem, see Bruce Palmer, *The 25-Year War* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 79.

[15] For Graham's description of how he conducted his "crossover analysis," see Daniel O. Graham, Oral History I, 24 May 1982 interviewed by Ted Gittinger, 7, 9, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX. For a discussion of Graham's June 1967 Crossover Memo, which served as the basis of the claim made in the June 1967 MOP that the crossover point had been reached, see "Adams' William Westmoreland Chronology," Joint Exhibit #64, 11–12; "Adams' James Meacham Chronology," Joint Exhibit #58, 39, both in *Westmoreland*; and Daniel O. Graham's testimony contained in *U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence*, 1682. For a discussion of the contents of the June 1967 MOP, see Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977), 69–70. The MACV Measurement of Progress Report was issued on a monthly basis by MACV J-3 and was based on selected data on VC personnel and weapons losses, VC initiated incidents, the number of Hoi Chanhs (defectors), and Order of Battle data on combat, support, irregular, and political personnel. The MOP was distributed to National Agencies, higher and lateral commands, subordinate MACV commands, and "other" addressees. See "Report of the Honolulu Conference to Standardize Methods for Developing and Presenting Statistics on Order of Battle, Infiltration Trends and Estimates," Joint Exhibit #227; "Annex C-Index of Current Periodic Reporting on Enemy Strength, Dispositions, Gains, Losses, and Base Areas," C-4, both in *Westmoreland*. In a 28 April 1967 meeting with the president, for example, Westmoreland had made a more limited claim about reaching the crossover point in all but the two northernmost provinces

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How did this claim about reaching the crossover point indicate that the United States was winning the war? A comparison of subsequent Order of Battle reports (see Table 1) to the July 1967 estimate shows how Graham's analysis was reflected in estimates of enemy strength. Even though there is a slight increase in overall enemy strength between December 1967 and January 1968 (765 or about .035 percent), the total estimate of the number of troops in communist ranks declines significantly between July 1967 and January 1968. In July, enemy strength was placed at 297,790, but by the eve of the Tet offensive, the estimate of communist strength was only 225,346. By definition, the military had attained one of its primary goals in Vietnam: the attrition objective set at the Honolulu conference had been achieved. During the summer of 1967, senior officers and analysts at MACV began to use Order of Battle estimates to demonstrate that American forces were winning the war. In the words of Colonel Charles Morris, one of Graham's colleagues at MACV: "we honestly believed . . . that we had reached the crossover point . . . Danny Graham and all of us thought the enemy was out of men."[16]

Sam Adams and the Skeptics at the CIA

By the summer of 1967, CIA analysts, in contrast to officers at MACV, had established a record of skepticism about achieving American goals in Southeast Asia.[17] Several factors probably contributed to the differences in the assessments offered by individuals working for these organizations. MACV analysts focused on battlefield events, while CIA analysts tended to integrate political, economic, and social developments into their judgments about the conflict. Analysts working at CIA headquarters also enjoyed a degree of detachment that was not available in Saigon. CIA analysts had the luxury of focusing on the big picture, while analysts working at MACV concentrated on supporting the day-to-day conduct of military operations. In addition, it was less onerous for CIA analysts to identify weaknesses in the American war effort: the U.S. military and not the intelligence community was largely responsible for the implementation of U.S. policy in Vietnam. CIA analysts could identify problems without calling into question the efficacy of the programs implemented by their organization.[18]

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of South Vietnam. See *The Pentagon Papers As Published by the New York Times* (New York: Bantam Books), 568; "William Westmoreland Interview Transcript" with Mike Wallace, 17 May 1981, Joint Exhibit #349, 23–24, in *Westmoreland*.

[16] "Criles Notes on Charles Morris Telephone Interview" (no date), Joint Exhibit #37A, 2–3, in *Westmoreland*. It should be noted, however, that Morris also stated that enemy losses no longer exceeded replacements by the late fall of 1967 because of an increase in NVA infiltration.

[17] For an example of this skepticism, which includes the assertion that the crossover point had not been reached, see "5/23/67, Central Intelligence Agency, 'The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate,'" Joint Exhibit #347, in *Westmoreland*.

[18] Daniel Graham confirms this division of responsibilities between MACV and the CIA. See Graham, Oral History I, 32.

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Disagreement over Order of Battle estimates, however, was not primarily responsible for this divergent perspective about progress in the war. In fact, CIA analysts relied on MACV estimates of enemy strength. Order of Battle analysis not only was a military bailiwick, it also was a massive enterprise. Senior agency officials decided not to use their comparatively limited resources in what would have amounted to a very small attempt to duplicate the work of dozens of MACV analysts who were able to draw upon the resources of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). CIA analysts settled for attaching their qualifications to the estimates produced by the military.[19]

Sam Adams, an enterprising young Harvard graduate who made his reputation as an analyst during the 1960 crisis in the Congo, was largely responsible for the Order of Battle estimates that were produced by the CIA. Toward the end of 1966, Adams concluded his own examination of VC strength. He used documents captured from the VC to develop a detailed estimate of VC strength in Binh Dinh province, the largest and most populated province in South Vietnam. Adams determined that at least one VC organization was not reflected in the MACV Order of Battle: the VC were busy recruiting teenagers to serve with a part-time organization called the assault youth, but this type of unit was not counted in the MACV estimate.[20]

When Adams used these captured documents to conduct his own estimate of VC strength, especially the strength of irregular units and the VC infrastructure, the results were shocking. Adams developed a detailed assessment of the number of individuals in these VC units in Binh Dinh province, and then he multiplied his results by the number of provinces in South Vietnam. Adams's analysis, which focused on the irregular and clandestine units maintained by the VC, yielded the number 600,000 as a conservative estimate for the total enemy strength in South Vietnam. Adams analysis was over twice the size of the official estimate carried in the MACV Order of Battle (277,150 as of 3 January 1967).[21]

[19] For example, in the May 1967 CIA assessment, analysts cited MACV numbers but noted that the estimates presented in the MACV Order of Battle were extremely conservative see, Daniel O. Graham, Oral History II, 8 November 1982, interviewed by Ted Gittinger, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, 2. On the reasons why the CIA never devoted the resources needed to duplicate MACV Order of Battle estimates, see "Monograph by Allen 'Indochina Wars—1950–1975,'" Joint Exhibit #313, 312, in *Westmoreland*. On the role of the NSA see Graham, Oral History I, 15.

[20] John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) 455, 459; "Monograph by Allen 'Indochina Wars—1950–1975,'" Joint Exhibit #313, 312; and "Memo 12/2/66 from Adams to Chief, Indochina Division," Joint Exhibit #222, 3, both in *Westmoreland*. Adams began his examination of VC strength following the conclusion of a study he conducted of VC desertion rates. Adams estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 VC deserted their units every year. When this figure was combined with the approximately 150,000 casualties the allies inflicted on the enemy every year, Adams's analysis indicated that the war should have been coming to a close because of VC losses (270,000 – 250,000 = 20,000). Adams, after being told by George Allen that the official estimate of enemy strength was "suspect," started his work on the VC Order of Battle. See Cubbage, "*Westmoreland vs. CBS*," 125–126; and Adams, "Vietnam Coverup," 41–42.

[21] Adams stated that in comparison to the number carried by the MACV Order of Battle, "the

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Adams's analysis did not generate much controversy during the first half of 1967, even though CIA officials used his work as the basis of the agency's view of the MACV Order of Battle. In fact, George Carver, Adams's boss at the CIA, informed Richard Helms, the director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and Walt Rostow, the president's national security adviser, that "the MACV Order of Battle . . . is far too low and should be raised, perhaps doubled." Rostow then suggested to General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the interested parties should meet to discuss the issue.[22] As a result, a conference was held during February 1967 on Order of Battle issues. During the meeting, it appears that MACV analysts actually sympathized with the position taken by Adams. Colonel Gains B. Hawkins, in charge of conducting estimates of enemy strength for MACV, placed enemy strength at 500,000. A CIA-MACV compromise over the issue actually appeared possible for a time.[23]

The debate began to heat up, however, by about mid-year. An official estimate issued by the CIA in May 1967 stated that in contrast to the MACV Order of Battle, which listed irregular force strength at 113,000, an accurate estimate for this category was "more likely in the neighborhood of 190–200,000. . . ."[24] Moreover, Adams's hand can be detected in another observation offered by this estimate: "it appears that [the] strength of the insurgent apparatus in South Vietnam, instead of totaling 292,000 as listed in the 15 May 1967 OB [Order of Battle], may actually be in the half-million range."[25] The critique contained in this widely disseminated document did not go unnoticed by analysts at MACV. Its existence undermines Adams's charge that a conspiracy prevented the presentation of information that indicated that estimates were in need of upward revision.

The Battle Over Estimates

The controversy over the Order of Battle began to emerge in June 1967; efforts to prepare a draft of the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 14.3-

number of Viet Cong is closer to 600,000, and perhaps more." See "Memo 12/19/66, from Adams to Director OCI [Office of Current Intelligence]," Joint Exhibit #224, 2, in *Westmoreland*. For a more formal statement of Adams's position and the report of the number contained in the MACV Order of Battle on 3 January 1967, see "Memo 1/11/67 from Carver to Deputy Director for Intelligence," Joint Exhibit #226, in *Westmoreland*.

[22] Cubbage, "*Westmoreland-vs. CBS*," 128. Needless to say, the fact that these senior officials were aware of the possibility that the Order of Battle was in need of revision, even before the issue became heated, provides strong evidence against Adams's conspiracy thesis.

[23] Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), 187–189. Powers states that this conference was held in mid-January 1967, but the official report issued at the end of the conference states that it was held between 6–11 February 1967.

[24] "5/23/67, Central Intelligence Agency, 'The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate,'" II-1.

[25] Ibid., II-2.

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67 entitled, "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam," catalyzed the debate. SNIE 14.3-67 was a formal assessment produced by the entire intelligence community and was intended to "estimate the capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists to conduct military operations in South Vietnam over the next year or so."[26] Obviously, an assessment of enemy strength would play a part in SNIE 14.3-67, and CIA analysts wanted the document to reflect their estimate of the strength of VC forces. MACV analysts, however, were no longer willing to bargain with the skeptics at the CIA over a compromise concerning the strength of the VC irregulars. Instead, MACV analysts adopted a vastly different approach to the discrepancy between estimates.

MACV proposed eliminating several types of units that were counted in the irregular category contained in the Order of Battle. In other words, MACV suggested that the VC self-defense and secret self-defense forces, the units Adams claimed were underestimated in MACV estimates, should be dropped altogether from assessments of enemy strength, including the estimate prepared for SNIE 14.3-67. In response to this suggestion, Agency analysts cabled Saigon: "Headquarters analysts would find solution to OB problem, as proposed, totally unworkable. Self Defense and Secret Self Defense Militia simply cannot be dropped or ignored in the official OB or in public releases on enemy strength. . . . In our view, it is time to be realistic in public as in private with nature of enemy force we are facing."[27]

The positions adopted by both sides in this controversy are easy to discern from the blizzard of cable traffic generated by the debate. The MACV position, which was supported by analysts at the DIA, rested on several arguments. First, MACV officers questioned the feasibility of developing an accurate assessment of these clandestine VC units; they claimed that a lack of hard data would turn any attempt to calculate the strength of these forces into an exercise in speculation. As Daniel Graham noted years after the war, even the effort to make a distinction between guerrilla units was not realistic:

> You didn't know how many . . . guerrillas there were, let alone have some guy out there in the boonies tell you, "I just saw a guerrilla, and we believe that he was a member of the self-defense militia, or the assault youth, or the village self-protection." . . . as far as the guys who were giving us direct reports from the field, no way . . . they could tell one guerrilla from another.[28]

Second, MACV officers argued that even if an accurate assessment was possible, it was not appropriate to include many VC units—including the self-

[26] "SNIE 14.3-67 Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists For Fighting in South Vietnam, 13 November 1967," Joint Exhibit #273, 1, in *Westmoreland*. For a discussion of SNIEs and National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) see Walter Laqueur, *A World of Secrets* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 32-37; and Richard K. Betts, "Strategic Intelligence Estimates: Let's Make Them Useful," *Parameters* 10 (December 1980): 20-26.

[27] "Cable 6/2/67 from Adams to Sandine," Joint Exhibit #239B, 1-2, in *Westmoreland*.

[28] Graham, Oral History II, 15.

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defense, secret self-defense, and assault youth—into an Order of Battle that accounted for combat units. According to General Creighton Abrams, deputy commander of MACV:

> From the intelligence viewpoint, the inclusion of SD [self-defense] and SSD [secret self-defense] strength figures in an estimate of military capabilities is highly questionable. These forces contain a sizable number of women and old people. They operate entirely in their own hamlets. They are rarely armed, have no real discipline, and almost no military capability. They are no more effective in the military sense than the dozens of other nonmilitary organizations which serve the VC cause in various roles.[29]

MACV was claiming that it was inappropriate to include thousands of South Vietnamese civilians—open and covert supporters of the VC cause—in the Order of Battle, thereby designating them as a legitimate military target. To be fair, civilians who supported the South Vietnamese cause would then have to be included in the allied Order of Battle, but this idea was rejected as preposterous by officers assigned to MACV. The American military simply preferred not to designate the civilians living in VC controlled areas as enemy combatants.[30]

Third, no matter how they looked at it, MACV officers believed that the acceptance of the CIA position would produce a public relations disaster. On the one hand, senior officers at MACV were concerned that a major increase in the Order of Battle would generate public and media criticism, especially in light of MACV reports of progress in the war. Not only would a massive increase in the estimates contained in the Order of Battle add to the credibility gap with the American public, but they also believed that it would undermine the Johnson administration's confidence in their conduct of the war. Westmoreland's initial reaction to the proposal to increase estimates of enemy strength—"What am I going to tell the press? What am I going to tell the Congress? What am I going to tell the President?"—reflects the idea that an increase in the estimate would be interpreted as evidence of military incompetence or as an attempt to end a long-standing effort to mislead Americans.[31] Westmoreland informed General Wheeler that "no possible explanation could prevent the erroneous conclusions that would result" from a significant increase in the estimates contained in the Order of Battle.[32]

[29] "Cable 8/20/67 from Abrams to Wheeler, Sharp, Westmoreland," Joint Exhibit #252B, 1–2, in *Westmoreland*.

[30] "George Allen 5/25/81 Interview Transcript," Joint Exhibit #7, 9; "Adams' Notes on William Westmoreland," Joint Exhibit #191, 57; and "William Westmoreland Interview Transcript," with Mike Wallace 17 May 1981, Joint Exhibit #349, 30, in *Westmoreland*. George Allen maintains that this position on VC irregulars was not held by all officers at MACV; some believed that the self-defense and the secret self-defense forces did pose a serious military threat. See "Monograph by Allen 'Indochina Wars—1950–1975,'" 317.

[31] "Gains Hawkins 3/8/81 Interview Transcript," Joint Exhibit #9, 67; and "William Westmoreland Interview Transcript" with Mike Wallace 17 May 1981, Joint Exhibit #349, 29–30, both in *Westmoreland*.

[32] "Cable 8/30/67 from Westmoreland to Wheeler, Sharp," Joint Exhibit #253A, in *Westmoreland*.

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On the other hand, MACV officers were worried that the disclosure of the increased estimate would leave them open to another charge: they were pushing for an increase in the Order to Battle to bolster their requests for additional forces. Westmoreland was sensitive to this charge, because he had earlier been accused by a senior official in the Johnson administration of following this type of strategy to secure additional forces for his command.[33] Other senior officers also were worried about this type of problem. For example, when improvements in the method of counting enemy-initiated incidents were applied retroactively by MACV analysts and produced a sharp increase, as opposed to a previously reported decrease in enemy initiated incidents over the past year, they received a sharp warning from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):

> I note . . . that some feeling exists within your [Westmoreland's] headquarters that there is a relationship between statistical bookkeeping . . . and decisions concerning future strength levels. I feel certain this does not reflect your own views, but for the record, you can assure those who hold such dangerous views that any requirements for additional forces which are well and clearly justified will receive a fair hearing at this and higher levels regardless of the way statistics on enemy activity are running, and that any attempts to "weight the dice" can only result in trouble for us all.[34]

One way or another, an increase in the Order of Battle estimate would rebound to the detriment of the war effort by reducing confidence in the military's conduct of the war.

In contrast, CIA analysts noted that MACV concerns about the impact of higher estimates on official Washington and the American public were not really justified:

> We think it possible that Saigon authorities are overemphasizing difficulty of explaining jump in figures adequately to "high levels" in Washington. Several CIA studies and some by other intelligence components have broached probability that estimates are upcoming which will be much higher. Questions we get from high levels involve when community is going to come up with these new assessments.[35]

They also argued that the failure to include the approximately 120,000 members of the VC self-defense and secret self-defense forces in American estimates of enemy strength would undermine the allied war effort. Analysts claimed that these forces formed a manpower pool that MACV analysts failed to consider as they worked on their crossover calculations. MACV, according to CIA analysts, probably subtracted many dead self-defense force members from estimates of the number of individuals in the more conventional NVA and VC units, thereby skewing the calculations that measured progress towards the attrition objective. Analysts stated that the inclusion of self-defense and secret self-defense forces

[33] Paul Nitze made this accusation. See Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 193, 416.
[34] "Cable 3/11/67 from Wheeler to Westmoreland," Joint Exhibit #233, 4, in *Westmoreland*.
[35] "Cable 6/2/67 from Adams to Sandine," Joint Exhibit #239B, 2–3, in *Westmoreland*.

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in the Order of Battle would depict a more realistic and accurate picture of the strength and nature of the communist forces fighting in South Vietnam.[36]

Efforts to arrange a compromise between MACV and the CIA broke down on 18 August when the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) included in a draft of the SNIE the estimate of 120,000 for the strength of the self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. This information prompted a flurry of protest from Robert Komer, General Davidson (MACV J-2), General Abrams, and Westmoreland. In response to this protest the JCS asked Helms, in his capacity as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, to send a team of personal representatives to Saigon to settle the dispute. The CIA team, composed of George Carver, William Hyland, Dean Moor, and Sam Adams, arrived in Saigon on 8 September. The effort to reach a compromise was about to collapse when Helms, who was anxious to avoid a split SNIE (whereby separate MACV/DIA and CIA figures would be presented), stepped in and apparently encouraged Carver, who was the head of the CIA delegation, to drop the CIA's insistence on quantifying the self-defense and secret self-defense forces. Westmoreland agreed to the compromise on 14 September 1967.[37]

The compromise between MACV and the CIA was tenuous at best, although it was reflected in the estimates produced by MACV starting in October 1967 (see Table 1). Since CIA representatives only succeeded in obtaining MACV's agreement to provide them with a copy of the June 1967 Crossover Memo, they apparently felt shortchanged. Moreover, CIA analysts took a dim view of a draft of a proposed MACV press briefing, which they received on 10 October 1967. They believed that the briefing violated the tenets of the September compromise, because it implied that there was greater certainty about Order of Battle estimates than was justified, further played down the role of self-defense and secret self-defense forces, and stated that the intelligence community had generally overestimated the size of enemy forces arrayed against the allies, whereas SNIE 14.3-67 stated that the analysts had historically underestimated communist strength. CIA

[36] For a characteristic example of the position taken by CIA analysts on the Order of Battle issue see "Cable 9/12/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #258AA, in *Westmoreland*.

[37] For the protests against ONE's move, see "Cable 8/19/67 from Komer to Carver," Joint Exhibit #250; "Cable 8/19/67 from Davidson to Godding," Joint Exhibit #251A; "Cable 8/20/67 from Abrams to Wheeler, Sharp, Westmoreland," Joint Exhibit #252B; "Cable 8/20/67 from Westmoreland to Wheeler, Sharp," Joint Exhibit #253A; and "Cable 8/25/67, from Westmoreland to Sharp," Joint Exhibit #255. For the JCS request to have the DCI (Helms) settle the dispute and for the personnel he sent to Vietnam on his behalf see "Cable 8/29/67 from Carver to Saigon," Joint Exhibit #220BB. For a discussion of the meetings between the CIA delegation and MACV representatives see "Cable 9/11/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #256B; "Cable 9/12/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #258E; "Cable 9/12/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #258AA; "Cable 9/13/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #259B; and "Cable 9/14/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #260B. For the claim that Helms compromised with MACV over the Order of Battle estimate in order to avoid a "split" NIE, see "Monograph by Allen 'Indochina Wars – 1950–1975,'" Joint Exhibit #313; 315, all in *Westmoreland*.

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representatives suggested that the agency should attempt to distance itself from what they considered to be the unsupportable statements offered by MACV analysts. The compromise remained effective, however, until the issue reemerged with a vengeance in the aftermath of the Tet offensive.[38]

The Controversy in Perspective

Although the intelligence community avoided a split SNIE, the temporary resolution of the Order of Battle debate left an important question unresolved. Did the MACV or the CIA estimate of enemy strength provide the best approximation of the forces faced by Americans in South Vietnam? In hindsight, neither estimate proved to be exact, but the MACV assessment was much closer to reality than the analysis developed by Adams. Evidence for the MACV position emerged in the aftermath of the Tet offensive.

The Tet offensive, launched amid the celebration of Vietnam's sacred holiday, was an extremely ambitious enterprise: it engulfed 39 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, five of its six autonomous cities, and 71 of its 245 district capitals in serious fighting.[39] In launching this go-for-broke offensive, the communists employed virtually all of the military forces under their control, including walking wounded and teenagers equipped with weapons still covered in packing grease. The maximum estimate of the number of communist troops that participated in the attacks, however, is only 85,000.[40] Renata Adler, who followed the *Westmoreland v. CBS* proceedings in detail, has already asked the obvious question raised by Adams's analysis: "What were the remaining five hundred and fifteen thousand [communist troops] doing during Tet?"[41]

Even though it can never be determined exactly, it would appear that MACV analysts might have overestimated communist combat strength by as much as 20 percent. The actual size of the force available to the communists (based upon a

[38] For Carver's request to MACV for a copy of the "Crossover Memo," see "Cable 9/12/67 from Carver to Helms," Joint Exhibit #258E, 3. CIA analysts eventually received a copy of the June 1967 MACV "Crossover Memo" sometime in early November 1967. See "11/14/67 Ron Smith re: The Crossover Memo," Joint Exhibit #710. For a copy of the proposed MACV press briefing, see "Memo 10/10/67 from Henkin to Carver," Joint Exhibit #263. For the reaction of analysts at CIA Headquarters to the proposed MACV press briefing, see "Memo 10/11/67 from Walsh to Carver," Joint Exhibit #265A; and "Memo 10/13/67 from Carver to Goulding." Joint Exhibit #266, all in *Westmoreland*.

[39] Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 74.

[40] Although estimates of the number of communist soldiers participating in the Tet offensive vary, Daniel Graham states that 85,000 was the largest estimate that was ever brought to his attention. See Graham, Oral History I, 11. The low estimate of the number of communist soldiers participating in Tet—58,000—was turned in by the CIA. See "2/68 CIA Memo on Communist Units Participating in Tet Offensive," Joint Exhibit #713, 1, in *Westmoreland*. In an interview with the author, George Allen noted that the CIA estimate of 58,000 for the number of soldiers participating in the offensive was made soon after the eruption of the Tet attacks and was based upon limited information.

[41] Adler, *Reckless Disregard*, 202.

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two-to-one ratio between support personnel and estimates of participants in the battle) probably ranged from a low of about 180,000 to a high of about 250,000. The number contained in the 31 January 1968 Order of Battle—225,346—appears reasonable, however, given this simple rule of thumb estimate. (See Table 1.) In contrast, Adams's estimate of 600,000 is a gross overestimation of communist strength (combat forces combined with partially armed civilian supporters) in South Vietnam.

Where did Adams go wrong in his analysis? Apparently, his central assumption proved to be inaccurate: the captured documents that formed the basis of his study did not provide an accurate description of the status of VC irregulars. In fact, these documents might have been fabricated, not to mislead the Americans but to demonstrate to superiors that cadre in the field had met recruitment and organizational quotas set by senior commanders. In the aftermath of the Tet attacks, for example, none of the POWs and defectors that fell into allied hands claimed to be members of the assault youth, self-defense, and secret self-defense forces, despite the fact that the CIA even warned interrogators to allow former VC to answer questions about their organizational affiliation without prompting.[42] In a 22 April 1968 cable to Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief, Pacific, Westmoreland explained: ". . . we questioned a representative cross section of prisoners we picked up during the Tet offensive. Not one has admitted to being a member of any of the organizations which CIA would quantify as 'the insurgency base.'"[43] Moreover, one senior NVA officer stated that he decided to surrender after he discovered that the several units of assault youth that he was supposed to lead in combat were nowhere to be found.[44] The fact that the South Vietnamese population failed to support the VC in their attacks also stands in evidence against Adams's assertion that the communists had a force of 600,000 soldiers and supporters in the country. Ninety percent of the POWs captured during the attacks claimed that they received no aid from South Vietnamese civilians. Admittedly, it was in the interest of the POW to answer the question in this way to avoid implicating compatriots, but only 2 percent claimed that they received unsolicited help during an attack that was designed to elicit support from the South Vietnamese.[45]

Apparently, Adams's analysis reflected the total number of combatants in the broadest sense of the term available to the communists, combined with the potential pool of strength available to the VC (the total number of individuals who might have supported the communist cause). In hindsight, Adams might be forgiven for making this mistake. The North Vietnamese and VC leadership, in

[42] For the warning to field interrogators, see "Cable 2/18/68 from Carver to Saigon," Joint Exhibit #296A, in *Westmoreland*.

[43] "4/22/68 Westmoreland Cable to Sharp and Wheeler," Joint Exhibit #403, in *Westmoreland*.

[44] Graham, Oral History II, 16.

[45] Douglas Pike, "The Tet Offensive: A Setback for Giap, But Just How Big?" *Army* 18 (April 1968): 61.

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hoping that the South Vietnamese population would revolt in support of the Tet offensive, made a similar error. VC cadre working in the south, according to Douglas Pike, created "in the minds of the people in the North a very strong view that anti-Americanism was on the rise, which it was . . . [but] it wasn't as bad as was being reported."[46] In other words, both Adams and the North Vietnamese might have been misled by the same types of reporting turned in by southern cadre.[47]

A Conspiracy?

In terms of the main question raised by Adams in the aftermath of the controversy, conclusive evidence can be provided to demonstrate that a conspiracy to prevent an increase in Order of Battle estimates did not exist at the highest levels of American intelligence. In fact, the inaccuracy of Adams's accusation can be illustrated in two ways. First, as the description of the debate over estimates of enemy strength demonstrates, Adams's charges received a fair hearing from senior members of the intelligence community and senior members of MACV. DCI Helms and General Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, were not only aware but personally involved in the debate over the Order of Battle. Adams's analysis was not summarily rejected by officials, but was instead the focus of a bruising bureaucratic debate. Moreover, if a conspiracy existed to suppress Adams's analysis, it was not an efficient one: at one point CIA analysts admitted that the entire intelligence community knew that a debate over the Order of Battle was taking place. In fact, MACV officers were concerned that the story about the existence of a dispute in the intelligence community might find its way into the media, reducing public trust in the individuals conducting the war. The *New York Daily News* correspondent in Saigon already had learned that the Order of Battle might be increased.[48] In other words, the dispute over the Order of Battle propagated the ideas Adams championed.

Second, even in the strictest sense, Adams's analysis was disseminated in at least one formal CIA report—the May 1967 estimate, which stated that enemy strength in South Vietnam might total as much as 500,000. He also succeeded in preventing MACV from ignoring the need to account in SNIE 14.3-67 for the possible existence of several kinds of clandestine VC units. Officers at MACV, after all, would have preferred to sweep this problem under the rug. These are not small accomplishments for a relatively junior player who also happened to be wrong.

[46] Douglas Pike, Oral History I, 4 June 1981 interviewed by Ted Gittinger, 36, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

[47] Pike and Graham both make this point. See Pike, "The Tet Offensive," 61; and Graham, Oral History I, 11.

[48] "Cable 8/20/67 from Abrams to Wheeler, Sharp, Westmoreland," in *Westmoreland*, 2.

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Did this conspiracy at the highest levels of American intelligence, which included officers at MACV, prevent accurate information from reaching senior members of the Johnson administration? Indeed, if members of the intelligence community deliberately misled the president or his advisers about the status of communist forces, then Adams's charges of conspiracy might be accurate. The documentary record, however, demonstrates that this simply is not the case.

MACV and CIA analysts were not alone in attempting to estimate enemy strength in South Vietnam. Apparently, NSA analysts not only monitored the movement of North Vietnamese soldiers down the Ho Chi Minh trail, but also monitored VC communications in an effort to calculate the number of VC units that were active and to monitor the movements of these forces. Information obtained from the NSA, however, was supplied directly by this agency to the White House. Members of the MACV staff, or the CIA for that matter, could not prevent these estimates from reaching the president and his senior advisers.[49]

The president was honestly and accurately informed not only about the debate over the Order of Battle, but also about the overall uncertainty involved in developing estimates of enemy strength. In a cover memo that summarized the findings of SNIE 14.3-67, Helms informed Johnson about the Order of Battle debate:

> The new estimate has been produced through an exhaustive process of analysis including detailed consultations in Saigon between the Embassy and MACV and a team from the Washington Community headed by my personal representative. . . . The new estimate is sensitive and potentially controversial primarily because the new strength figures are at variance with our former holdings. Much of the past data on overall Communist capabilities in Vietnam has turned out to be unreliable and many of the figures have turned out to be too low. . . . we have not been able to find a reliable basis for reconstructing Communist strength figures retrospectively to provide a true standard of comparison between present and Communist strength as it actually was a year ago. . . . I have considered not issuing this Estimate and after considerable consultation, believe this would be a mistake. . . . too many people are aware that the exercise to get agreed figures has been going on. In short, the charge of bad faith or unwillingness to face the facts would be more generally damaging than the issuance of this document which can stand on its own feet.[50]

Adams lost in his attempt to gain complete acceptance of his inaccurate estimates, but the president was made aware generally of his efforts and the issues at stake.

Despite the fact that senior members of the Johnson administration were aware of the Order of Battle controversy, several junior officers who served as intelligence analysts testified during the *Westmoreland vs. CBS* litigation that estimates that reflected an increase in enemy strength had been arbitrarily blocked or altered

[49] Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 459; and "Russell Cooley 4/9/81 Interview," Joint Exhibit #11, 6, in *Westmoreland*.

[50] "11/15/67 Memo From Rostow to LBJ," [including Memo from Helms] Joint Exhibit #963, 3, in *Westmoreland*.

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by their immediate superiors.[51] Other individuals who were not involved in the litigation also have described similar events, which seem to substantiate the overall veracity of Adams's position, including its conspiratorial overtones. For example, Robert Simmons, a junior officer who worked on Order of Battle estimates at the Headquarters of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), has stated:

> Intelligence officers were under a great deal of pressure in the fall of 1967 to produce statistics that proved the war was going well. . . . Order of Battle officers . . . were told in late October that their holdings did not reflect progress results expected in General Westmoreland's Combined Campaign Plan and that these figures were to be "reassessed." When their reassessments still did not satisfy the requirement for progress, the ranking intelligence officer in II FFV, personally changed the figures before forwarding them to Saigon.[52]

Even though a connection seems to exist between the charges raised by Adams and these incidents, the relationship is largely coincidental. The experiences cited by these officers have little to do with the accusations leveled by Adams that a conspiracy existed at "the highest levels of American intelligence."[53] None of the available evidence indicates that the individuals who supressed these estimates based their actions on orders issued by officers at MACV. Instead, several other incentives probably motivated the alteration of estimates at the grass roots level.

First, the six month tour of duty for officers placed a premium on demonstrating results in an extremely short period of time. Officers were loathe to report fluctuations of enemy strength in their area of responsibility. They might have reasoned that negative reporting could act as a black mark on their record, preventing the necessary ticket punch needed for promotion.[54] Second, the emphasis given to quantitative measures of progress was generally viewed with disdain by officers who were busy with the actual conduct of military operations. Since they believed that these numbers could not provide an accurate reflection of the situation they faced, they might have reasoned that it was foolhardy to risk their careers over quantitative analyses that they regarded as worthless.[55] Third, army officers confronted tremendous institutional pressure to demonstrate that the policies adopted by their service were succeeding. In other words,

[51] Brewin and Shaw, *Vietnam on Trial*, 29–30.

[52] Robert Ruhl Simmons "Tet 1968: The Political Ingredients of Military Defeat," (Unpublished Paper, Harvard University, 1978), 17–18; Deborah Fitts, "Robert Simmons Recalls Enemy Strength Tinkering," *The Westerly Sun*, 18 February 1985. Tim Lomperis also has described a similar experience that occurred while he was a junior analyst attached to MACV Headquarters in 1973. See Lomperis, *The War Everyone Lost—and Won*, 71–72. II Field Force was a major Headquarters that commanded American forces in the provinces that surrounded Saigon.

[53] On this point, see Adler, *Reckless Disregard*, 239–240.

[54] On this point, see Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 196; and Patrick J. McGarvey, "DIA: Intelligence to Please" in Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 318–328.

[55] For a similar point, see Van Creveld, *Command in War*, 254–255.

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institutional loyalty corrupted the analytical-policy distinction that should have been maintained in the military's evaluation of its own performance. In effect, estimates produced by junior officers were manipulated, but the officers who changed these estimates were probably responding to personal or institutional imperatives and not the dictates of a deeply rooted conspiracy to mislead senior officials.[56]

The stories told by these junior analysts, however, embody both manifestations of the intelligence-to-please syndrome. Estimates were deliberately altered, but the officers who suppressed reports that conflicted with the expectations of higher authorities were not acting under orders. Instead, officers who were eager to please their superiors changed reports to accommodate the expectations of senior commanders. Even though these incidents probably did little to affect the overall intelligence picture, they do reflect a breakdown in the delicate balance between intimacy and detachment that should exist between commanders and intelligence advisers. Military intelligence is highly prone to this type of problem, because officers seem to lose their sense of objectivity when they are required to evaluate the performance of their own service and commanders.

Explaining the Controversy

Although they had no way of knowing at the time, agency analysts would have been pleased with one of the comments about SNIE 14.3-67 offered to the president by Walt Rostow: "this is a conservative estimate."[57] Interpreted in this manner, SNIE 14.3-67 would have represented a victory for CIA analysts. They might have lost the battle over estimates of enemy strength, but they had taken the first step in limiting MACV claims of progress in the war. The issue driving the Order of Battle controversy was not the disagreement over the size of the forces arrayed against the allies in South Vietnam. Instead, it was an argument about which organization would be allowed to set the ground rules governing discourse about the war.

A simpler explanation for the controversy can, of course, be suggested. MACV's resistance to CIA meddling with its estimates of enemy strength might be explained by bureaucratic imperatives. Organizations can be expected to resist the efforts of other bureaucracies to encroach on their domain. MACV analysts also considered the CIA critique of their estimates to be amateurish: Adams, after all, was suggesting that old men, women, and children should be counted on the same list that tallied battle-hardened and highly capable NVA soldiers.

[56] On the pressures faced by officers who serve as intelligence analysts and evaluate the performance of their particular service, see Michael Handel, "The Politics of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 12 (October 1987): 18; and Gelb with Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam*, 309.

[57] "11/15/67 Memo From Rostow to LBJ," [including Memo from Helms] Joint Exhibit #963, 2, in *Westmoreland*.

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Indeed, organizational definitions of who constituted a combatant loomed large in the debate. MACV tended to take a narrow view of the issue, arguing that only males who were armed, fought full-time, and were under the control of higher authority should be counted as combatants. In comparison, CIA analysts took a broader view of the issue that reflected political realities more than traditional military criteria. MACV officers, however, did not initially maintain that Order of Battle analysis was none of the CIA's concern. In fact, their first response was favorable. CIA efforts to study the "VC Political Order of Battle" would allow MACV analysts to concentrate on what they considered to be important, the assessment of the NVA and VC forces organized along conventional lines.[58]

Because the military did not object to the CIA's initial foray into the Order of Battle business, the controversy over estimates of enemy strength, although influenced by differences in the CIA's and MACV's definition of the term combatant, was not prompted by a desire to protect organizational prerogatives. Instead, the bureaucratic struggle that took place between MACV and the CIA resembles the type of event captured by the political process theories advanced by Roger Hilsman, Samuel Huntington, Richard Neustadt, and Warner Schilling. With one important caveat, these theories—reflected in Graham Allison's notion that "players . . . make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics"—can explain the forces driving the debate over estimates.[59] Allison's explanation takes the rules of the bureaucratic game as a given, but in fact the rules of the game were being contested by MACV and the CIA.[60]

The Order of Battle controversy was a struggle to determine which organization would be able to set the agenda concerning debate about the war: MACV wanted a positive agenda, based upon the ideas of progress and impending success; while the CIA desired a pessimistic agenda that highlighted the relative lack of progress in South Vietnam compared to the resources that had been devoted to the conflict. The organization that lost this struggle would be put on the defensive. It would then have to shoulder the additional burden of proof by first demonstrating how its claims indicated that the prevailing wisdom was wrong.

What kind of evidence would support the contention that the Order of Battle debate was just an instrument in the struggle to determine which assumption

[58] Adler makes this observation about the attitude of officers engaged in Order of Battle work for MACV. See Adler, *Reckless Disregard*, 113.

[59] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 144; Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Report," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (December 1959): 361–382; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), esp. parts 1, 2, and 10; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley, 1960); and Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950" in Warner R. Schilling, Paul T. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

[60] Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 170.

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would govern debate about the war? Was the United States winning or losing in Vietnam? First, both sides in the debate agreed that there was tremendous uncertainty surrounding an estimate of the VC units that were the focus of Adams's analysis. The majority of CIA analysts and senior agency officials, for example, did not give their unqualified support to Adams's findings. They recognized that Adams's estimates, extrapolated from a detailed study of only one province, were weak. Because so little was known about the clandestine VC units, they also recognized that by changing the assumptions employed by Adams, other analysts could produce different but equally plausible results.[61] Moreover, MACV analysts would have agreed with the idea that the effort to estimate the strength of these VC units was difficult and that it was impossible to develop an exact assessment. MACV and CIA analysts could agree to disagree, creating a situation that was ripe for a compromise that could satisfy everyone except Adams. In fact, SNIE 14.3–67 was produced through compromise: it incorporated the numbers championed by MACV accompanied by the qualifications suggested by the CIA.

Second, just weeks before the Order of Battle controversy reached its peak, MACV analysts made a claim that the crossover point had been reached. The attrition objective had been achieved and by definition the United States was winning the war in Vietnam. MACV analysts always have pointed out, however, that Adams's analysis would have had no effect on their crossover calculations. In a sense they are absolutely correct; the attainment of the crossover point just indicated that enemy losses now exceeded replacements. This number could have been reached if the enemy had 600,000 or 225,000 troops. Yet, this claim does contain a disingenuous element: by projecting a continuous net reduction of two to three thousand soldiers per month from the Order of Battle (for example, the October estimate listed 224,581 for total enemy strength) Westmoreland was able to make the assertion in November 1967 that in two years the American commitment in South Vietnam could be scaled down.[62] If current trends continued, communist forces would have declined to a total strength of about 150,000 (224,581 − 72,000 [3000 per month loss × 24 months] = 152,581). In contrast, the light at the end of the tunnel was not so bright if one accepted Adams's analysis: it would take more than twelve years before American forces could begin to withdraw from South Vietnam (600,000 − 432,000 [3000 per month loss

[61] Ranelagh, *The Agency*, 459–460. In fact, during his testimony at the *U.S. v. Russo and Ellsberg* litigation in early 1973, Adams even admitted the difficulties inherent in estimating VC strength: "Now, even in the guerrillas . . . you are not absolutely sure how many to count. The same problem arises with the Self-Defense, Secret Self-Defense and particularly the Political Cadre. . . . It is very difficult to decide who to count." See Adler, *Reckless Disregard*, 196; and Cubbage, "*Westmoreland vs. CBS*," 136–137.

[62] Westmoreland made the prediction during an address to the National Press Club in Washington, DC. See "21 November 1967 Westmoreland Speech to the National Press Club," Joint Exhibit #360, 9, in *Westmoreland*.

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× 144 months] = 168,000). If Adams's analysis was accepted, MACV's claim of progress and impending success, based upon achieving the crossover point, would have appeared ludicrous. In effect, CIA officials and analysts used the Order of Battle issue to attempt to undermine claims of progress made by MACV based on crossover calculations.

Although the facts mustered by the CIA in questioning the military's claims of progress in the war were wrong, the general thrust of its critique of American policy has been vindicated by events. Over the years, the American public has been strongly attracted to this aspect of the controversy, especially as the arcane arguments that fueled the debate become increasingly shrouded by the mists of time. Americans are enamored with the image of a lone individual, Sam Adams, struggling against bureaucratic inertia to change the agenda governing discourse on Vietnam. When viewed from this perspective, his charges of conspiracy and malfeasance seem to explain the general failure of American policies in Southeast Asia. In a sense, Adams's accusations serve as a response to the stab-in-the-back thesis that has been suggested by some to explain the Vietnam debacle. The military, according to this argument, did not lose on the battlefields of Vietnam, but in the living rooms of America.[63] Adams's charges suggest that American policies in Vietnam failed not because they were badly conceived, poorly implemented, or lacked sufficient public support. Instead, members of the American military sowed the seeds of the Vietnam fiasco when they deliberately altered and suppressed information that indicated that their policies were failing.

Conclusion

If Adams's estimates were so wrong and his accusations of conspiracy unfounded, then why does his story continue to exert such a strong attraction? One could accuse General Westmoreland, DCI Helms, General Abrams, or senior members of their staffs of bad judgment and even stupidity. But to charge them with deliberately attempting to prevent accurate information from reaching members of the Johnson administration is absurd. Adams's refusal to recognize that honest differences of opinion could exist in the realm of intelligence analysis led him to an error rare among individuals with experience in large governmental organizations. He claimed that the workings of a conspiracy offered a better explanation of the shortcomings of intelligence analysis than human frailty or organizational pathologies.

History will probably depict Adams as a tragic figure who tilted at windmills, a man, according to his colleague George Carver, "who was often in error but seldom in doubt."[64] Adams's estimates were wrong, but he served as the point

[63] Jeffrey P. Kimball, "The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War," *Armed Forces and Society* 14 (Spring 1988): 433–458.

[64] Carver quoted in Adler, *Reckless Disregard*, 199.

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man for a CIA position that appears to be supported by subsequent events. In a sense, many Americans, including several observers of the Vietnam war, believe that Adams fought for a noble cause. Given this assumption, it is easy for them to ignore the fact that the substance of the claims made by Adams and the CIA were incorrect. Yet, as long as Americans focus on the assertions made by Adams, they will fail to recognize the real tragedies embodied in the debate over enemy strength.

First, most CIA and MACV analysts never looked beyond the bureaucratic ramifications of the controversy: analysis was replaced by continuous recrimination when institutional priorities were threatened. No effort was made to exploit Order of Battle analyses in a way that would assist the actual prosecution of the war. Ironically, Americans only questioned each other about the discrepancy between the estimates contained in captured documents used by Adams and the analyses produced by the best efforts of the entire intelligence community. Instead, MACV and the CIA should have attempted to exploit this discrepancy for intelligence purposes and not as a weapon in bureaucratic battle. In other words, they might have tried to determine what might happen if the communists actually believed the figures that were contained in their secret communications. The Americans might have attempted to identify the opportunities that could become available if the communists possessed an exaggerated sense of their own capabilities. For instance, analysts at both the CIA and MACV dismissed as unrealistic VC calls for civilian help in upcoming attacks (which turned out to be the Tet offensive), because they correctly estimated that the communists lacked widespread support. If they had realized that communist documents indicated that this support was available, they might have recognized one of the warnings they possessed about the impending attacks. In an atmosphere charged by bureaucratic battle, however, this type of analysis was simply not undertaken within the intelligence community.

Second, junior analysts began to champion vigorously their estimates in the policy debates conducted by senior officials. Instead of simply informing their superiors of the conclusions that they had drawn from the analysis of raw data, according to Tom Cubbage, they wanted senior officials ". . . to accept and to act on their intelligence product, no matter what the consequences."[65] A policy-to-please syndrome, to coin a phrase, emerged when analysts pressured intelligence consumers to modify policies in response to estimates. In a strange turn of events, analysts who only focused on small aspects of the war somehow managed to convince themselves and others that they were qualified to address the most important questions of strategy confronting the allies. As a result, the tasks faced by senior officers and officials were complicated by the repeated need to respond to the policy and bureaucratic implications of every turn in the debate over the Order of Battle. Under these circumstances, the Order of Battle contro-

[65] Cubbage, "*Westmoreland vs. CBS*," 167.

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versy became a self-sustaining phenomenon that exerted a disproportionate and ultimately counterproductive influence over commanders and analysts. Mundane efforts to use information to better prosecute the war simply fell by the wayside.

Third, the intelligence-to-please syndrome influenced estimates of enemy strength, especially those produced by officers working as analysts. Personal and institutional considerations apparently influenced the decisions made by middle-level officers to shape the reports produced by junior analysts in a way that supported the policies adopted by the American military. In fact, the Order of Battle controversy demonstrates that military institutions engaged in intelligence work are likely to experience the breakdown in the distinction between intelligence analysis and policy formulation that is at the heart of the intelligence-to-please syndrome. It is extremely difficult for individuals to resist the pressures that emerge when they are asked to evaluate information directly bearing on the performance of their own organizations. Yet, Americans were not prepared in Fall 1967 to deal with the problems generated by civil-intelligence-military relations.[66]

In sum, the negative consequences supposedly produced by Adams's alleged conspiracy pale in comparison to the existing state of affairs within the American intelligence community on the eve of the Tet offensive. Indeed, a breakdown in the distinction between the roles played by intelligence analysts and policy makers produced a situation far more detrimental to American aims in Southeast Asia than the workings of any conspiracy. Ultimately, the Order of Battle controversy created a situation in which the paper war fought in the bureaucracies of Washington and Saigon sometimes took precedence over the shooting war occurring on the battlefields of Vietnam.*

[66] Michael Handel has already noted that the topic of civil-military-intelligence relations largely remains unexamined. He has called for the development of a theoretical framework, patterned after Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, to study this relationship. See Handel, ed., *Leaders and Intelligence*, 4.

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The Changing Relationship between Economics and National Security

AARON L. FRIEDBERG

Since ancient Athens taxed its empire to raise a fleet against Sparta, there has always been a strong connection between wealth and military power and, therefore, in the most simple and direct way, between economics and national security. But to what extent will these two subjects continue to be linked in a world in which, for the more developed countries at least, the prospect of war seems to be shrinking, while the importance of peaceful commercial exchange expands? The purpose of this article is to suggest that while the relationships may have grown more complex, economics and national security are and will continue to be intimately intertwined. This point can best be illustrated by identifying four sets of issues that will come increasingly to occupy the attention of scholars and government officials in the years ahead.

The Impact of National Defense on Economic Performance

The first cluster of concerns has to do with the impact of war—broadly defined in the Hobbesian sense to include both actual fighting and preparations for it—on national economic performance. Since the end of the World War II it is the second part of this problem that has most concerned the two superpowers, locked as they were in an armaments competition of unprecedented scope and seemingly limitless duration. Over the last forty-five years the United States and the Soviet Union have built and discarded generation after generation of new weapons, but

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thanks largely to the very destructiveness of those devices, they have never gone to war with one another.

Prior to 1945 the United States, blessed by geography, had never felt the need to raise and maintain large defense forces except in time of actual conflict. It is therefore hardly surprising that, during the first fifteen years of the cold war, there were constant worries that the new and unprecedented levels of peacetime military spending would wreck the nation's economy by giving rise to ruinous inflation, devastatingly high taxes or both. Such fears faded for a time, as the economy grew at a healthy pace and the share of national resources devoted to defense tended generally to decline; but they returned with a vengeance in the 1980s.[1]

The correlation between the defense build-up that began in the late 1970s and peaked in the mid-1980s and the apparent collapse in American international economic competitiveness that accompanied it caused some to conclude that these two developments were directly linked. As the decade wore on and the trade and federal budget deficits grew, there was increasing concern that the United States had become overextended. Like other great powers of the past, it was claimed, America had allowed itself to be weighed down by worldwide commitments that were now deranging its finances and undermining its long-term economic health. The only way out of this trap, it seemed, was for the United States to shed its external burdens, bring home its overseas forces, and cut deeply into its defense budget.[2]

Just how bad, on balance, cold war defense spending was for the American economy is still open to debate. It is likely, however, that those who have emphasized military burdens as the prime cause of U.S. difficulties have underestimated the complexity of the economic relationships involved, overlooked other contributing factors, and overstated their case.[3]

If any country became overextended in the course of the cold war, it was not the United States but the Soviet Union, which may actually have been directing over one quarter of its GNP to defense, far more than was generally assumed to be the case and as much as four times more than the burden being borne by the United States. This fact may have escaped the attention of most Western analysts, but it had a powerful impact both on Soviet reality and on the perceptions of a new generation of Soviet leaders.[4]

Determining exactly how and to what extent the exertions of their military

[1] See, for example, Lester Thurow, "How to Wreck the Economy," *The New York Review of Books*, 14 May 1981, 3–8.

[2] See David Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); also Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

[3] For an elaboration of this argument see Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Political Economy of American Strategy," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989): 381–406.

[4] See the essays in Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, eds., *The Impoverished Superpower* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1989).

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competition contributed to the respective economic problems of the two superpowers is an important historical question. Nevertheless, in its more immediate and practical form, the overextension debate has now been overtaken by events. With the collapse of Soviet power the question for both sides is no longer, "What are the effects of continued high levels of defense spending?" Rather, "what will be the impact of real and deep defense cuts on long-term economic performance?"

Both superpowers now face the challenge, which is as much political as it is economic, of redirecting resources freed from defense into uses that will strengthen productivity and stimulate growth. For the Soviets, who struggle to convert a heavily militarized, centrally planned economy into a smoothly functioning, civilian-oriented market system, this is quite literally a matter of life and death. For the United States in the wake of the Gulf war, both the share of national resources (certainly no more than 3 percent of GNP if U.S. defense spending is eventually cut proportionately in half, versus 10–15 percent of GNP for an equivalent reduction on the Soviet side) and the stakes involved, although substantial, will be considerably lower. The question for Americans is not if their economy can be saved by defense cuts, but whether they can take advantage of those reductions to improve their country's overall performance, in particular its international competitiveness.

The answer to this question will depend on where the resources freed by defense cuts go. That, in turn, will depend partly on certain political decisions.[5] Reductions in defense spending could lead to smaller budget deficits, lower interest rates, and increased private investment. But given the politics of the budget process, such savings could also be applied to other uses, such as expanding nondefense government programs. Some of these, like spending for education and infrastructure improvements, could enhance productivity. But others, like more entitlement benefits for the middle and upper classes, would not contribute as much to the nation's long-term economic well-being.[6]

Cuts in military spending—including reductions in defense-related research and development (R&D)—could reduce overall demand for skilled scientists and engineers, thereby holding down their wages and making it easier for civilian industry to employ them in conducting commercial R&D.[7] But there may be a variety of reasons why corporations have not been investing more in R&D. Some of them having nothing directly to do with the cost of skilled labor.[8] Merely

[5] For a fuller discussion, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "In Search of the Peace Dividend," *The Wilson Quarterly* 14 (Autumn 1990): 78–9.

[6] Many early, optimistic estimates of the macroeconomic impact of defense cuts simply assumed that all such reductions would be applied to lowering the budget deficit. See "The High Cost of Olive Branches," *U.S. News and World Report*, 11 December 1989, 32–33; and "The Peace Economy," *Business Week*, 11 December 1989, 50–55.

[7] See, for example, the discussion in Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

[8] Thus, for example, a recent survey by the National Science Foundation found that corporate spending on R&D had not risen very much during the latter half of the 1980s in part because the large

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cutting back on defense research may not have a very large effect. Other government policies (like changes in the tax laws) could be needed to stimulate commercial R&D. Unless other forms of research activity increase, reductions in defense R&D could lead in the short run to an underemployment of the nation's human resources and, in the long term, to a smaller pool of highly skilled scientists and engineers.

It is sometimes claimed that if the government had spent less over the years on defense-related R&D, it might have been able to spend more federal money on research with direct commercial applications.[9] The end of the cold war, in this view, provides a unique opportunity for government to shift its priorities and to do more to bolster national competitiveness in a variety of civilian sectors. Whatever the merits of the case may be, this argument overlooks a crucial political fact: throughout the postwar period direct government support for developing civilian technology has been scarce, not because of resources, but because of ideology. As one French observer has explained it, in the United States there has been widespread agreement that, while the federal authorities had a part to play in supporting basic scientific research and funding work of immediate military importance, it was "not the government's role to become involved with commercial technological development, which [was] a matter for private firms."[10]

Consensus on this issue has now begun to break down, and the question of the state's proper role in promoting technical development has become an increasingly contentious political issue. For the moment, however, there is little prospect of a substantial shift toward government spending on commercial research, no matter what happens to the size of the defense budget.

The Impact of Economic Change on National Security

The second way in which economics and national security will remain linked is through the effects of global economic change on the power and position of individual states. There are three distinct issues here, the first and most fundamental of which has to do with the implications for international politics of the process of uneven national growth. As some economies expand more rapidly than others, the distribution of wealth among states begins to shift; and with these shifts in wealth come, eventually, changes in the distribution of political power. Such changes are often accompanied by considerable turmoil and some-

numbers of firms involved in mergers or acquisitions during that period tended to reduce their research budgets. See "Slow R&D Spending Growth Continues into 1990s," *Science Resources Studies Highlights*, National Science Foundation Newsletter 90–307 (March 1990). For further discussion of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on corporate R&D, see Office of Technology Assessment, *Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing*, OTA-ITE-443 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], February 1990), 46–7.

[9] Melman, *Permanent War Economy*, 95.

[10] Jean-Claude Derian, *America's Struggle for Leadership in Technology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 104.

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times even by war, as rising states begin to throw their weight around and declining ones seek to hold onto their previous privileges.[11]

Since the end of World War II the worldwide distribution of economic resources has changed substantially. Although the United States has grown much wealthier in absolute terms since 1945, other countries have expanded even more rapidly and the relative American predominance in the world economy has thus been considerably reduced. Because of the cold war, however, and the central role of the United States in providing military protection to its allies and trading partners, none of the other Western powers has ever really wanted to challenge American leadership. Nations that might otherwise have been more inclined to assert themselves as they grew wealthier and stronger have for the most part chosen not to do so; as a result, the political consequences of economic change have thus far been relatively muted.

Among its other effects, the end of the cold war will crack the crust that has been holding existing alignments in place and hasten a fundamental restructuring of the international political system. In particular, the implosion of the Soviet empire will loosen the ties that bind the present Western alliance together and make possible the reemergence after forty-five years of Japan and Germany as major and much more independent world powers. The events of the late 1980s will permit these two countries to step more easily into the political roles to which their economic success has seemed increasingly to entitle them. Often announced and long anticipated, the transition from bipolarity to something more closely approximating true multipolarity seems finally to be at at hand. The central political questions of the coming era are whether this transformation can be managed without serious disruptions in relations among the central actors, what the characteristics of the new system will be, and in particular whether it will be as stable as the one it is replacing.

In the past, changes in the distribution of wealth have always been accompanied by shifts in the distribution of military capabilities, because it is largely through the possession of such capabilities that states have secured their interests and exerted political power. At present there is a sharp discontinuity between the economic stature of two of the major powers (Japan and Germany) and their military capabilities. Whether or not this gap persists will go a long way toward determining if the system now emerging will be distinctly different from any that has existed in the past. Will it be one in which leading states are much less concerned about providing for their own physical security and in which military power is therefore much less important than it used to be? Or will it be one that is really not so different from earlier multipolar systems with their shifting alliances and their propensity for diplomatic surprise and periodic armed conflict?

[11] See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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Economic forces are changing not only the structure of the international system, but the manner in which it functions. In recent years, analysts have noted a marked tendency toward what has come to be referred to as globalization. As a result of improvements in transportation and communication, countries at all levels of development are becoming increasingly tightly interconnected – not only through the traditional ties of trade; but also by vast and rapid financial flows, exchanges of information, people, and technology; increases in all forms of foreign investment; the worldwide dispersal of production facilities by large corporations; and the formation of business alliances across national boundaries. The possible impact of these trends on the security of individual states has already begun to be felt in two related areas.

At one time only a handful of countries were capable of developing and producing the most sophisticated forms of military hardware; but as demonstrated recently and dramatically by Iraq, that number has now increased substantially. Drawing on assistance from friendly governments, the services of foreign scientists and corporations, and, increasingly, their own domestic resources, a lengthening list of states has acquired the capability to manufacture everything from tanks to fighter aircraft to ballistic missiles.[12] The number of nations able to assemble weapons of mass destruction (whether nuclear, chemical, or biological) has also been increasing,[13] as has the ability of even less developed countries to provide themselves with secure channels of communication (through the use, among other things, of fiber optic cables and commercially available encryption devices) and advanced intelligence (through access to satellites, whether nationally or privately launched).[14]

The diffusion of military capabilities brought about by globalization will make certain Third World states more dangerous to their neighbors; and it also could render them less susceptible to influence or interference from outside powers. With more potential sources of weapons and equipment, belligerents in future wars may be less dependent on any one country for rearmament and thus less vulnerable to diplomatic pressures backed by threats of supply interruptions. Outsiders will also have to think long and hard about intervening in Third World conflicts, if by so doing they would risk exposing their forces, overseas facilities, and perhaps even their home territory (or that of their regional allies) to the most

[12] Between 1965 and 1984 there was a considerable increase in the number of Third World countries capable of building fighter aircraft (from one to eight), helicopters (from one to six), and tanks (from one to six). See Future Security Environment Working Group, *The Future Security Environment* (Washington, DC: Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, October 1988), 49. On the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, see W. Seth Carus, *Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, June 1988).

[13] See W. Seth Carus, *Chemical Weapons in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, December 1988).

[14] On the growing access to overhead reconnaissance information, see Ann M. Florini, "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Satellites and U.S. Security," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988): 81–123.

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devastating forms of attack. The course of events in the Persian Gulf would probably have been quite different if Iraq had waited to bring its nuclear weapons program to fruition before launching its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

At the same time as globalization is reducing the military dependence of some less developed countries, it will pose serious challenges to the continued strategic independence of the more advanced nations. With the dispersion of centers of production and technological development and the increased sophistication and expense of modern weaponry, fewer and fewer states will be able at acceptable cost to provide entirely for their own defense. Whatever their initial preferences, the major European powers have been driven increasingly into cooperative, multinational ventures in order to be able to afford to develop and produce modern weapons systems.[15]

Even the United States, long accustomed to virtual autonomy in defense production, has recently had to face up to the fact that it now imports many of the parts and subassemblies that are incorporated into its major weapons systems. The possibility that the United States may soon be dependent on foreign sources, not only for standard components but for the most advanced forms of civilian and military technology, has also begun to receive anxious official attention.[16]

For both the United States and its traditional allies, resisting the tendency toward globalization could have considerable and perhaps unbearable costs, especially in a period in which defense budgets are likely to be declining rapidly. On the other hand, acquiescing to the forces of economic change will leave countries less fully in control of their own defense and hence of their security than they have been accustomed to be in the past.[17]

Economic Statecraft

Even in a world of much lower levels of military tension and a much higher degree of economic integration and interdependence, politics is not going to cease and neither is political conflict. States are going to continue to have differences, and they are going to continue to try to impose their will on one another. In the past, nations have often used economic instruments as a way of attempting to

[15] See Andrew Moravcsik, "Defense Co-Operation: The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads," *Survival* 32 (January-February 1990): 65–85; also see Martyn Bittleston, *Co-operation or Competition? Defence Procurement Options for the 1990s*, Adelphi Paper 250 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

[16] For two expressions of this concern, see Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), *Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 1988); also Defense Science Board, *The Defense Industrial and Technology Base* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 1988).

[17] For more on this issue, see Ethan B. Kapstein, "Losing Control—National Security and the Global Economy," *The National Interest* 18 (Winter 1989–90): 85–90; also Theodore H. Moran, "The Globalization of American Defense Industries," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 57–99; and Moran, "International Economics and Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Winter 1990–91): 80–82.

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influence the political behavior of their rivals (and sometimes their friends as well).[18] Such practices could become more common in the years ahead, as interdependence intensifies, political relationships shift, and the utility of military power in most situations remains relatively low. National security policy may, therefore, come to encompass measures designed to reduce a country's vulnerability to economic influence attempts (and, perhaps, to enhance its capacity for exploiting the vulnerabilities of others), as well as the more traditional forms of preparation for military defense.

There are basically three different kinds of situations in which economic statecraft could play a central role. The first are those in which relatively weak states seek to use their control over scarce resources to influence the policies of the comparatively strong and wealthy. This, of course, is what the Arab oil-producing countries sought to accomplish in the 1970s and in part what Saddam Hussein hoped to achieve in 1990. With no one state able to exert control over a decisive fraction of world reserves, the diversity of suppliers' difficulties of coordinating their policies and the dependence of many on their customers for protection will continue to limit the oil weapon utility in achieving specific strategic objectives. As in the past, what is true of oil will be even more the case for other, less critical commodities.

A second form of economic statecraft would involve attempts by strong states to use trade and financial assistance to shape the political preferences of the weak. Sanctions are the most familiar instrument for this purpose, although their successful application usually requires the cooperation of a large number of states. It is also possible that under certain conditions, individual countries might try to build blocs or spheres around themselves, as Germany and Japan sought to do in Central Europe and East Asia respectively during the 1930s.[19]

A large country's willingness to direct private investment and governmental assistance on especially generous terms toward its smaller neighbors could help to make them more sensitive to its wishes. If they found their exports to other parts of the world blocked by rising tariffs, smaller countries could become dependent on a larger one that was willing to grant them continued access to its domestic markets. The price extracted by the bloc leader might be primarily economic—preferred treatment for its own exporters and investors. But its demands could also come to have a political component—support for its positions in international organizations, mutual security arrangements, access to military facilities, or simply the denial of such access to third parties.

The final and in many ways most dangerous possibility is that strong countries could begin with increasing frequency to use economic instruments against one another. As the extent to which the United States was relying on foreign (and

[18] See David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); also Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[19] For the classic account of German policies, see Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945).

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especially Japanese) investors to finance its budget deficit became clear during the 1980s, there were growing fears that the United States might be becoming, as one writer put it, a "prisoner of foreign capital."[20] If Japanese investors were ever to hold back from buying U.S. Treasury securities, it was claimed, the results could include rapidly rising interest rates (which would lead to slower U.S. economic growth) and a drastic decline in the value of the dollar (which would promote inflation). The mere threat of such action could conceivably be sufficient to force American compliance with Japan's wishes. In the course of particularly tough negotiations over trade or in some future crisis in which American and Japanese interests diverged, it has been suggested that the United States could find itself exposed to powerful, if subtle pressures.[21]

Similar concerns have arisen as a result of the growing U.S. reliance on imports of high-technology products like semiconductors. Especially if they were concentrated in a single country, sudden loss of access to foreign suppliers could make it very difficult for the United States quickly to increase production of a wide range of weapons and communications systems.[22] The threat of such disruption would send a strong signal of displeasure at, for example, an American effort to resupply an allied third party involved in a regional conflict. The actual imposition of an export embargo could delay and disrupt any American attempt at emergency military mobilization.[23]

Putting aside the question of whether governments would have sufficient control over private actors to put their plans into effect, the principal and powerful objection to all such scenarios is that relations between big and wealthy states typically involves a considerable degree of mutual dependence. This means that it would be very difficult, for example, for Japan to do serious economic harm to the United States without causing grievous injury to itself and vice versa. Thus, if the Japanese government were to take steps that resulted in an American recession and a collapsing dollar, they would in the process hurt their own exporters and diminish the value of the many dollar-denominated assets held by their investors. Similarly, if in an effort to punish Japan for some aspect of its foreign policy, the United States government were to place steep tariffs on

[20] Felix Rohatyn, "Restoring American Independence," *New York Review of Books*, 18 February 1988, 9–10.

[21] For an attempt to sketch out such a scenairo, see Daniel Burstein, *Yen!* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990), 13–20.

[22] See Defense Science Board, *Report of the Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, February 1987).

[23] All of this assumes that a single foreign government would have both the willingness and the ability to halt the flow of critical components into the United States. Because of the diversity of suppliers this may not in fact be possible in many cases. See the discussion in Moran, "The Globalization of America's Defense Industries." Nevertheless, American worries about semiconductor dependence have been fed by the remarks of some Japanese commentators. See Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say "No"* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 20–23.

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Japanese-made semiconductors, one of the main effects would be to drive up the price of the many American products into which those components are now built.

That any attempt by one big power to use economic instruments against another would be costly and risky does not, of course, render it unthinkable. Indeed, the very existence of mutual risk could encourage both sides to regard exercises in economic statecraft as tests of strength and will from which it might be very difficult for them to back away.[24] Moreover, the fact that a particular course of action would be harmful to a nation's economic well-being cannot be said to rule it out as a real possibility, especially in situations where there would be other important values at stake.

National and Economic Security

If there is at present a strong trend toward greater international economic integration, there is also, as Robert Gilpin has pointed out, a powerful countervailing tendency towards "benign mercantilism," an approach to national economic policy that is designed to enable a society to "retain domestic autonomy and possess valued industries in a world characterized by the internationalization of production, global integration of financial markets, and the diminution of national control."[25] In the United States, the case for benign mercantilism generally takes the form of appeals for government action to preserve the nation's "economic security." The phrase means different things to different people and, indeed, its very vagueness is what accounts for some of its present popularity.

At one level, appeals to this new concept are related to the fairly familiar problems of maintaining an adequate defense industrial base. Anxious experts point out that globalization is eroding traditional U.S. autonomy in defense production, and they call for government action to protect certain existing industries, to assist in the development of important new ones, and to regulate foreign investment in American companies whose products could be crucial to defense research or military mobilization.

Although there are undoubtedly real problems, and while some of the concern expressed over them is certainly sincere, it is also true that economic security has become a rallying cry for special interests. Representatives for industries as diverse as semiconductors and textiles have proclaimed their essential importance to the nation's defense and have called upon the federal government to protect

[24] The analogy here may be to situations of mutual nuclear deterrence in which each side has the capacity to do terrible damage to the other, but in which one or the other or both may be willing to manipulate the risk of such a catastrophe in order to achieve its objectives. The nature of this relationship between debtor and creditor is suggested in C. Fred Bergsten, "Economic Imbalances and World Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring 1987): 784.

[25] Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 404.

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them against intense foreign competition.[26] Some of these claims are clearly more serious than others. Likewise, while there may be legitimate reasons to worry about specific instances of foreign direct investment, much of the fear expressed over alien intrusions into the American economy is driven more by xenophobia than by analysis.[27]

Beyond any direct connection to defense, real or alleged, there is another, less clearly defined conception of economic security that has begun to gain attention in recent years. To an ever great degree, the wealth of nations has come to depend on their ability to engage successfully in international economic competition. Doing well requires staying at the forefront of developing and commercializing new technologies and maintaining a capacity to manufacture and market the products of scientific progress.

On these points there is little debate. Where disagreement *does* arise, at least in the United States, is over the government role in promoting the fortunes of industries that may be critical to the nation's economic future, regardless of their importance to national defense. Other states appear to be using various forms of direct intervention (including protection, subsidies, and funding for research and development) in an effort to help nationally-based high-technology firms gain competitive advantages.[28] The question is whether the U.S. government ought to follow suit, or whether it would do better to hold to its traditional indirect approach of ensuring a favorable overall economic climate, promoting competition, and relying on market forces.

This issue is at the heart of an emerging debate, the fourth in the last one hundred years over the proper economic role of the American state. The first, at the turn of the century, resulted in an expanded federal role in regulating private industry. The second, in the 1930s and 1940s, led to the government assuming an increased responsibility for stabilizing the nation's economy, using fiscal and monetary tools to limit excesses of unemployment or inflation. The

[26] See, for example, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, *Mobilization Requirements of the Domestic Textile Industry*, 99th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1986); and Hearings Before the Subcommitee on Technology and Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee, *Issues Confronting the Semiconductor Industry*, 100th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1987).

[27] For a dispassionate discussion of the national security raised by foreign direct investment, see Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, *Foreign Direct Investment in the United States* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1989), 73–93.

[28] Whether these efforts have been successful and, indeed, whether it is even theoretically possible for them to have been so is the issue at stake in discussions of industrial policy and, more recently, strategic trade policy. On the latter, see the essays in Paul R. Krugman, ed., *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); also Paul R. Krugman, "Strategic Sectors and International Competition" in Robert M. Stern, ed., *U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 207–232; Klaus Stegemann, "Models of Strategic Trade Policy, *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989): 73–100; and J. David Richardson, "Strategic Trade Policy," *International Organization* 44 (Winter 1990): 107–135.

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third, which also began during the Depression and has continued down to the present, centers on the question of how far the state should go in ensuring the economic welfare of individual citizens. The fourth debate, in the closing decade of this century, will be over what part government should take in deliberately promoting the international competitiveness of the U.S economy, thereby presumably enhancing the nation's relative wealth, its power, and thus its "security," by some definition of that notoriously slippery and expansible term.*

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Congressional Caucuses and Party Leaders in the House of Representatives

SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND

This article focuses on the relationship between party leaders and congressional caucuses. Leaders operate in a context set by factors in the polity and the internal organizational structure of Congress.[1] In the 1990s that context has been affected by the decline of party in the electorate and increasingly complicated and crosscutting issues on governmental agendas. Congress has become more decentralized structually and more egalitarian with increased opportunity for active participation by individual members. Changing norms have increased expectations that leaders will respond to demands of individuals and groups within the Congress.[2]

[1] Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981): 411–425; Charles O. Jones, "House Leadership in an Age of Reform" in Frank H. Mackaman, ed., *Understanding Congress* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1981); and Frank Mackaman, ed., *Understanding Congress*, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1981).

[2] See, for example, Charles S. Bullock, III and Burdett A. Loomis, "The Changing Congressional Career" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985); Christopher J. Deering and Steven S. Smith, "Subcommittees in Congress" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed.; "The House in Transition: Partnership and Opposition" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed.; Norman

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In an institution with changing norms and a fluid structure, informal congressional caucuses have flourished. Caucuses are voluntary groups of members of Congress, without formal recognition in chamber rules or line-item appropriations, that seek a role in the policy process. They enable members of Congress to pursue policy, representation, and reelection goals.[3] They have the potential to assist or to make more difficult the work of party leaders. By integrating issue networks, caucuses can help coordination and centralization within Congress.[4] However, caucuses also increase structural fragmentation. If, as a consequence, integrated lawmaking becomes more difficult, the ability of the leaders to carry out institutional responsibilities may be decreased.[5]

This article focuses on the following questions: What is the relationship between the work of party leaders and caucus formation? How do caucuses affect the work of leaders in managing the House and the legislative process? Do caucuses carry out any leadership functions? And what are the lessons of the leader-caucus relationship in the contemporary Congress? Questions of organizational adaptation can be addressed, and the relationship between the individual and the institution in an era of change can be assessed.

The information reported here is drawn from ninety-five semifocused, open-ended interviews conducted from 1977–1988 during the 95th–100th Congresses with staff directors of congressional caucuses and interviews with leadership staff in the House conducted from 1983–1988 during the 98th–100th Congresses. All respondents were promised anonymity. All unattributed quotations are from the interviews. A computer file with caucus membership, electoral and seniority data, and constituency characteristics for each representative in the 97th Congress is also drawn on.

An Overview of Caucuses

In recent years the number of caucuses has increased significantly. Before 1969 only three had been established: the partisan House Democratic Study Group

J. Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, "The Senate Through the 1980s" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed.; Barbara Sinclair, "The Speaker's Task Force in the Post-Reform House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1981): 667–681; Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

[3] Burdett A. Loomis, "Congressional Caucuses and the Politics of Representation" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, ed., *Congress Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1981); Susan Webb Hammond, Daniel P. Mulhollan, and Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., "Congressional Caucuses as Interest Groups" in Alan Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, 1st ed. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1981); and Susan Webb Hammond, "Congressional Caucuses in the Policy Process" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989).

[4] Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Susan Webb Hammond, and Daniel P. Mulhollan, "Congressional Caucuses: Changes in Decisionmaking Networks" (Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Denver, 1981).

[5] See, for example, Loomis, "Congressional Caucuses."

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and House Wednesday Group, and the bipartisan, bicameral Members of Congress for Peace through Law (now renamed the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus). Between 1970 and 1974 another ten groups were established, seven in the House and three in the Senate. After 1974 the rate of group formation increased rapidly: by 1980, 57 more groups were established; between 1981 and 1987, 90 more had been formed. During the first session of the 100th Congress (1987) 118 caucuses operated; 42 others had been disbanded. All representatives, including party leaders, now belong to caucuses.

Six types of caucuses can be distinguished on a two-dimensional membership measure based on caucus purpose and shared member characteristics. The caucuses within each group are alike because members have a common characteristic such as party and ideology, representation of constituency interests, or personal interest in an issue.

Party Caucuses, which include class clubs (Democrats or Republicans who begin their terms in the same Congress) are formed within each chamber by intraparty groups with a similar ideology. They seek to influence party positions and legislative outcomes within the chamber and increasingly within the national party. The Conservative Democratic Forum (Boll Weevils) of conservative Democrats, or the Conservative Opportunity Society of conservative Republicans are typical.

The common characteristic for members of the *Personal Interest Caucuses* is interest in an issue—for example, some foreign policy issues, the arts, or families and children. Caucus activities are not directly linked to representation of constituent interests. Many of the personal interest caucuses focus on agendas or, because of the diversity of views among a large membership who agree on the importance of an issue but not on specific programs, serve primarily an informational function. They concern party leaders to the extent that they fragment agendas or serve as a catalyst for legislative action by individual members.

The four other types of caucuses are constituency based. Members of the *National Constituency Caucuses* are perceived and perceive themselves as representing groups nationwide, outside as well as within their congressional districts or states: blacks, women, Hispanics, Vietnam-era veterans. Caucus concerns are diverse, and the focus is on a wide range of issues. *Regional Caucuses* work on issues of particular concern to a geographic region—the Northeast-Midwest, the sunbelt, or western states, for example. The issues often transcend party lines, making it more difficult for party leaders to achieve party unity. Members of the *State/District Caucuses* represent concerns of constituents with a common characteristic: family farmers, rural residents, or ethnic groups. The issues of concern to these caucuses also often transcend party lines. *State/District-Industry Caucuses* are active on the problems of a specific industry or business within a state or district: coal, steel, textiles, or mushrooms, for example. These caucuses have close ties to a subsystem[6] and the issues cut across party.

[6] See, for example, Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens, "Caucuses as Interest Groups."

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As data presented below reveal, there are major differences between party caucuses and all other types of caucuses in their relationship with congressional leaders.

The Origins and Institutionalization of Caucuses

Although a number of factors converged to create the conditions for an accelerated rate of caucus formation, the failure of party leadership was a significant catalyst.[7] Members felt that their concerns were being neglected by party leaders: important issues were not being addressed by committees; groups, particularly ideological ones within the parties, were not fairly represented on committees or within the party; and members were too often asked to vote on controversial bills that had virtually no chance of becoming law. Initially, party leaders were threatened by these new and uncontrolled congressional subunits. However, leaders gradually responded to rank-and-file demands and extended their inclusive leadership style to caucuses by supporting institutionalization and including caucus representatives in leadership legislative deliberations. This adaptation also enabled party leaders to use caucuses to meet institutional goals.

Caucus Formation

Caucuses are perceived by members as a response to decline in the strength of party leadership within Congress and to the failure of leaders to adapt congressional structures to handle the increasingly complex and crosscutting issues facing Congress. Forty percent of the caucus respondents specifically mentioned the weakness or failure of party leaders as an important element in caucus formation. A typical view is presented by Representative Robert W. Edgar (D-PA), chair of the Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition in the 97th Congress: ". . . chief among the reasons [for caucus formation] were such factors as failure of the . . . leadership structure to adjust to an era in which more educated, better informed Members are requiring better leadership on increasingly complex public policy problems. . . ."[8] A similar argument is made by a former caucus director: "[Caucuses were established because of] the new independence of congressional members from the traditional formal leadership of the House, which, in its thus weakened state, allowed ad hoc groups to arise and fill the vacuum."[9] Another

[7] For more detailed discussion of the factors that affected and facilitated caucus formation, see Susan Webb Hammond, Daniel P. Mulhollan and Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., "The Institutionalization of Interests in Congress: An Organizational Perspective on Informal Groups" (Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Dallas, 1981).

[8] Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Legislative Service Organizations, Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st sess., *Report* (Washington, DC: Committee Print, 24 June 1987), 57.

[9] Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., *Conservatives Stalk the House: The Republican Study Committee, 1971–1980* (Ottawa, IL: Green Hill Publishers, 1983), 2.

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caucus staff director noted that "The breakdown of [party] leadership, and also the breakdown of committee leadership, has probably helped to create all the special interest and special purpose caucuses."

Failure of party leaders to respond to members' specific policy concerns was also important. For example, liberal Democrats established the Democratic Study Group to counteract the party leadership, including committee chairs.[10] The Hispanic Caucus was established to overcome "the inaccessibility of the leadership." A factor in the formation of the Republican Study Committee was that "Party leadership staff is not available to rank and file members for assistance on their legislative agendas."[11]

As more complicated and crosscutting issues appeared and as party leaders had increasing difficulty coordinating a decentralized and even fragmented institution, caucus formation accelerated. Early caucuses were primarily within-party and focused on a number of broad issues. More recently, most caucuses are bipartisan and focus on a set of issues surrounding a single concern (rural Americans) or an industry (steel, textiles). (See Table 1.) For these caucuses, failure of party and party leaders to address major crosscutting concerns of members and constituents were important elements in caucus formation.[12] Caucuses have benefitted from the recent shift to a more inclusive leadership style: representatives of caucuses have been appointed to party committees; and caucus experts have served on leadership task forces. But success in achieving inclusion has encouraged, rather than discouraged, caucus formation. As Speakers become more involved in setting House agendas and in working on issues prior to committee consideration,[13] caucuses form because issues are *not* on the leaders' agenda—and caucuses hope to change that. Table 2 displays the number of caucuses of each type in the 100th Congress.

Institutionalization

Party leaders acquiesced in and then supported and facilitated the recognition and resulting institutionalization of caucuses by approving office space, supporting

[10] Mark F. Ferber, "The Formation of the Democratic Study Group" in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., *Congressional Behavior* (New York: Random House, 1971); Arthur G. Stevens, Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas E. Mann, "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955–1970: The Democratic Study Group," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974): 667–681.

[11] Feulner, *Conservatives*, 24.

[12] State/district industry and personal interest caucuses especially have proliferated in recent years. This reflects the increasing fragmentation and specialization of issue areas within the polity. It also confirms that success breeds success: interview data indicate that the success of early industry and party caucuses led others to form similar groups. See Susan Webb Hammond, Daniel P. Mulhollan, and Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., *Informal Congressional Groups in National Policymaking* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming). Much of the increase in the number of party groups is attributable to the class clubs.

[13] See, for example, John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Viking, 1989).

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TABLE 1

Increase in Informal Congressional Caucuses

Years	*Number*	*Type*	*Partisan*	*Bipartisan*
1959–1968	3	Party (2)	2	
		Personal Interest (1)		1
1969–1974	10	Party (5)	5	
		Personal Interest (1)		
		National (1)		5
		Regional (1)		
		State/District (2)		
1975–1980	57	Party (7)*	7	
		Personal Interest (7)		
		National (5)		
		Regional (10)		50
		State/District (9)		
		State/District Industry (19)		
1981–1987	90	Party (14)**	14	
		Personal Interest (27)		
		National (1)		
		Regional (10)		76
		State/District (18)		
		State/District Industry (20)		

* Includes five class clubs.

** Includes eight class clubs.

Source: Author's Data.

TABLE 2

Caucuses, by Type, First Session, 100th Congress

Type	*Number*	*Percent*
Party	17[a]	14
Personal Interest	29	24
National Constituency	5	4
Regional	16	14
State/District	19	17
State/District Industry	32	27
TOTAL	118	

[a] Includes 7 class clubs.

Source: Author's data.

regulatory action, and increasingly working with caucuses on legislative issues. During the 1960s and early 1970s, congressional caucuses operated under existing House and Senate rules governing personal staff and office operations. A first step in institutionalization by Congress was the provision of office space to caucuses; a number of them now occupy offices in House office buildings or

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annexes. (Senate caucuses continue to operate from senators' personal offices, although one Senate group, the Steering Committee, has had separate offices.) In 1976, the House Commission on Administrative Review (the Obey Commission) was established with the active support of the House leadership. Several commission recommendations were designed to stabilize and facilitate the operations of informal congressional caucuses. The effect was to legitimate an existing phenomenon by recognizing the groups as separate entities and proposing procedures and disclosure regulations solely applicable to caucuses.

By 1979 additional recognition as legitimate entities was accorded caucuses by the House Administration Committee's action, which permitted caucuses to apply for designation as Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs). LSOs could establish caucus staff and office accounts; semi-annual income and expenditure reports to the Clerk of the House were required. Two years later, following wide press coverage of an investigation of caucus funding by the Better Government Association, party leaders supported the establishment by the Committee on House Administration of an Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Legislative Service Organizations. After lengthy hearings and extensive consultation, further recognition was accorded caucuses by committee regulations, which required more detailed quarterly expenditure and income reports from LSOs and prohibited those receiving any House monies (clerk hire, space, office expenses) from accepting outside funds.

Caucus representation on party committees has been institutionalized by congressional leaders. Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill (D-MA) used his at-large Steering and Policy committee appointments to bring in representation from various caucuses: the Black and Hispanic Caucuses, the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, and the southern Boll Weevils. Similarly, appointments to the Democratic Caucus's Party Effectiveness Committtee assured representation for various congressional caucuses. Republican class clubs elect representatives to their party's Policy Committee and Whip organization. And since 1975 freshman class clubs have met with party leaders and committee chairs during the House organizational meetings following biennial elections.

Leaders have joined caucuses when it served policy or symbolic purposes. In the 97th Congress, O'Neill belonged to eleven caucuses, including two party (Democratic Study Group [DSG], United Democrats of Congress [UDC]); two regional (New England and Northeast-Midwest); and two industry groups. Minority Leader Robert H. Michel belonged to four caucuses—one party, one regional, and two industry groups.

Leaders seeking to maximize achievement of personal and institutional goals will shift their styles in response to contextual changes.[14] In recent years, party leaders acquiesced in legitimizing and institutionalizing caucuses. They adapted

[14] David W. Rohde and Kenneth Shepsle, "Woodrow Wilson and Congressional Leadership," *Congress & the Presidency* 14 (Autumn 1987): 111–134. See also Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context," and Sinclair, "Speaker's Task Force" and *Majority Leadership*.

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TABLE 3

Caucus Membership by Seniority, 97th Congress

	Number of Caucuses Joined		
Seniority of Members	*1–6*	*7–9*	*10–22*
Most Senior (8 or more terms)	57.3%	19.4%	23.3%
Middle Senior (4–7 terms)	31.1%	29.5%	39.3%
Junior (1–3 terms)	30.6%	29.7%	39.7%

Source: Author's data.

to this new organizational phenomenon by defining the change in terms that permitted responsiveness to colleagues by incremental shifts in operating procedures and by interaction with the new subunits to achieve personal and institutional goals.

The Leadership Functions of Caucuses

A major activity of most caucuses is to provide information to members. Caucuses supplement the information available from the committee and leadership system, often distributing detailed information more widely and offering members alternative perspectives on pending issues. Some party caucuses carry out specific leadership-information functions. The DSG, for example, prepares briefing materials on the bills listed on the weekly whip notices, a function performed for the Republicans by the Republican Conference. Thirty-five percent of the House members report relying on DSG material for information on floor legislation not handled by their committees.[15]

Caucuses offer opportunity to junior members to develop leadership skills and substantive expertise outside the committee system. Junior and middle-level representatives are more likely than senior members to belong to caucuses. (See Table 3.) During the 97th Congress, 31 percent of both junior and middle-level seniority members belonged to 1 to 6 caucuses; 39 percent belonged to 10 to 22 caucuses. In contrast, 57 percent of the most senior members (eight or more terms) belonged to 1 to 6 caucuses; only 23 percent belonged to ten or more caucuses. The more senior a member, the less likely he or she is to belong to a caucus. When party is controlled, seniority and number of caucus memberships continue to be correlated, with increased seniority reducing caucus memberships more for Democrats than for Republicans.

Caucuses also supplement the formal structure in identifying, socializing, and

[15] Commission on Administrative Review, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st sess., *Final Report: Administrative Reorganization and Legislative Management* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), H.Doc.95-232, vol.2:57.

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training future leaders. Junior members frequently are active in establishing caucuses and are the most active group in many caucuses. More of the junior members serve as caucus leaders—as chairs, officers, or members of steering or executive committees. During the 97th Congress, fifty-nine junior members (1–3 terms seniority), in contrast to thirty-eight middle level and thirty most-senior members served in these positions. Thirty-one caucuses were chaired by junior members, compared to twenty-six chaired by representatives with middle-level seniority, and twenty-two by most-senior members.[16]

Caucus leaders guide caucus activity and serve as spokespersons. If the caucus takes positions on legislative issues, caucus leaders work with committee or party leaders. In the early 1980s, junior Republicans (for example, Newt Gingrich [GA], Vin Weber [MN]) led the Conservative Opportunity Society to major media attention, an impact on the 1984 Republican platform, and work with the Republican leadership in the House. The 98th New Members Caucus and the '82 Budget Group gave freshman Democrats substantive expertise and leadership visibility. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) served as president of the New Members Caucus. In the subsequent 99th Congress, she was appointed an at-large whip and won a seat on the Budget Committee. Both she and Mel Levine (D-CA) developed acknowledged expertise on military procurement issues as a consequence of their work with the '82 Budget Group. Levine currently cochairs the Military Reform Caucus, and Boxer now serves on the Armed Services Committee. Serving as chair or a party committee representative of the class clubs offers power-in-the-institution rewards and is highly prized.

Interview data describe the leadership-socialization function of caucuses:

> . . . in many ways, [the Class Club] was a proving ground, a place to practice becoming leaders . . . in leadership, organizationally, and also in parliamentary and legislative areas. [Members] were finding how to operate . . . the process of compromise, and the way in which one functions in the United States House of Representatives. And they could then . . . take that learning to other activities in the House.

One respondent, commenting on the work of his boss as chair of a state/district caucus, clearly delineated the benefits that junior members derive from serving in caucus leadership positions: "He has gained a tremendous amount of exposure from some of the activities. And it's given him an outlet for leadership that he has not had in the [formal structure of the] House."

Freshmen who serve as caucus chairs have gone on disproportionately to serve on major committees or in junior leadership positions of party groups. By the 99th Congress, 66 percent of the 97th freshmen Democrats who had been caucus leaders were serving on an exclusive committee or were in a party leadership position, usually as part of the whip organization; 31 percent of the non-caucus-leader freshmen held these positions. Leadership aides readily identify junior

[16] Interview data and caucus membership lists.

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members who have been appointed to Leadership Task Forces because of leadership potential and/or substantive expertise developed through caucus work.

Because caucuses are diverse, a loose seniority system governs caucus leadership appointments. Junior members are most likely to serve as chairs of the smaller or more specialized caucuses – for example, the '82 Budget Study Group or the newly established Science and Technology Caucus in the 97th Congress. In the 100th Congress, 89 percent of the junior members who served as chairs or cochairs of caucuses led "junior" (that is, more recently established) caucuses. Apprenticeship on a caucus steering committee or executive board also helps members with middle-range seniority establish eligibility to serve as chairs of the larger, more established caucuses. Eleven percent of those serving as chairs or cochairs of established caucuses during the 100th Congress were junior members; 37 percent had middle-level seniority and 47 percent were senior members. Chairing a major caucus – such as the DSG, the Environmental and Energy Study conference, or the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus – can give members with mid-level seniority further leadership training and subsequent recognition as issue leaders and major contenders for formal positions of power.[17]

One leadership aide confirmed these conclusions, noting that ". . . caucuses, especially for junior members, are an alternate committee structure. . . . the '82 Budget Group probably spent as much time on budget issues as [Budget] committee members did . . . caucus members can be as conversant with an issue as someone on the committee." The alternate structure intersects the formal structure of the House, and caucus training has become a legitimate route to formal positions of power.

Legislative Issues

On legislative matters House leaders have adapted to caucuses by developing processes for within-party representation of caucus viewpoints and by including all types of caucuses in leadership policy and strategy deliberations. But leaders relate to party and to nonparty caucuses differently.

Party Caucuses

As Table 4 reveals, all party caucuses work with their party leaders in some way. "Work with party leaders" is defined as active caucus participation in support of leadership activity. This includes participation in leadership meetings, whip count assistance, etc. Table 4 includes House caucuses for which we have response data regarding work with party leaders. Senate caucuses are not included in this analysis; most Senate caucuses include leaders as members, and the less structured Senate rules result in less formal work with party leaders by caucuses.

[17] Susan Webb Hammond, "Committee and Informal Leaders in the House of Representatives" in John J. Kornacki, ed., *Leading Congress: New Styles, New Strategies* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1990), 60–62.

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TABLE 4

Caucus Work with House Party Leaders[a]

Type of Caucus	*Yes*	*No*
Party*	100%** (28)***	0
National Constituency	75% (3)	25% (1)
Regional Constituency	21% (3)	79% (11)
State/District Constituency	14% (2)	86% (12)
Industry	29% (4)	71% (10)
Personal Interest	16% (3)	84% (16)
PARTY	100% (28)	0
NON-PARTY	23% (15)	77% (50)
TOTAL	44	50

[a] Based on semi-focused caucus and leadership interviews; not all caucuses responded to this question.

* Includes class clubs.

** Percent of all respondent caucuses in the category.

*** Number of caucuses.

Source: Author's data.

Of the eleven party groups that are not class clubs, seven have worked on shaping party and leader agendas through long-range issue research and planning (for example, the Wednesday Group, the Conservative Opportunity Society) or by placing issues on current agendas. Seven have worked with committee leaders of their own party to shape legislation that takes account of a group position and is also acceptable to party members; ten have worked regularly with party leaders to affect legislation scheduled for floor action. Five caucuses serve an explicit leadership-information-supplement function by distributing research reports or briefing information relevant to pending Floor activity (for example, the DSG and Democratic Research Organization [DRO]). The involvement with party leaders is substantially higher for party caucuses than for nonparty caucuses. And party caucuses are active at an earlier stage in the legislative process than other types of caucuses; they seek to influence party rules and party agendas, as well as the final legislative product. This is possible because of their intraparty position.

Some party groups seek guarantees of representation and access from party leaders. The Boll Weevils (the Conservative Democratic Forum [CDF]), for example, sought leadership support on committee assignments: "The Boll Weevils got started when we didn't have an awful lot of time [the September before Reagan was elected]. . . . one of the primary goals was to go to the leadership and to work for more positions on committees. Our representation on key committees was very, very low. . . . Now that was one of our first successes."

Both Democratic and Republican party-based caucuses influence long-range and pending congressional party agendas. In 1975, for example, proposals developed by the Republican Study Committee—including welfare and food stamp

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reform—were adopted by Minority Leader John J. Rhodes for the Republican Legislative Agenda he established.[18] In the 99th Congress the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS) was a major factor in the Republican response to the McIntyre election issue. The COS was also a chief sponsor of the 1986 Baltimore Conference III, working closely with the Wednesday Group and the Republican leadership to provide a "broad-based conference" to discuss "new ideas, and the structure and procedures of Republicans in the House," according to participants. The 92 Group, established to work toward a Republican house majority in 1992, "ginned up in '85 and presented an alternative budget." The caucus worked with Republican party leadership groups, although ironically "Budget Committee Chairman [William H.] Gray (D-PA) leaned heavily on it . . . and it probably had more influence on the Democrats than the Republicans," according to one observer.

Negative agenda setting by party caucuses is described by a participant in an effort by the United Democrats of Congress (UDC), a moderate-to-conservative party caucus:

> Let's say the leadership of the UDC . . . feels strongly about a piece of legislation. Very quietly they go to the Speaker, or invite the Speaker down for a very candid, off-the-record discussion of what membership is willing to do. The Speaker [has] learned it is very important to pay very careful attention to UDC. . . . There are, you know, members who were tired of having to go on the line for certain issues that there was no chance in the world would ever be raised in the Senate. Why then should members of the House have to go on record? Why not have the Speaker get some kind of a commitment from the Senate that they'll at least consider it before we go out on a limb on some controversial legislation that to moderates and conservatives would prove to be very, very harmful politically. . . . I think that perhaps the UDC is most influential in continuing to remind the leadership that there are Democrats who may not share their same views on all issues.

Party-based caucuses have chosen to work through the formal party structures of the House and have sought approval from the Republican Conference of all Republican members or the Democratic Caucus of all Democrats to achieve some goals. In the 1970s, the Democratic Study Group effected major reforms by achieving a Subcommittee Bill of Rights and changes in rules governing election of committee chairs. The DSG and other informal groups have worked with the Democratic Caucus on the Budget Resolutions; in 1983, for example, DSG meetings with Budget Committee members and with the Speaker resulted in agreement on content and strategy so that the party was unified.

The revived Democratic Caucus has served as a vehicle through which some informal groups pursue their policy goals. The Party Effectiveness Committee, established in February 1981 by then-Caucus Chair Gillis Long, sponsored strategy sessions, research, and long-range agenda and issues planning: the 1982 "Yellow Book" and the "Blueprint for the Future" released in January 1984,

[18] Feulner, *Conservatives*, chaps. 6 and 7.

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just before the Iowa presidential caucuses, laid out Democratic concerns and proposals. The changed operations and interests of the Democratic Caucus have resulted in service as an umbrella organization and a role as broker for interests represented by congressional caucuses. Democratic party leaders have sought to include all party viewpoints as represented by the party-based informal caucuses and to represent concerns held by groups of Democrats in other caucuses such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues.

Intraparty caucuses do not, however, always support party positions. In 1981, the Conservative Democratic Forum supported President Ronald Reagan and worked with Republicans to shape budget legislation. In that session, the strength of the Conservative Coalition increased by 20 points, with a success rate of 92 percent;[19] on one roll call vote on a tax bill, 64 percent of the members of the CDF supported the president's position.[20]

Caucus members are sensitive to the delicate position of intraparty adversarial groups. This balance and the nature of the leader-party caucus exchange relationship are demonstrated by the Freshmen Democrats in the 98th Congress. The 98th New Members Caucus (D) was united by the deficit issue. In 1983 the caucus established a Budget Study Group, which sponsored informational sessions and meetings with Budget Committee members and others. The following year the group decided to oppose the 1984 Democratic Budget Resolution. The leadership sought to contain conflict in exchange for caucus support by developing a compromise floor amendment and asking Representative Buddy MacKay (D-FL), chairman of the freshman group, to sponsor it (the MacKay Freeze Amendment for an across-the-board spending freeze). In the 99th Congress, the Budget Study Group became the Democratic Budget Group, with attendance by leadership staff as well as more senior Democrats. It is perceived as an informational, training, and occasional strategy group by both members and staff.[21]

Party caucuses seek to influence policy without fragmenting the parties. One Republican, commenting on the Conservative Opportunity Society, said: "They recognize the need for a party role. They want to be coopted by the leadership, not be a rump group of grenade throwers."[22]

For party leaders, intraparty caucuses are additional and fragmenting groups whose views may, if not taken into account, upset fragile coalitions or within-party compromises on content. On the other hand, because all members share a common party label, they offer potential assistance to party leaders for coalition building at an early stage of the legislative process. "Party caucuses have to be

[19] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1981), App. 35-C.

[20] Reported in Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1986), 205–206.

[21] Interview data, but also see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 7 June 1986, 1270.

[22] Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, *Setting Course* (Washington, DC: The American University, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, 1984), draft 87.

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listened to by the leadership. . . . some are very influential," according to one leadership respondent. Leaders have adapted to intraparty caucuses by efforts to accommodate diverse views, enabling them to contain conflict and to face the opposition party with as much unity as possible. In the post-reform era of independent candidates and fragmented congressional structure, the conditions for party operation have changed; but the parties appear to be adapting and reviving, devising new integrative mechanisms. In this changed situation, congressional caucuses based on party are important actors.

Nonparty Caucuses

Although all party caucuses work with party leaders on legislative matters, slightly less than one-quarter of the nonparty caucuses do so. (See Table 4.) A number of factors determine whether leaders and nonparty caucuses work together. First, there must be leader-caucus agreement on an issue position. If caucus and party leaders disagree, caucuses may actively work against the leadership. A caucus can be "sometimes with and sometimes against" party leaders. Congressional norms make shifting alliances between leaders and caucuses both feasible and typical, and reinforce leaders' ability to rely on caucus expertise on the leaders' chosen issues.

Floor action must also be pending. The nonparty caucuses work with party leaders only on matters expected to come to the floor. In all instances, regularly scheduled agenda issues (such as authorizations or appropriations) or other mandated matters (such as the extension of the Equal Rights Amendment [ERA]) have been the vehicles for caucus-leader interaction.

The bipartisan nonparty caucuses must also be able to adapt their organization and procedures to work with party leaders on partisan issue positions. Some caucuses work through task forces, with the understanding that not all caucus members are committed to the caucus/task force position. Members of other caucuses work under the general aegis of the caucus, but as individuals. Some caucuses focus on a general legislative approach and do not become involved in partisan conflict over scheduling or rules of debate.

If leaders and caucus agree on an issue approaching floor consideration, caucus voting strength, expertise, and "maturity" (that is, tenure and institutionalization) are conditions that make being brought into the policy process by leadership more likely. Established caucuses with a record of accuracy, expertise, and votes are most likely to be called on for assistance—advice as well as information, whip counts, and work on legislative content and strategy. Caucuses that work with the leadership are perceived by leaders as having expertise or offering coalition building access to members or constituent groups.

The multiple roles of caucus members are a further factor in work with the leadership. Members who serve as party whips have an opportunity to raise caucus concerns at whip meetings. The party leadership gains access to diverse members active on an issue through issue leaders who have a caucus affiliation.

Many nonparty caucuses do not work with party leaders. Table 5 reports

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TABLE 5

Reasons Nonparty Caucuses Cite for Not Working with Party Leaders

Caucuses	*Information Only*	*Newly Established*	*Early Legislative Stages Only*	*Other*	
National Constituency	–	–	1 (100%)	–	1
Regional Constituency	1 (9%)	1 (9%)	8 (72%)	1 (9%)	11
State/District Constituency	1 (8%)	5 (42%)	5 (42%)	1 (8%)	12
State/District Industry	1 (10%)	2 (20%)	6 (60%)	1 (10%)[a]	10
Personal Interest	6 (38%)	1 (6%)	4 (24%)	5 (31%)[b]	16
	9 (18%)	9 (18%)	24 (48%)	8 (16%)	50

[a] Can't agree on legislation.

[b] "Does not work on legislation" and "focuses on mobilizing the grass roots."

Source: Author's data.

reasons cited by caucus respondents. Of 50 nonparty caucuses, nearly half (48 percent) work only at early stages of the legislative process—drafting legislation or on committee hearings or markup. At these early legislative stages, nonparty caucuses generally work only with committees; in contrast, party caucuses work with both committees and party leaders. Nine nonparty caucuses have chosen to serve only an information function. Some, like the Environmental and Energy Study Conference, limit their activities to research and information. Others seek to affect agendas by keeping an issue salient but do not take positions that would require working closely with party leaders on specific policy issues. Some caucuses (18 percent) are too newly established to work with party leaders. Others cite a variety of reasons: the caucus does not work on legislation or opposes the leaders' position, for example.

When leaders work with caucuses on current legislative issues (for example, whip counts, floor amendments, etc.), they expand the working group beyond the caucus, bringing in their own advisers and close colleagues. The caucus may serve as a catalyst; it may continue to form the core of the working group. In some instances, as compromises are hammered out, leaders may hold occasional meetings with a caucus to determine caucus views and perspectives; but the caucus does not control personnel, style, or strategy. Party leaders have adapted to work with nonparty caucuses, and these bipartisan caucuses have adapted their organization and procedures to make this possible.

Two brief case studies illustrate these findings: both the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues and the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus have worked with the leadership on strategy, scheduling, and whip counts for pending floor legislation. Both caucuses are bipartisan but handle the consequences of bipartisanship differently.

Women's Issues. For the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues, a national constituency caucus, the constraints of bipartisan membership affect caucus organization for advocacy. Agendas and issues are agreed on by caucus consensus,

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but members participate in legislative drafting or strategy as expert individuals who are also caucus members. The caucus as a group does not become involved in strategies of scheduling, rules, or coalition building. One respondent noted, "In developing legislation, it is often possible to work in a bipartisan fashion. But with scheduling, strategy, or rules, that often gets partisan—you must deal with majority and minority parties—so the caucus tends to stay out of those issues."

How does this work in practice? A cadre of Women's Caucus members worked on drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1984. Part of a broad-based working group, they participated because they were on the relevant committee or had been very much involved in the issue.

Subsequently, the caucus circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter with forty co-signers, including some members of the leadership, asking representatives to support the legislation without substantive amendments. It was "up to the members to testify and lobby individually." If members spoke for the caucus, they would support the content of the legislation without substantive amendments but would not take a position on the type of rule.

In the 98th Congress the Caucus also worked with the Democratic leadership on extending the ratification period for the Equal Rights Amendment. The Speaker tapped caucus expertise by seeking advice on floor strategy from Representatives Pat Schroeder (D-CO), caucus cochair, and Don Edwards (D-CA). Caucus members and staff later worked on whip counts with the Democratic whip organization and the Leaders' Task Force on ERA. The caucus took its own whip counts and also channeled the whip counts of citizen groups to the leadership.

Central American Issues. The Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus was active during the 98th Congress (1983–1984) on the MX missile and on Central American issues, especially El Salvador and Nicaragua. On all three issues the caucus worked closely with the Democratic leadership in the House, offering expertise, access to votes, and coalition-building assistance in exchange for leadership support of a caucus policy position. The caucus, based on members' personal interest, is bicameral and bipartisan. Advocacy activity is carried out through bipartisan task forces established to work on a specific issue. Agreement on a specific legislative position is reached within the task force, not by the entire caucus.

Long before caucus members began to work with the House Democratic leadership, the caucus organized to work on Central American issues. Representative George Miller (D-CA) was appointed head of a bipartisan Task Force on Central America by caucus chair James Leach (R-IA). Establishment of a task force offered its chair an institutional base, giving the effort legitimacy within the House and, eventually, extensive press coverage. The task force of twenty members "reached consensus on one priority initiative," which became the Foley amendment to the fiscal year 1985 Department of Defense authorization bill, prohibiting sending U.S. combat troops to Central America. The caucus initiated the amendment and asked Representative Tom Foley, the majority whip, to

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sponsor it. After Foley agreed, the caucus task force worked to build support, and Democrats on the task force and caucus staff attended leadership strategy sessions and worked closely with the Speaker's office and the Democratic whip organization. The caucus and especially the task force were in contact with constituent groups concerned about U.S. policy in Central America and became a kind of conduit between these groups and the congressional leadership. It also drew on citizen groups' whip counts – perceived as extremely accurate – to supplement the counts of the Democratic whip organization. The amendment passed with a 5:1 margin. One observer considers a major factor in that margin to be sponsorship by a member of the leadership.

Caucuses, Leadership, and Legislation

Several additional factors emerge as significant elements in caucus-leader interaction. Caucus influence depends on accuracy of information, especially in whip counts. Commitment is important: committed members will attend innumerable meetings and contact members one-on-one to get an accurate whip count or to persuade on an issue. Some participants believe this to be a major factor in whip count accuracy and in caucus achievements. Success breeds success: the achievement of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus in an earlier MX debate, for example, helped them in subsequent work with the leadership. And caucuses can serve an early-warning function analogous to the Rules Committee's field commander role described by Bruce I. Oppenheimer,[23] because they work on a different time perspective and can be alert to the potential and problems of long-range strategies.

Conclusion

What can we conclude about the activity of congressional caucuses and party leaders? Caucuses are both a response to leadership failure and a challenge to current leadership style. The failure of party leadership to facilitate both the expressive function of a representative legislature and the integrative function required by lawmaking has been a major factor in the development of caucuses in the contemporary House. Subsequently, with leader support, caucuses have been accorded recognition as legitimate subunits of the House. Caucuses, in fact, now supplement leadership functions through information activities and by identifying and training future leaders.

Caucuses present a dilemma for party leaders. Although organizationally they have potential to decentralize and fragment the institution further, they also offer leaders opportunity to build coalitions. When policy views converge, caucuses can assist party leaders. When policy differences exist but can be negotiated,

[23] Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "The Rules Committee: New Arm of the Leadership in a Decentralized House" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 1st ed. (New York: Praeger, 1977).

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caucuses increase demands on leadership but can also assist eventual acceptance of policy among a wide number of members. When policy positions differ and caucuses operate as adversaries of leadership, leaders must mobilize to defeat them.

Leader-caucus work is an exchange relationship. Caucuses want leaders to respond to their concerns and to support their policy positions; leaders need caucus help. Caucuses give leaders access to blocs of members with expertise and votes; leaders can bestow benefits on caucus members and give visibility and support to caucus positions. All caucuses expect leaders to establish conditions that give caucuses legitimacy, accountability, and opportunity for policy work.

Leaders have preferred to include, rather than fight, intraparty caucuses. All the party-based caucuses work with their party leaders in Congress at all stages of the legislative process. Caucuses have been granted institutionalized representation within party councils and influence party legislative agendas, content, and strategy. Often their role is to persuade leaders to keep items off a legislative agenda or to modify the substance of legislation to include a broader coalition of party members. Party leaders want to build broad-based coalitions within the party with minimal defections. Party unity, although illusive, is a significant goal and an important factor in legislative outcomes; the adaptive response of party leaders to intraparty caucuses has been to keep differences within the party insofar as possible.

For nonparty caucuses, pending floor action and agreement on an issue position are necessary conditions for work with party leaders. Caucus maturity, expertise, voting strength, and previous record are additional factors that determine work with the leadership. Bipartisan caucuses must adapt procedures and structure of working with partisan leaders on partisan issues. Although leaders control the situation and direct the working groups, there is a reciprocal exchange of benefits.

By responding to rank-and-file members and expanding their inclusive leadership style to caucuses, leaders have facilitated the expressive function of the legislature. Leaders also draw on caucus integrative capabilities to achieve integrative goals. Benefits include support for caucus concerns and assistance to caucus members in carrying out their representational responsibilities. Not all caucuses work with party leaders. But those caucuses that *do* work with the leadership are increasingly important actors in the legislative system.*

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Charisma: A Blighted Concept and an Alternative Formula

WILLLAM SPINRAD

Guided by a quest for comprehending a political leader's popular appeal beyond the typical determinants, the charisma concept offers an obvious challenge. What is the symbolic appeal of an individual political figure? What is the residual factor after all the other ingredients are spelled-out: popularity of political organizations, issue stands, beliefs and ideologies, conditions of the times? Examining published usage of the term charisma indicates that it has a minimum value for analysis of political processes and historical developments in macroscopic political situations.

In its more extreme form, the term has been applied to "virtually every situation in which the popularity of a political or any public personality is involved."[1] But when utilized by serious scholars, the result has commonly been misleading. Dramatic consequential historical developments, such as the Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of Nazism, have been blithely explained via the personal appeal of charismatic leaders. As examples of exaggerated emphasis on the subject, two recent scholarly volumes by Ruth Willner and Arthur Schweitzer assessed in elaborate detail the historical significance of many political figures entirely in terms of stipulated charismatic qualities, in some cases involving people hardly known or long-forgotten.[2]

[1] Joseph Bensman and Michael Givant, "Charisma and Modernity: The Uses and Abuses of a Concept," *Social Research* 42 (Winter 1975): 570.

[2] Ruth A. Willner, *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984). Note some of the individuals listed in both – former Philippine President Magasaysay, Carol Perez, Juan Valasco – people of interest only to historical trivia experts.

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The major theme of this article is that analyses in terms of personal charisma have little value for understanding macroscopic political events. Perhaps more importantly, they have often served as a substitute for more comprehensive analyses. We must search for an alternative formulation to appreciate a political figure's purely personal appeal.

The Ideas of Max Weber

I begin with an examination of the contributions of Max Weber, who brought the term into the language. My intent is not another exegesis of his ideas on the subject, which many have attempted. Instead, the objective is to tease out the more prominent features in his formulations, to test their heuristic value as applied by him and others in specific situations. This is no easy task, for this uniquely careful scholar utilized an array of characterizations and applications. Typically, he sought to facilitate understanding of reality, not to describe reality: his ideal-type concepts were designed as intellectual guides, not as logically tight categories.

Most commonly adopted by others is his depiction of charisma as a type of authority inducing automatic obedience to an individual outside of and commonly counter to institutionalized traditional and legal-rational authorities. Such obedience rests on the special personal qualities of such individuals. Most prominent in Weber's analysis of religious history, as initially inspired by the early Christian notion of "gift of grace," is its applicability to many types of social phenomena, often to any purely personal appeal or innovating tactics of a leader. Thus, the personality attributes of charismatics suggest a unique human being with a transcendental aura and contain obvious religious implications – possessed of a "supernatural and divine force,"[3] capable of "superhuman powers,"[4] inspiring "awe and reverence,"[5] even subjugation to the "coercion of the gods."[6] Some have developed more comprehensive lists of personality traits stimulating such orientations among followers.[7]

The nexus between leader and followers is assumed to be essentially nonrational, somewhat akin to conventional depictions of "color" or "personal magnetism," albeit with some mythic element. To Weber, however, it is the followers' perception of such qualities, not what analysts disclose, that is crucial. Charisma is essentially in the eye of the beholder, something insufficiently appreciated by

[3] Kojiro Miyahara, "Charisma: From Max Weber to Contemporary Sociology," *Sociological Inquiry* 53 (Fall 1983): 372.

[4] Ibid., 381.

[5] Ibid., 376.

[6] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon, 1957), 25.

[7] See, for instance, Donald McIntosh, "Weber and Freud: On The Nature and Sources of Authority," *American Sociological Review* 35 (October 1970): 901–911. Such attempts to combine Weberian ideas on the subject with psychodynamic concepts add little to an appreciation of the historical impact on any political figures, despite the facile appeal common to such accounts.

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later writers. Weber's discussions about concrete figures suggested less interest in personality elements per se and less mythical, more rational connecting links. Even in his sociology of religion, he explained that the "charismatic prophet" was primarily an effective conveyer of a worked-out doctrine; the magician-shaman was judged by his results. Other examples included the military chieftain in primitive societies who established his charisma by victory, the pirate entrepeneur whose personal popularity came from the booty obtained. Weber insisted that the charismatic "prove himself in practice."[8] In more mundane language, the public should perceive the charismatic as someone with the capacity to "deliver," especially when analyzing political phenomena.

It is important to note his few applications of the term in reference to political situations, for which it has been most commonly utilized since. The Caesarist phenomenon denotes the assumption of political authority by a military leader, typically in response to popular demand.[9] This becomes in his later writings plebiscitarianism, the coming to political power of any individual through his personal appeal to the populace. The most prominent historical example Weber offered is the British Liberal Party leader, William Gladstone, who was thrust into the prime ministry by popular pressure, apparently against the wishes of party leaders.[10] Except for an occasional ad hoc reference, these are the only illustrations from macroscopic political society he presented—a slim basis for the use of the concept by later writers in reference to macroscopic political processes.

Inherent Limitations of the Charisma Concept

In its classic form, the concept implies a direct appeal from leaders to followers.[11] In the contemporary world, images of public figures commonly derive from planned propaganda efforts, especially via the mass media. A corollary is that at some earlier unspecified time and place, the situation was different. In truth, any widespread image of a public personality, including a presumed attribute of charisma, has come to large publics primarily through elaborate mechanisms of mass persuasion, whatever the motivations and techniques. In fact, it has often involved a process after the person is no longer around, often containing elements of fabricated mythology. Even the messages of the founders of world religions came to those beyond the circle of immediate disciples through the propaganda devices of a few later symbol experts.

Put in another way, the original posing of the formula by Weber and others implied a charismatic nexus between leader and followers dependent on primary

[8] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, vol. 2, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1142.

[9] Ibid., 1451–1456.

[10] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford Galaxy, 1958), 105–106.

[11] Bensman and Givant, "Charisma and Modernity," 600–606.

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group involvement; his personal aura derived from close contact. It, therefore, remains valuable for appreciating the social-psychological processes observable in sects and many cults.[12] Accordingly, even if the charismatic appellation may sometimes possess a minimal relevance for larger entities, it emerges from a deliberate, orchestrated process in which the charismatic symbol is utilized by others for their own concrete purposes. In other words, Weber's many depictions of the "routinization of charisma" may turn out to be the most seminal part within his many discussions of the general subject.[13] This involves systematic activities through organized structures, frequently extolling rationally developed idea systems, not spontaneous responses to a personal aura.

Political Charismatics

The major part of this article will assess claims about specific political figures described as charismatic. In evaluating their historical significance, some of Weber's formulations do provide a helpful guide. In line with his intellectual orientation, I am concerned with the usefulness of the concept and how much an observer's application of charisma attributes enhances analysis of historical consequences. I am not concerned whether anyone is or is not a genuine charismatic, a fruitless task with prodigious accompanying arguments.[14] In line with Weber's interests, to appreciate the impact on followers it is necessary to note their rational appraisals of achievement as they perceive it. The purely mythical appeal is generally discounted. In considering the historical significance of specific individuals, other factors must be minimized: first, the role of political organizations, as functioning bodies directly affecting a political leader's political role and also as symbols for popular identification; second, the interest and values of constituents, for which both organizations and specific individuals are rationally perceived as agencies for realization; third, the political attitudes of constituents, perhaps coalesced into an ideological orientation, for which organizations and/or specific individuals are popularly perceived as fitting exemplars, again involving a rational orientation in the minds of followers.

The purported charismatic political examples described in the literature can be conveniently classified into three types. First, those with significant popular support who pose a serious challenge to a regime and its authorities. They may operate within or outside and be opposed to established institutional mechanisms.

[12] See Rose L. Coser and Lewis Coser, "Jonestown as Perverse Utopia," *Dissent* 26 (Spring 1979): 158–163; Rosebeth M. Kanter, *Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); Ed Sanders, *The Family: The Story of Charles Manson's Dune Buggy Attack Battalions* (New York: Dutton, 1971).

[13] This emphasis is akin to that of Edward Shils, who perceives some version of routinized charisma as providing legitimizing formulas for well-institutionalized authorities in day to day operations. See Edward Shils, "Charisma, Order, and Status," *American Sociological Review* 30 (April 1965): 199–213.

[14] See Wilner, *The Spellbinders*; Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma*.

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Second, movement leaders strive for specific objectives within institutionalized political systems and sometimes use deviant, perhaps illegitimate means. At most, they represent a form of ad hoc charisma, presenting no threat for usurping legitimate authorities.

Third, those who seek to obtain and maintain political office within institutionalized systems through conventional processes. Their purely personal appeal establishes a special ingredient for any resulting success, either in office-seeking or in achieving policy objectives. Legitimacy challengers can be further subdivided into three categories: rightist, generally fascist leaders; leftist, most often communist leaders of some form; leaders of nationalist-ethnic insurgencies.

Rightists

The charismatic appellation is especially encouraged by rightists' self-designated labels as alternative leaders. The misleading direction from such analytical emphases is well illustrated in attempts to explain Benito Mussolini's role in Italian history without paying attention to all the complexities of Italian society and politics from World War I to recent times and without noting the tenuous loyalty of the Italian populace to his regime.[15] More challenging are the assertions about the significance of Hitler's charismatic appeal in explaining the Nazi era in Germany. A common description emphasizes his "magnetic" impact on immediate cohorts, while others concentrate on his speaking style, with its mythological evocations, as a clue to his mass mobilizing potential.[16] Yet, these are not crucial for explaining the large party membership that developed, the one-third of the popular vote once obtained, the apparent loyalty to the regime. Before coming to power, Hitler was the leader of the Nazi Party. Without its well-structured mechanisms, including the large coterie of paid activists, propaganda instruments, and implicit ideological sympathy of "respectable" elements of the population, he would have meant little historically. Hitler became the official leader of a nation initially successful in all-out war. Several have analyzed the rise of Nazism from various vantage points with minimal reference to any personal transcendental hold of the leader on the masses.[17] Perhaps no alternative leader

[15] See ibid. Several other writers insist that much of the Italian population was always apathetic about his regime, which maintained power through judicious use of terror. See Alberto Aquarome, "The Totalitarian State and Personal Dictatorship" in Ernest A. Menze, ed., *Totalitarianism Reconsidered* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1981), 181–193; Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947).

[16] Among the many pertinent examples, see Wilner, *The Spellbinders*; Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma*; Theodore Abel, *Why Hitler Came to Power* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1938); Joseph Nyomarky, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967).

[17] Karl D. Brucher, *The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1970); William S. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy* (New York: Norton, 1946); Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

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would have had his success. But this is beside the point. The charismatic emphasis is unnecessary and becomes a substitute for the searching historical analysis one would expect from social scientists.

Leftists

The most publicized example from the left is V. I. Lenin, as well exemplified in an account by prominent scholar of Russian history, Robert G. Tucker.[18] Probably no other individual has been historically more consequential in challenging the legitimacy basis of his own and many other societies. Tucker's analysis concentrates on Lenin's forceful presentation of his political ideas, his fanatical devotion to his purpose, his ability to engender either avid devotion or antagonism from colleagues. Often charismatic figures are described primarily in terms of primary group settings. If one considers the public historical role, the charismatic idea is especially misleading in Lenin's case. Besides lacking any dramatic public persona, he never sought any mass appeal on the basis of his "personality" and none was evoked until he was no longer around, another manifestation of post-hoc mythologizing. Lenin based his programmatic messages to political colleagues and ultimately the mass public on his rationally constructed interpretation of Marxist doctrine. Ultimately, his historical role had pertinence only through the Bolshevik organization, which became increasingly appealing to a wide population at a particular historical juncture. Dwelling on personal charismatic features adds little to an understanding of these complex historical events and may obfuscate their essential meaning. Among accounts and analyses of the 1917 October Revolution with all the conflicting interpretations, notions about Lenin's charisma are absent.[19]

Another leader of the October Revolution, Leon Trotsky, provides a better fit for the charismatic criteria, both in terms of public style and forceful public appeal. He would have remained a marginal, if brilliant political figure if he had not joined Lenin's party in 1917. His later defeat in contest with Stalin had nothing to do with respective charismatic qualities, and his later failure to develop a significant rival communist movement was scarcely helped by any continuing charismatic features.[20]

Press, 1982); Rudolf Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana University Press, 1945); Frederick L. Schumann, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism* (New York: Knopf, 1935).

[18] Robert Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Daedelus* 97 (Summer 1968): 731–756.

[19] William Henry Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution 1917–1921,* 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1952); Robert W. Daniels, *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* (New York: Scribners, 1967); John H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization* (New York: Norton, 1976); Leonard Schapiro, *The Russian Revolution of 1917: The Origins of Modern Communism* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Leon Trotsky, *The Russian Revolution* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1932).

[20] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed-Trotsky: 1879–1921* (New York: Oxford, 1956); Isaac

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Efforts to develop charismatic, transcendental images of other communist leaders with or without their assumptions of state power, best exemplified by Stalin's "cult of personality," were largely contrived examples of pseudo-charisma, illustrated in many cases by the lack of any routinized charisma following their personal demise or political fall. This changed to some extent in the World War II era and afterwards with such figures as Joseph Broz Tito, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Min, and Fidel Castro. With the exception of Castro, they assumed leadership with a well structured organization possessing an official doctrine, of which they became official speakers. More importantly, they were widely perceived as successful military leaders against some form of foreign oppression. Whatever the other ideological pronouncements and ultimate policies, they symbolized nationalistic assertions.

Nationalists

The charismatic label was especially popular in descriptions of those who led upsurges against colonial rule in the post World War II era—Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Ben Bella, Sukarno.[21] Ben Bella and Sukarno were readily usurped by others without any substantial evidence of their mythic heritage, and the successors of Kenyatta and Nasser scarcely seem to evoke their names, suggesting another superficial component in the charisma formula. What stands out about these figures is their special identifications as symbols of nation building, around which they structured their organizations and developed a mass appeal. This is a common feature of many who assume a mythical personal image, or charisma. They are personalized symbols of a nation—the collectivity that provides the major source for social allegiance. In other words, they become individual manifestations of societal charisma, which may be the most seminal application of the entire concept. Fitting examples go back at least to Jeanne d'Arc and would also include George Washington, despite the insistence of one analyst that the appellation is not appropriate because he was associated with a Whig Conservative perspective, rather than a revolutionary innovator.[22] Such a description is meaningful for both conservative and revolutionary leaders or some special combination of both, as Henry Kissinger depicts Otto von Bismarck.[23] In fact, such a mythological figure can be completely contrived, as in the Swiss legend of William Tell as the leader in the struggle against Austrian domination.

Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast* (New York: Oxford, 1954); Ronald Segal, *Leon Trotsky: A Biography* (New York: Pantheon, 1979).

[21] For example, see the account about Nkrumah in David Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup," *Daedalus* 97 (Summer 1968): 657–692

[22] Barry Schwartz, "The Whig Concept of Heroic Leadership," *American Sociological Review* 48 (February 1983): 18–31

[23] Henry Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary," *Daedelus* 97 (Summer 1968): 888–922.

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Movement Leaders

The charismatic designation has appeared prominently in describing the role of mass movement leaders who both effectively mobilize populations and provide motivating symbols for such mobilization. This phenomenon may be especially pertinent when their constituencies comprise very deprived population sectors with little organizational talent or experience. One can readily think of the legendary plebian bandit types—Robin Hood, El Cid—who had little ultimate historical impact except mythologically.[24]

The charismatic formula has been commonly used in analyzing the popular appeal and public attention of several American black leaders. Most notable are the discussions about Martin Luther King, for whom the notion of a charismatic influence, whether the term is explicitly used or not, has almost assumed a self-evident, truistic character. The result is a misleading appraisal of his singular political role, including a typical post-hoc mythologizing.[25] In his case, some specific details are in order. He is usually described as the organizer of the Montgomery bus boycott, which first got him national attention, and the 1963 March on Washington, both of which assessments are *inaccurate.* Both events were products of careful, organized efforts by many groups of people. Most of King's other activities came through the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in which he was the most important but not the only leader. Without others, his personal inspiring style would have had little historical impact. Most of his actions did produce viable results, in accord with the general advances accomplished by the Civil Rights Movement at that time. Analyses of the historical role of other such movement leaders, not merely their ability to generate applause or get media attention, should be subject to the same kind of analysis.

Office Holders and Seekers in Legitimized Systems

Such applications of the concept constitute the most popular and suspect examples of its usage. To have much relevance the uniquely personal appeal must be disclosed, implying a minimization of the crucial role of parties and quasi-party organizations, both as symbols for popular loyalty and nominating electoral agencies. In addition, the charismatic image, in line with the classical and usual meaning, should transcend rational considerations or contain some element of a mythical nexus between a political figure and his popular supporters.

Weber emphasized one historical example, William Gladstone. According to his account, the British Liberal Party organization, of which Gladstone was not an integral part, chose him for party leader because of his well-established per-

[24] E.J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959).

[25] A meaningful appraisal of King's political role can be discerned from such biographical accounts as David L. Lewis, *King: A Critical Biography* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Stephen B. Oates, *Let The Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York; Harper and Row, 1982).

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sonal popularity.[26] Naturally, this symbolizes a significant political phenomenon, but hardly represents a popular upsurge. Without the Liberal Party's programmatic appeal, which Gladstone well articulated, he would have remained at most an influential writer and speaker, but not a dominant political figure. Even in the hands of a Weber, dwelling on personal charisma offers a poor guide for understanding political history.

The more recent British example is Winston Churchill, a uniquely interesting political figure and the leading symbol of the entire World War II struggle. Yet his political biography, before and after the war, vividly discloses the essential irrelevance of mythic image considerations for comprehending political history. A marginal political figure for most of his career, despite a worldwide reputation, he was thrust into the prime minister's office after the early war defeats.[27] His role as wartime leader was accepted in Britain and elsewhere, but any possible transcendental image that emerged did not prevent his party's decisive defeat in the postwar election. This had nothing to do with the fact that the crisis was over, and no one felt the need for a charismatic, as some analysts insist.[28] The Labour Party, program and symbol, simply appealed to more British voters than did the Conservatives.[29] When Churchill again became prime minister in 1952, no new crisis called for a charismatic figure. The Conservatives won more parliamentary seats than the rivals as a result of popular reactions to existent conditions.[30] Those who dwell on the charismatic influence of Churchill furnish a convenient mechanism for challenging the value of the entire concept, for their efforts add little to a comprehension of twentieth-century British political history.

Other possible examples could be cited, especially in parliamentary systems with multiparty coalition governments, where government officials can sometimes assume a uniquely popular role above party labels. The United States seems to provide the best setting for the charisma phenomenon. Executives are elected separately from legislators, with a concentrated attention on their campaigns and incumbencies. The personal institutional power of a president is extensive, whatever the continuing arguments about limitations; plebiscitarian messages "to the people" are common. However, for the concept to have useful implications for historical-political analysis, the criteria for inclusion under the heading must be especially comprehensive. The purported charismatic should emerge as a candidate through popular upsurge, even if ultimately chosen through the efforts of

[26] Garth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 105. Almost in passing, Weber offered a similar analysis of the political career of David Lloyd George. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1452.

[27] See William Manchester, *The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983).

[28] For instance, see Robert Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Spring 1977): 383–393.

[29] R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, *The British Election of 1945* (London: Cumberlage, 1947).

[30] D. E. Butler, *The British Election of 1951* (London: Macmillan, 1952).

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political professionals or image experts. Candidate voting strength should be better than that of party running mates. The candidate should be able to utilize personal popularity to gain policy objectives, if necessary by messages to the people. Among all the American political figures for whom the charismatic label has been applied, several fit many of these criteria, none all of them. Each, through most of his or her political career operated through institutionalized political channels via conventional political techniques, whatever the specific methods at different times.

The one example of a presidential candidate with a very magnetic personal appeal who was "thrust" into nomination is not listed among the possible charismatics – William Jennings Bryan.[31] He would seem a more fitting candidate than the others usually presented. Weber offers one interesting example, Theodore Roosevelt, concentrating less on his rise to political prominence, his many achievements in office, and his striking public persona than on his 1912 presidential campaign.[32] Attempting to alter the two-term tradition, he ran as the candidate of the Progressive Party, which came to be structured around him as a person. He got more votes for the presidency than the Republican incumbent, William Howard Taft. Although Roosevelt undoubtedly achieved much of his voting strength from his identification with the political tenets of the Progressive movement, which provided the name for his party, the party effectively disappeared when he was no longer its candidate.[33] This unique experience thus provides one of the better examples of a possible charismatic phenomenon, but it had little impact historically.

Applying the charismatic designation to Franklin Roosevelt, as many have done, is also more appropriate than other similar characterizations.[34] A very popular vote-getter, he successfully broke the two-term presidential tradition and achieved most of his vast domestic and foreign objectives. However, those who describe his political career in charismatic terms miss all the complexities of his political biography before and during his presidency and ignore the overwhelming evidence that he generally operated within traditional American political mechanisms, in which he has been judged one of the most accomplished masters.[35] When he did go outside this style and tried a popular appeal, with his attempt to purge senators who opposed his Supreme Court reorganization plan, he failed completely. Charisma was no substitute for effective politics, even for FDR.

[31] David B. Anderson, *William Jennings Bryan* (Boston: Twayne, 1981).

[32] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 1132.

[33] George E. Mowery, *Theordore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1946); Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1931).

[34] Robert Tucker, "Personality and Political Leadership"; Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma*; Ruth A. Wilner, *The Spellbinders*.

[35] See, for instance, James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt-Brace Harvest, 1963); John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in History* (New York: Harper, 1950); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959).

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Especially suspect are the many accounts of John Kennedy's purported charisma, subject to an extensive post-hoc mythologizing that is common in the context of martyrdom.[36] Whatever his appealing public persona, he scarcely fulfilled any of my listed criteria. His nomination resulted from a well financed and carefully designed campaign. With significant support from established political leaders, he ran well behind his ticket in a year of overwhelming Democratic Party victories and achieved little of his policy agenda. In his case, personal style, including any conceivable charisma, did not result in significant historical consequences.[37] Ironically, his successor, Lyndon Johnson, a politician associated with an unfavorable public persona, was more successful as a vote getter and was able to achieve an array of policy objectives, primarily because as an FDR protege he was a skilled political operator, at least until he confronted the overwhelming problems of the Vietnam war.[38]

Dwight Eisenhower is not included in charismatic lists, although he fulfills our listed criteria better than most—an impressive vote-getter, no party identification before his nomination effort, personal appeal above issue considerations. His supporters emphasized his purely personal qualities, which was also true of those who favored his Democratic opponent in two races, Adlai Stevenson. One analyst portrayed the campaigns as a series of assertions from both candidates about a "sense of destiny." Comments from many supporters suggested evaluations in terms of morality symbols.[39] In the light of these observations it is important to dwell on these elections, because analyses of the election results discount the significance of such elements. A unique study attempted to appraise possible evidence of charismatic perceptions among the electorate. Classifying open-ended responses, very few would fit under the charisma rubric.[40]

Ronald Reagan is the most recent candidate for charismatic status for some observers. He fulfills some of the minimal criteria—a successful vote-getter running well ahead of his ticket; successful in most of his policy efforts, mostly by conventional political operations, albeit with an occasional attempt at plebiscitarian appeals. Above all else, his rise to political prominence, perhaps initially aided by his movie-actor celebrity status, was by institutionalized and deliberate political methods; and his presidential election victories were predominantly a

[36] Note Schweitzer's description of his "electoral charisma with a vengeance," his "heroic charisma" during the Cuban missile crisis. Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma*, 324.

[37] Henry Fairlie, *The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973); Lewis J. Piper, *The Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Crown, 1975); Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President: 1960* (New York: Atheneum, 1964); Tom Wicker, *J.F.K. and L.B.J.: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics* (New York: Morrow, 1968)

[38] Ronnie Dugger, *The Politician: The Life and Times of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Norton, 1982).

[39] James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 48 (December 1954): 1083–1102.

[40] Ibid.

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reflection of "condition of the times" variables.[41] There is little evidence that public perceptions of transcendental qualities were significant.

Some Exceptional Cases

Judgments about the relevance of the charisma concept for comprehending macroscopic political phenomena are based upon specific examples. In all such cases, the resulting analysis adds little to an understanding of historical developments and typically encourages insensitivity to the crucial factors involved. The charisma formula specifies or implies a mythical, transcendental, essentially nonrational mass loyalty to a political leader as a person. Organizational considerations are of minor importance; interest and value concerns of supporters as well as concrete political attitudes or comprehensive ideologies are commonly ignored. In all the examples reviewed, this orientation induces a misleading perspective. If any mythic element is involved, it is a reflection of a particular figure's symbolic identification with a larger collectivity to which there is a mythic loyalty—a nation, ethnic group, class, etc. Above all, however, a political leader's personal popular appeal, after discounting the other determinants of popular support, rests on perceptions of concrete achievements.

Two twentieth-century figures played historical roles resembling a purely charismatic influence, especially a personal appeal unrelated to organization factors. The political careers of Charles de Gaulle and Mohandas K. Gandhi illustrate what is absent in the other examples.[42] De Gaulle's case had no special magnetic personality features. Although a political organization emerged around his person, his historic function transcended such instrumentalities. When he left official politics in the 1940s, the organization effectively disappeared. When brought back into power in 1958 by the military leadership striving to maintain the empire, he instituted the dismemberment of that empire, in direct opposition to their hopes. Although the reinvigorated Gaullist party ran the government for some time afterwards, its public support was uniquely related to his personal image. A 1970 survey revealed that only 15 percent could correctly name his party; among the party voters, 90 percent gave him as the reason for their choice.[43] No similar phenomenon has been elsewhere disclosed. Without much formal

[41] Ronnie Dugger, *On Reagan: The Man and His Presidency* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); Everett C. Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Spring 1981): 1–25.

[42] For de Gaulle, see Jean Charlot, *The Gaullist Phenomenon* (New York: Praeger, 1970); Anthony Hartley, *Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement* (New York: Outerbridge and Dientsfrey, 1971). For Gandhi, see Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Dhananjay Keer, *Mahatma Gandhi, Political Saint and Unarmed Prophet* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1973); Penderal Moo, *Gandhi and Modern India* (New York: Norton, 1969).

[43] David R. Cameron, "Stability and Change in Patterns of French Partisanship," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (Spring 1972): 9–30.

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organization, Gandhi inspired not only those in close contact but a mass following, which joined him in actions he typically initiated on his own. Both a national liberation symbol and a religious philosophical prophet, no successors were able to continue his type of political activity with any success.

Organizations had some impact for both—de Gaulle's party and the Congress Party with which Gandhi was allied. Both men were important nationality symbols and expressions of the sacredness associated with such collectivities. Both were, associated with concrete, readily-perceived achievements, indicating the crucial importance of the efficacy dimension.

Perceptions of Political Efficacy

Max Weber's concepts can be readily transformed on the basis of his own statements into the mundane language of survey research. Judgments about reliability, performance, competence, trustworthiness, and ability to do a good job are akin to his emphasis on perceived achievements. This, obviously, implies the importance of rational considerations among supporters, whether accurate or mistaken. Webster's New World Dictionary defines efficacious as "bringing to pass, accomplish, producing or capable of producing the desired effect." It can also encompass assumed vigor of attempts or merely the facility for posing political questions in ways cogent for a significant part of the public. Personality characteristics as publicly conveyed are often demonstrably irrelevant, clearly illustrated in the cases of such significant historical figures as Lenin and de Gaulle. A political leader's personal appeal to the public is often situational and temporary.

Movement Leaders Against the Establishment

Anti-establishment leaders for whom charisma is ascribed were usually successful. This was true of both Lenin and Hitler. They effectively communicated their political aims to wide population sectors in specific historical contexts, achieved power, and seemed to ease crisis situations. Furthermore, they continued their effective forceful actions after achieving power. After his improvised army defeated domestic rivals and foreign forces, Lenin's regime began to orchestrate a new social order under perilous conditions. He created an international apparatus to expand the thrust of the revolution. Although it is difficult to check the extent of genuine popularity under Hitler's totalitarian regime, a common assessment is that his personal appeal as leader was enhanced initially by the abrogation of Versailles Treaty provisions, afterwards by the decline in unemployment through the Keynesian technique of rearmament, and ultimately by the early war victories. His image dissipated, however, after military defeats, with few mythic memories. Leaders of national insurgencies generally received their earliest heroic images through effective communication and organization, later by the success of their efforts. However, their images frequently dissipated when they lost their power, conspicuously in the cases of Nkrumah and Sukarno.

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Movement leaders among the downtrodden may provide an exception, for their mythic images may prevail in the absence of rationally perceived successes. Their effective articulations do engender psychic rewards, important for such population constituents, with a lasting aura, as in the cases of black leaders like Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X. But they do not constitute meaningful lasting leadership, because they have not delivered, a requirement especially crucial for such followings.

Office Seekers and Holders in Parliamentary Systems

Individual figures may have a special importance for the public in such systems. If there are many relatively weak parties, the leader of a coalition government can become a uniquely significant symbol if forceful in his leadership. Efficacy in both articulating and achieving policies will thus give the leader a special aura. The story of Pierre Mendes-France's incumbency as French premier in the early 1950s was a conspicuous example that had little to do with any obvious personality traits. Under conditions of strong parties, the party and leader becomes a significant symbol for popular party allegiance. The history of West Germany provides appropriate examples among leaders of both the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Parties. The Christian Democrats were clearly the dominant party during the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, associated in popular perceptions with the achievement of stability and prosperity after the turmoil of the war.[44] Social Democratic electoral fortunes were most conspicuous under the leadership of Willy Brandt, identified with an articulated policy of better relations with Eastern Europe. Helmut Schmidt was perceived as the political figure associated with vigorous economic growth and welfare state extension.[45] Without them, neither party appears to command much popular allegiance. Many other variables have been influential.

U.S. Office Seekers and Holders

The United States provides an especially fitting setting for evaluating the distinctly individual appeal of a political figure. The efficacy dimension supplies insight into appraisals of those considered charismatics as well as many others. For instance, the continued popular support for traditional machine politicians, despite widespread evidence of corruption, was often a reflection of the belief that they "got things done."[46] In recent times, the special advantage of congres-

[44] Richard Hiscocks, *The Adenauer Era* (New York: Lippincott, 1966); Terence Prittie, *Konrad Adenauer* (Chicago: Cowles, 1971).

[45] On Brandt, see Terence Prittie, *Willy Brandt: Portrait of a Statesman* (New York: Schocken, 1974). On Schmidt, see Jonathan Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany* (New York: St. Martins, 1985).

[46] Jerome A. Bruner and Sheldon J. Korchin, "The Boss and the Vote: A Case Study in City Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 10 (Spring 1946): 1–23.

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sional office holders is likely associated with their perceived ability to "get things done" for their constituents.[47] Personal style seems of minor importance.

For presidents especially, popularity is clearly a reflection of perceived efficacy in the several meanings of the term. For Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, widespread public support in the early days of his administration emanated from the vigor of his actions and proposals in the context of the Depression crisis, although there were as yet no meaningful achievements. His later election victories could be interpreted as reflecting sufficient national agreement with New Deal programs and foreign policy positions. But many who opposed these policies and had little identification with the candidate or his party still felt allegiance to him as a person, because of such perceived achievements as completed public works projects and successful wartime leadership. Ascription of charisma adds little to this interpretation. Eisenhower's appeal represented another image of efficacy that transcended issue and party considerations because of his apparent competence in maintaining national stability.[48] A similar image may be part of the explanation for the 1972 landslide victory of Richard Nixon, a politician with a much-reported negative public persona.[49] Marginal swing voters attributed the sense of inefficacy to the Carter administration in 1980,[50] and a belief in the vigor and achievements of Reagan and his associates in 1984.[51]

Military Actors

The avenue to public popularity, political leadership from identification with military actions, realized or threatened, deserves scrutiny, especially since it sometimes implies an accompanying charismatic aura. Sometimes a military record provides little more than an avenue to celebrity, as frequently has happened in American history. However, it may also signify a more consequential phenomenon, as in the Caesarist development accented by Weber, when the military role provides a special plebiscitarian symbol, possibly for a challenge to legitimate powers. One common feature of all such situations has not been sufficiently emphasized—they were judged successful achievers in those actions.

Perhaps even more indicative is the impact of successful military actions by a national civilian leader. They enhance nationalistic identification with the leader and establish an image of active efficacy, which may transcend other bases for support or opposition. This phenomenon may be most clearly appreciated by accounts of recent small-scale, short-lived operations in the United States. When an American naval vessel went aground in Cambodia, President Gerald Ford sent

[47] Candice J. Nelson, "The Effect of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections: 1964–1974," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Fall 1978): 665–678.

[48] Samuel Lubell, *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York: Harper, 1956).

[49] Samuel Lubell, *The Future While It Happened* (New York: Norton, 1953).

[50] Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate."

[51] Everett C. Ladd, "On Mandates, Realignments and the 1984 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Spring 1985): 1–15.

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a message with the tone of an ultimatum. Surveys revealed a resulting increase in his popularity among the war-weary American public, the majority of which was opposed to the general dispatch of troops abroad.[52] What followed President Nixon's decision to mine Haiphong Harbor in North Vietnam in 1972 at the same time a meeting with Soviet Leonid Brezhnev was scheduled, was similarly indicative. When the military effort did not force cancellation of the meeting, Nixon's popularity increased appreciably, which may have helped achieve his landslide electoral victory that fall at a time when Americans had become increasingly hostile to further military involvement in Southeast Asia.[53] Similarly, Reagan's decision to order an invasion of Grenada, judged by some a military debacle, enhanced his popularity, even though the majority of the public was opposed to military intervention in the Americas.[54] Although the increased popularity often turns out temporary, these almost petty examples indicate how efficacious-appearing acts of political leaders tend to enhance their appeal to the public, even among those skeptical about the policy implications.

Conclusion

Perhaps the total elimination of the charisma concept in serious discussions would be salutory. In any case, its disappearance in analyses of large-scale political phenomena would seem to be beneficial. At worst, its utilization has tended to obfuscate the complexity of social-political trends. Even in appraisals about the singular symbolic role of a particular political leader, it leads to erroneous implications with a common focus on personality characteristics rather than impact upon public perceptions. Public persona of specific historical examples have been magnetic or dull, affable or austere. None of this has any lasting relation to popular appeal. One must ask: Does the charisma concept add appreciably to an understanding of historical political developments, or does its use actually divert attention from more crucial variables? For those examples I have considered, the accounts add little to an appreciation of macroscopic politics. We must return to one glaring illustration, the assessment of Winston Churchill's personal image as historically crucial. Even the course of World War II would have likely been similar without his inspiring public persona; surely, the respective courses and electoral fate of the Conservative and Labour Parties would not have been much different.

Whatever the other determinants of popular political choices and political loyalties, the special personal appeal of any single individual is primarily based upon some perception of political efficacy. Ultimately it comes from a widespread belief in a person's ability to deliver in some form, even if results are often

[52] *Gallup Opinion Index: Report 117*, March 1975; *Report 119*, April 1975; *Report 120*, June 1975.
[53] Lubell, *The Future While It Happened*.
[54] *The Gallup Poll on Public Opinion 1983*, 262–265.

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temporary. Inspiring rhetoric and other types of symbolic communications may sway and excite for a while, especially among a few avid followers. But, for many of the apparent faithful, these are not sufficient for any continuing influence. As Weber indicated, the most seemingly charismatic still has to produce results. Even when the political figure is primarily a symbolic representation of a large collectivity—a nation—any lasting impact upon popular evaluations, besides what may ensue from post-hoc mythologizing, depends upon the satisfaction of collective aspirations, such as the establishment or reinvigoration of a nation.

Why does the charisma concept remain so popular among political analysts, whether glib journalistic commentators or prodigious scholars? Perhaps it is explainable by the time-honored fascination with heroes, which likely prompted Weber's attention to the subject. Affected by such works as Thomas Carlyle's classic enunciation of the historical importance of heroism, the heroic mold offered a fitting antidote to the increasingly evident bureaucratic style.[55] Similarly, many social scientists, immersed in the plodding process of tracing complex social and political developments, yield to a common romantic impulse by pinpointing the unique people whose actions and impact are not reducible to such prosaic explanations. Heroes in any aspect of life attain that status by their successful deeds, an indication of their efficacy, not because of special personality traits. This is demonstrably true of political heroes.

[55] Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 53.

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Justifying Democracy: A Review Essay

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN

Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky have collected a series of essays linking normative theories of democratic government with procedurally-oriented work in social choice.[1] While some of the chapters are predictable restatements of the authors' positions, others do make genuine contributions. Even those chapters that are familiar to the specialist, however, will be helpful to students seeking clear expositions of basic ideas.

The volume begins with a synthetic and thoughtful essay by J. Roland Pennock on the justifications of democracy. By democracy he means liberal, constitutional democracy, not the unconstrained rule of the majority. For him an "ideal" democracy is centrally concerned with respecting the autonomy and freedom of individuals. Democracy can only be justified if individuals are rational beings capable of autonomous action. Pennock also assumes that individuals are moral beings, have both physical and psychological needs, and are social animals. The ideal liberal democracy then "holds that the value of society or of community is not a thing in itself apart from the individuals that compose the entity in question."[2] The theory "embodies a strong (but sometimes overstated) presumption in favor of each individual's judgment about what contributes to his wellbeing."[3] It follows from Pennock's view of human nature that liberty and equality are central to democracy. By equality he does not mean that all individuals must be treated

[1] Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky, eds., *Politics and Process: New Essays in Democratic Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[2] Ibid., 21.

[3] Ibid., 22.

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alike in all contexts, but rather that there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of equality whether in democratic voting procedures or in the distribution of substantive political and economic power. In moving from the ideal to the actual institutions of political life, Pennock stresses the importance of voting as a crucial link. He defends majority rule even in the presence of voting cycles by arguing that its very instability means that the losers can hope to be in the majority the next time around. He also puts more stress than is common in the public choice literature on the moral motivations of individuals when they participate in politics. Pennock argues that

> as political participation contributes to the intellectual and moral development of citizens, it tends to improve the quality of government output. What is valuable, to be sure, is not just any participation – for example, voting – but discussion, debate, organization for political purposes, and all that contributes both to the education of citizens concerning the issues surrounding policy decisions and to voter influence on policy.[4]

Pennock's affirmative vision of democracy stands in sharp contrast to the gloomy prognostications of the Virginia School of public choice. While both approaches are based on individualistic premises, the Virginia School has a distinctly more pessimistic view of human nature. Peter Aronson's essay summarizes this position. Brennan and Lomasky provide a new twist to the Virginia School's crabbed vision, one which is meant to undermine the claim that democratic procedures are responsive to the preferences of the electorate. Because of the large number of voters and the gap between expressing support and bearing the cost of public programs, they question whether voting should be viewed as a choice process at all. A vote should be understood as meaning only that the individual preferred to vote for a particular policy, not that he or she prefers the policy itself with its associated costs and benefits. "Because voting is essentially cost free, it is conducive to extremes of altruistic and malicious expression, both of which tend to be dampened by the cost structure of private undertaking."[5] They argue that malicious behavior is especially likely in the voting booth because anonymity "insulates one from the reproach of one's victim."[6] Democratic choice is equivalent to flipping a coin. Its only additional feature is that it permits people to express their sentiments, something people apparently like to do.

This grudging defense of democracy provoked comment from several of the other authors. Pennock believes than because the purely rational individualist would not vote, those who do vote are more likely to be motivated by moral concerns than Brennan and Lomasky suppose. He also argues that citizens are more willing to support public benefit programs than to donate to private charities because of the state's ability to levy taxes that eliminate free riders. Dennis Mueller argues that voting should be seen as a conditioned response. The type of behavior Brennan and Lomasky see as a problem he sees as a benefit.

[4] Ibid., 34.
[5] Ibid., 54.
[6] Ibid., 55.

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> An individual might decide against a proposal if it is left to him alone to decide, but vote for the proposal when he knows that his vote will not change the outcome, thereby indulging his conscience by voting according to his ethical preferences, because he knows this conscience vote will not actually cost him anything. . . . The individual would then be acting qua voter in much the same way that Rawls says individuals ought to act behind the veil of ignorance.[7]

The problem for Mueller is not how people vote but whether they will vote at all. "The dilemma of democratic participation is that the same characteristics of goods that make collective action necessary weaken an individual's incentive to participate in a democratic process that decides the quantity and quality dimensions of the goods."[8] Mueller then goes on to make such concrete suggestions as free television broadcasts of political debates with all other programming suspended, decentralization of decision making, and the use of alternatives to plurality voting such as proportional representation or weighted voting.

While the debate between Pennock, Brennan and Lomasky, and Mueller forms the most interesting part of the book, there is considerable value in the other essays. James Fishkin provides a clearheaded discussion of the differences between the hypothetical agreement imagined by James Buchanan and John Rawls and suggests a way of sorting out alternative approaches. His own work focuses on situations of actual agreement reached under what he calls refined or ethical preferences. James Coleman's chapter is a well articulated and skeptical review of justifications for democracy from a rational choice perspective. The contractarian perspective is given primary focus in the papers by William Nelson and, of course, James Buchanan. David Osterfeld's paper on federalism rediscovers Charles M. Tiebout's defense of decentralized government without, however, taking account of the large literature in urban economics and public finance critical of this perspective. Finally, Shirley Letwin defends the proposition that a system of law that is general, impersonal, and noninstrumental is the essential basis of a free, democratic society.

[7] Ibid., 86.
[8] Ibid., 93.

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Book Reviews

Abe Fortas: A Biography *by Laura Kalman. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 499 pp. $29.95.*

This second of two major biographies of ill-starred Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas confirms and elaborates the sad self-destruction of a man of extraordinary talents. The first, in 1988, was a 700-page study by Bruce Murphy, a University of Pennsylvania political scientist, with the subtitle, "The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice." The present volume by historian and lawyer Laura Kalman of the University of California, Santa Barbara, is an authorized biography in the sense that Kalman had the assistance of Fortas's widow, Carolyn Agger; access to personal papers; and extensive interviews with Fortas's family and associates. This connection had no perceptible effect on the author's judgments. Reviewing one of Fortas's appearances before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Kalman is succinct: He lied.

Born in Memphis, with a passion for the violin (he was known locally as Fiddlin' Abe), he graduated from a local college at the age of 20, entered Yale Law School, then the center of the Legal Realism movement, where he became editor of the *Yale Law Journal* and the protege of William O. Douglas and Thurman Arnold. After graduation, for a time he combined teaching at Yale with high-level operations in New Deal Washington. He worked with Jerome Frank at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Douglas at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Harold Ickes at the Department of the Interior, becoming undersecretary there.

Leaving Interior in 1946 with some encouragement from the irascible secretary, and after an enlistment in the navy that quickly ended with a medical discharge, he joined Thurman Arnold in a Washington law firm. With the later addition of Paul Porter, it was to become perhaps the best known law firm in the country—certainly in Washington. The firm was particularly active in defense of government employees and others charged with disloyalty during the McCarthy era. In his most noteworthy appearance as counsel before the Supreme Court, in the

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case of *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963), Fortas convinced the justices that representation by counsel was a constitutional right in all criminal cases.

His most famous client, however, was Lyndon Johnson, who was to become Fortas's evil genius. He met Johnson soon after the Texan's election to the House in 1937 and was one of a group of New Dealers supporting Johnson's bid for the Senate in 1948. When Johnson won the Democratic nomination by fifty-seven votes in an election marked by massive fraud on both sides, Fortas developed the legal strategy that preserved Johnson's place on the November ballot and in his subsequent career. As vice president and later as president, Johnson relied constantly on Fortas as legal adviser and general handyman.

Johnson felt his obligation to Fortas so strongly that he determined to reward him with appointment to the Supreme Court. Fortas genuinely did not want the Court appointment, which would terminate his active political life and greatly reduce his income. (He drove a Rolls Royce.) But he solved both problems. After only a few weeks on the Court, Johnson was again calling on him for advice, and he was responding. Law clerks could take naps in his office, because he was up at the White House so much of the time. As for the money, he entered into a lucrative arrangement to provide services to a charitable family trust, headed by a man who was in trouble with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Neither would have been fatal to his status on the Court had not Johnson attempted to make him chief justice after Earl Warren had indicated his intention to resign. It was at the Judiciary Committee hearings on this nomination that he was forced to lie about his continuing relations with the president. The bitter political fallout forced withdrawal of the nominaton, but worse was to come. The Nixon administration, seeking a Court vacancy, made such a scandal of the trust payments that Fortas chose to resign. His old law firm did not want him back, but he formed a two-man law firm and made one nostalgic appearance before the Supreme Court. Lyndon Johnson is reported to have said, "I ruined his life" (p. 376).

Laura Kalman's book is a model of biographical research. She presents a full and fair account of a checkered career.

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy *by Barry M. Blechman with the assistance of W. Philip Ellis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 249 pp. $24.95.*

This is a well-organized, comprehensive, and very readable account of how and why Congress has seized—and more importantly retained—much of the high ground in the creation of defense policy. Appraisals of congressional policy processes and their consequences are reasoned, balanced, and often keenly insightful. To institutionalize greater comity between the presidency and a resurgent

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Congress, proposals to strengthen Congress abound. Most—but not all—of Blechman's prescriptions are eminently sensible and persuasively reasoned. As class discussion topics, they are filaments for illumination, even heat.

Blechman's thesis is that since Vietnam and into the foreseeable future, domestic politics and institutional perspectives have driven Congress to speak with a louder voice—one it has no intention of muting. Consequently, the executive should accept the inevitable, willingly share power with Congress, and recognize that policy consensus from both branches serves the national interest. That's hardly an original contribution in today's intellectual climate. However, Blechman sees many shades of gray that escape most other champions of what to some of us has become an imperial Congress. The author promotes doctrine without being doctrinaire.

Blechman's explanation of the tensions between Congress and the executive is far more political than legal. The political motivations (some crassly partisan, some craven) that prompt congressional behavior are a recurrent theme in the narration of events. They also shape Blechman's judgment about which reforms in the congressional policy process are feasible. Thus, he would revise the War Powers Resolution to accommodate the legislature's "political timidity" (p. 194), which prompts it to evade on-the-record votes to either support or oppose hostilities.

Chapter 1 presents an overview of congressional actions since Vietnam and raises questions about their efficacy. Chapters 2 through 6, respectively, cover the military budget and management of defense resources, arms control, arms sales abroad, covert operations, and war powers. Virtually every facet of these topics is included.

In the seventh and last chapter, Blechman favorably appraises a stronger congressional role in defense policy. One section condenses specific reforms from earlier chapters into four guidelines: Required congressional decisions should be sought before the executive acts. As much as possible, Congress should avoid changing previous decisions. Congress should take a longer view. Greater responsibility should be given to specialized groups in Congress.

The sweet reasonableness of these generalizations sometimes turns sour when traced back to a specific reform. For example, in the chapter on war powers, Blechman proposes that a president "be required" (p. 197) to engage in prior consultation with a statutory group of eighteen congressional leaders. That such "senior" leaders might leak information Blechman dismisses as "absurd and insulting" (pp. 197, 198)—a rebuttal more defensive than persuasive. Blechman then undercuts his own argument by adding to the original eighteen-leaders group "four additional members elected by each party's caucus in each chamber" (p. 198). These sixteen "rank and file members" could express "changing political views" and "ease the appearance of elitism . . ." (p. 198). Realistically, no president would risk leaks by consulting with thirty-six legislators, especially if they included dogmatic doves elected by Democratic caucuses.

Much of this book is based on interviews with legislators and staff members

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in Congress; no interviews within the executive branch are cited. That may explain the occasional lapse from reality, as viewed from the White House. However, even good diamonds have flaws. Compared to other books in this genre, this is a gem.

HARVEY ZEIDENSTEIN
Illinois State University

Pledging Allegiance: The Last Campaign of the Cold War *by Sidney Blumenthal. New York, HarperCollins, 1990. 386 pp. $22.95.*

If critics of Theodore White's volumes on presidential campaigns in the 1960s called him the Parson Weems of our time, admirers of Sidney Blumenthal's chronicle of the 1988 campaign might see him as a journalistic Henry Adams. Blumenthal (and everyone else) lacks Adams's sense of historical context, but the *Washington Post* correspondent seems to share Adams's beliefs that politicians inevitably trail helplessly behind events; that they try to make it up by using empty phrases to deceive an easily deceived Congress and public; and that with the second law of thermodynamics afflicting politics as well as the natural world, the situation must further decline. Adams concluded that when the presidency moved from George Washington to Ulysses S. Grant, one's belief in evolution had to be questioned. Blumenthal agrees, but starts at a lower starting point: Richard Nixon to George Bush.

Nixon is the central figure in the story. He and Henry Kissinger, Blumenthal argues, created the only world George Bush knows and wants to know. In 1972 Nixon successfully campaigned as both peace maker and warrior, melded social issues into national security issues, and anticipated the attack on the "L-word" by unfairly maligning McGovernism. The voters, ever-fewer in numbers and ever-slower in intellectual mobility, bought it all. They did so again sixteen years later. But Bush paid a devastating price for his victory. Surrounded by Kissinger's friends and unable to rise above Nixon's need for the cold war, Bush was immobilized as Mikhail Gorbachev destroyed much of that world. After six months of a supposed fundamental review of national security, the White House announced the new U.S. policy was "status-quo plus." The laughter died when Bush relived the 1920s by sending 27,000 troops to Panama and anticipated the so-called new world order by going to war with Iraq.

Blumenthal carefully analyzes the supporting cast. When liberals threatened to explore the Heritage Foundation's possible role in laundering money in the Iran-contra scandal, Congressman Richard Cheney of Wyoming protected the neoconservatives and squashed the investigation by threatening to look into the Brookings Institution and other nonconservative think tanks. As for the evangelicals, Bush, who listened for years "to droning sermons on the undemanding strictures of upper-class faith" (p. 69), had no problem cultivating Jim Bakker and Jerry Falwell. Only Pat Robertson, who emerges as a cross between Elmer Gantry and Elmer Fudd, was

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too much for Bush. But Blumenthal's special target is Michael Dukakis, who had little use for any ideas; and when he did receive some from the John F. Kennedy School faculty at Harvard, they were invariably bad. For Blumenthal, Gary Hart and Richard Gephardt (but not Jesse Jackson) are brilliant by comparison. Dukakis did not believe his job was "to lay the foundation for a new order," while Bush's campaign was only "the continuation of the Cold War by metaphor" (p. 262). "That's history" was a favorite Bush phrase for disposing of embarrassing questions (p. 319). Henry Adams would have understood.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Then and Now: How the World Has Changed Since WW II by Tad Szulc. New York, William Morrow, 1990. 515 pp. $22.95.

Tad Szulc, a distinguished foreign correspondent, has written a sprawling account of the changes he has witnessed in the world over the last half-century. Neither a memoir nor a comprehensive history, his book is a fascinating account of historical change that focuses on three themes—the revolution in technology, the rise and fall of Marxism-Leninism, and the turmoil that has wracked the Third World.

It is the last two developments that stand out most clearly in Szulc's kaleidoscopic treatment. As a perceptive journalist, he is able to understand the initial appeal of Marxism in countries that only had known repression. It was not just the Red Army that imposed communism on the countries of eastern and central Europe overrun by the Soviet Union in 1945; many young idealists were attracted to Marxism as a secular religion that promised to do away with poverty and social injustice. Szulc describes the growing disillusion with communism in the Iron Curtain countries, noting particularly the crucial events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and the Prague spring of 1968 as important steps toward the final breakdown of Marxism-Leninism in the fall of 1989. His account of what he terms the "Autumn of the People" is especially sensitive and acute.

Far more depressing is his sobering account of what happened over the past fifty years in the Third World, where 75 percent of the global population lived by 1990. Instead of viewing the nations that emerged from imperial rule from the usual cold war perspective, Szulc portrays their struggle for existence as a human tragedy. Whatever virtue the cold war had in imposing order and avoiding World War III, it also permitted a constant series of civil wars and regional conflicts that cost millions of lives, created vast numbers of refugees (an estimated 17 million by 1990), and left these underdeveloped countries mired in poverty and debt. The United States, mistaking nationalist striving for communist subservience, hurt both its own interests and those of proud and defiant Third World nations like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Szulc's book reveals that the greatest failures of the CIA were not its celebrated covert actions but rather its inability to anticipate events like the Iranian

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Revolution or understand the appeal of nationalism in Southeast Asia and Central America. From Chiang Kai-shek and Ngo Dinh Diem to Fulgencio Batista and Anastasio Somoza, we consistently backed the losers in the Third World.

Too impressionistic to be a reliable history of the past fifty years, *Then and Now* nevertheless benefits from the personal insights of a gifted journalist. Szulc offers nuances that cast a different light on familiar events, and he succeeds in humanizing the impersonal forces of history. In one telling anecdote, he destroys the myth of pacification in Vietnam. After listening to senior American and ARVN officers brief Secretary of State William Rogers on their success in making the highways of the Mekong delta safe for travel even at night in 1970, Szulc asked two Army captains if they agreed. "'That's bullshit, man,' one of them said. 'It's worse than ever . . . I'd have to have my head examined before I'd drive *anywhere* at night around here. . .'" (p. 318).

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan *by Mark A. Peterson. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990. 342 pp. $32.50.*

This book contributes positively to a new and improved understanding of presidential-congressional relations. Much of the work on this topic has stressed presidential success with Congress, essentially portraying the two institutions as locked in a series of contests, for each of which a winner and loser can be declared. Often the frustrated effort to generalize, to escape the dreaded case study charge, has led to analysis of roll call voting—directly or by relying on support scores. Most such studies carry a warning: these results may be dangerous to your understanding.

Peterson turns away from a presidency-centered perspective, offering instead a "tandem-institutions perspective" that asks the analyst to accept that national policy decisions require involvement at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. He encourages us to identify and understand the processes by which these decisions are made—sometimes cooperatively, sometimes in conflict, often with one or the other of the institutions playing a more dominant role. One might legitimately and sensibly conclude from this discussion that the two institutions are oriented toward similar agendas, seeking to perform those functions perceived to be associated with their status. That conclusion alone casts doubt on an approach that stresses institutional combat. Further, it seems reasonable to believe that measuring success or failure may require more than a single judgment as to who was ahead on the day a vote was taken, if it makes sense to declare a winner at all.

The book tackles a large topic and the author sensibly narrows it by concentrating on domestic policy and on the president's legislative initiatives. Among

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the more useful conceptual contributions of the book are Peterson's distinction among institutional, political, economic, and policy contexts. Some settings, for example, institutional structures, are seldom subject to presidential manipulation. It is not that they don't change; it is just that presidents can't typically control them for purposes of short-term legislative strategy. Other settings are more "malleable," for example, the health of the economy or more immediate political circumstances. Presidents try to manage these settings but with limited success. They are but one of many actors, and their decisions often have unintended consequences. Then there is the policy context—the setting associated with the issues at hand and the proposals designed to treat them. It is in this context that the president has the greatest latitude, but Peterson wisely advises us that issues vary and so do the politics and strategic choices of each. His discussion of the variability in impact, priority status, and politics is particularly helpful.

Peterson's organizational scheme is to combine conceptual analysis with that distinguishing among individual presidencies. The scheme is not wholly successful and, indeed, rather frustrating for the reader. The task might be eased somewhat if the reader imagined that each chapter were subtitled: "Think about going at it this way." The concepts are truly useful, the variables associated with strategic choices are logical and helpful, and the effort at integrative analysis is imaginative. The chapter on individual presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to Ronald Reagan relies on the earlier, more conceptual chapters but cannot do more than tempt us to explore further. Peterson's comparative analysis is based on some 300 presidential initiatives (supplemented by interviews and secondary analyses). While an admirable beginning, it only partially satisfies one's curiosity about the effects of the individual president interacting with his political and policy environments.

There is a lot going on in this book. That it does not meet all of its goals should not trouble either the author or readers. It offers plenty in its clear development of concepts and methods of analysis. It deserves the attention it will receive as a contribution to better understanding of the interaction between the White House and Congress.

CHARLES O. JONES
University of Wisconsin-Madison

FDR and the News Media *by Betty Houchin Winfield. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1991. 276 pp. $34.95.*

Given his privileged and wealthy background and his early and enthusiastic embrace of journalism (he was editor of the Harvard Crimson as a junior) Franklin Delano Roosevelt clearly seemed destined to become a press baron. He chose a different path, of course, but even as president of the United States, he was still an editor—of the entire nation's newspapers.

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The extent of his involvement in the daily journalism of America during his twelve years in the White House is chronicled in meticulous detail by communications historian Betty Houchin Winfield from a sifting of the reams of private papers of the principal players. It was, she says, a case of news management—or spin control, in present-day jargon—and if that seems a harsh and deprecatory description, let it stand. Indeed, FDR emerges from this study as the founding father and preeminent virtuoso of spin control.

But no part of the author's work is to demean the late president as a cynical political manipulator. Rather, she traces how he became aware as a young office seeker of the power of the press, of how it could be used to win elections, and, most importantly, of how it could be employed to alter public perceptions and win popular support for policy.

Among twentieth century presidents, none, with the possible exception of John F. Kennedy, enjoyed the personal rapport and acceptance by the working White House press that FDR possessed. It was a marriage of like minds in many ways, because the president understood the needs of the news media for a story and genuinely tried to provide one.

Thus, in his dozen years in the White House he held about 1,000 press conferences—about twice a week when he was in Washington. They established a pattern of easy give-and-take among the regulars and the president. And they had a careful ground rule: no direct quotations of the president unless wording was authorized by Press Secretary Steven Early. The rule was observed, as rules usually are in any exclusive club, which the White House press corps was. That, too, helped with the news managment. A few writers like Anna O'Hare McCormick of the *New York Times* enjoyed private interviews on special occasions, but mostly the privilege of talking with the president was confined to club members.

By effectively coopting the writers who covered him and who provided positive, front-page stories on his administration, FDR was able to shrug off the editorial page thrashings he regularly took from their publishers. In winning four terms he never came close to winning editorial endorsement of the majority of the nation's newspapers. So much for the power of *that* press.

Personal charm and bantering skill were only the surface elements in White House news managment. Beneath lay a shrewd organization led by a news professional in Steve Early. This was a White House alert to the new communications technologies. The fireside chat lives in history as a radio art form of FDR, a precursor of the one-on-one relationship television now gives presidents. His successors can only envy Roosevelt's skill in the medium.

Noted, too, by Winfield was the White House use of polling techniques—then in their infancy—to determine where problems lay on policy issues so that they could be addressed and overcome.

As a dispassionate historian the author has copiously annotated her study with a footnote for virtually every challengeable statement. Indeed, the work is largely

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nonjudgmental. One conclusion might be drawn: if you wish to become a politically successful president, become a journalist first.

JOHN J. SMEE
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The Six O'Clock Presidency: A Theory of Presidential Press Relations in the Age of Television *by Fredric T. Smoller. New York, Praeger Press, 1990. 158 pp. $39.95.*

In *The Six O'Clock Presidency*, Fredric Smoller claims that network news has become increasingly negative in its portrayal of presidents. As a result, public confidence in the presidency is eroding, as is the ability of presidents to govern effectively. Smoller supports this argument with content analyses, as well as his own observations of and interviews with the White House press corps. The theoretical arguments are not always original, and the evidence is not conclusive. Nonetheless, this book is a useful addition to research on television and the presidency.

Through the first four chapters, Smoller argues that presidential coverage is driven by the profit motive. Besides being "inherently newsworthy," the president is one of the few political figures in whom people are interested (p. 17). Thus by covering presidents, networks can serve the public interest without jeopardizing profits. Presidential news is also national and so does not compete with affiliates' local programming. News from the White House is cost effective and logistically easy to produce. Finally, covering the president brings prestige to correspondents and the networks. Increased coverage, says Smoller, brings increasingly negative coverage. Television is particularly hard on the president because of its penchant for stories that are visual, entertaining, melodramatic, short, and uncomplicated. In addition, television correspondents, because they are highly educated, extremely well-paid celebrities, are not intimidated by the president and are willing (even eager) to confront him.

Chapter Five presents evidence that network coverage of presidents is extensive and negative. Smollar drew a sample of 1,800 out of the 4,180 weekday CBS news broadcasts aired from 1969 through 1985. He then coded the transcripts of all 5,292 presidency stories broadcast on those days. Each story was coded for type of activity portrayed, story tone, length, and rank in the broadcast.

Not surprisingly, Smoller found that presidents are covered a great deal: 97 percent of the newscasts had at least one story on the president, and the average was between two and three stories a night. Sixty percent of these stories were neutral or balanced, 24 percent were negative, and 16 percent were positive, resulting in a "net tone" of -8 percent. Smoller also argues that coverage becomes increasingly negative both within and across administrations (p. 47).

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Chapter Six explicates the "four seasons of presidential news" (p. 61). Based on impressionistic analyses of transcripts, Smoller argues that coverage of each presidential term begins with a generally positive personal profile, shifts to a discussion of the president's agenda, prematurely evaluates the effectiveness of policies, and ends with a generally negative reevaluation of the president. This cycle makes it difficult for presidents to successfully pass, let alone execute, their legislative agendas.

Chapters Seven and Eight are comparisons of Jimmy Carter's and Ronald Reagan's press relations. Carter maintained an open presidency, holding numerous press conferences and keeping his press secretary informed. As a result, he was unable to control his television image. Reagan took a more controlled approach, using speeches and carefully orchestrated media events to present a positive public image, while avoiding press conferences and other unstructured exchanges with journalists. In Chapter Nine, Smoller recommends that presidential coverage be reduced, profits be deemphasized, more media-savvy presidents be elected, and the public be reeducated.

The Six O'Clock Presidency has several shortcomings. Few of the arguments and findings are new or surprising. Despite its importance, very little is said about the criteria used or the difficulties faced in determining the tone of stories. (The appendix is only mildly helpful in this regard.) Also, my own reading of his data does not lead unambiguously to Smoller's conclusion that coverage becomes more negative within and across administrations. Finally, the author might have provided more systematic arguments and evidence for the changing seasons of coverage.

Smoller's most intriguing finding is that despite his reputation as the teflon president, Reagan received more negative coverage than past presidents. This conclusion cries out for explication, yet little is given. To the contrary, Chapter Eight implies that Reagan's media strategy was effective at controlling his press image. I suspect part of this ambiguity results from the use of written transcripts. Given the importance of visuals in the effective impact of television, it may be, as Mark Hertsgaard suggests in *On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency* that negative reporting is overwhelmed by the positive visual images that often accompany it.

Nonetheless, *The Six O'Clock Presidency* has much to recommend it. The content analysis provides a valuable, longitudinal picture of network news coverage of presidents. Quotes from journalists and technicians, peppered throughout the book, are extremely revealing. And Smoller's interpretations and conclusions, while not always supported by the data, are provocative and suggest interesting avenues for future research.

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Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of *The New York Times*' Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy *by Nicholas O. Berry. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1990. 164 pp. $39.95.*

Nicholas Berry decided to test two popular yet conflicting theories about press coverage of foreign policy because both ran counter to his own experiences when reading foreign affairs news. The challenged theories contend either that the press plays a dominant, independent role in shaping foreign policy, often tying the president's hands, or that the press is putty in the hands of the president and his media managers when it comes to foreign policy reporting. Berry, who chairs the Department of Politics at Ursinus College in Pennsylvania, believes that the press neither dominates foreign policy nor surrenders to governmental manipulation. Rather, during early policy stages, it is a neutral reporter of what government officials say about foreign policies, because journalists lack the analytical capacity to examine these policies critically. However, once foreign policies have been implemented, it becomes easier to tell whether or not they meet the goals stated by the administration and whether or not they were successful. If policies turn out to be failures, the media feature the views of vocal critics, despite governmental attempts to manipulate news coverage to support official policies. By that time, it is usually too late to avert the disastrous consequences of the initial policy.

To test these hypotheses, Berry content-analyzed *New York Times* front-section coverage of five policy disasters. They were the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the John F. Kennedy presidency, the Vietnam war in the Lyndon B. Johnson years, the Cambodian incursion ordered by President Richard Nixon, the Iran hostage crisis that President Jimmy Carter faced, and interventions in Lebanon while President Ronald Reagan was in office. For each of these disasters, Berry compared press pronouncements in selected issues of the *New York Times* with the statements of the incumbent president. A consistency scoring system was developed to assess to what extent the ideas expressed in a press statement were consistent with the president's overall policy perspectives, his analyses of the situation at hand, and his perceptions of the policy's appropriateness in terms of U.S. national interests, goals, and strategies. The various policy phases, from initial development to final outcome, were then compared in terms of press agreement or disagreement with the government's policies and policy pronouncements.

Berry's findings confirmed his theory and disconfirmed its rivals. If the *New York Times* is typical—an open question—official foreign policy statements are reported without distortions as are foreign policy failures. Administrations are not allowed to hide their failures behind cloaks of soothing publicity. However, the press does not challenge government pronouncements unless and until these challenges are first made by credible, quotable political sources. Because critical scrutiny of public policies is so essential in a democracy, Berry urges critics of foreign policy, particularly academicians, to become more vocal and to develop better access to the media. This is especially important in the foreign policy domain, since reporters seem less

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inclined to be critical or even analytical when foreign, rather than domestic, policy coverage is involved.

Why does the press behave as it does? Berry cites the general orientation of American journalists and professional constraints as major reasons. The president and his top officials are important sources whose views must be reported accurately. Deadline pressures, unfamiliarity with foreign affairs, and fear of alienating top officials, all dampen the ardor to challenge presidential policies. However, when conflicting reports from other reliable sources become available, and especially when the factual situation differs from the projected outcomes, reporters switch their attention to these more recent data. Their patriotism, which makes them willing to rally around the flag initially, drives them to expose policy failures that require changes in policy direction.

This is a carefully designed and executed study. One can criticize it for its limitations, such as using only *New York Times* contents, omitting editorial pages from scrutiny, and employing a subjective coding scheme without reporting reliability data. But these shortcomings pale against the merits of the study. Its findings are strong, its theoretical base is solid, and the analyses of presidential frames of reference for foreign policy making are intriguing. Comparisons between the patterns of foreign and domestic news reporting are enlightening. All in all, this is a must-read for anyone interested in how the press covers foreign policy.

DORIS A. GRABER
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Claiming the Dream: The Victorious Campaign of Douglas Wilder of Virginia *by Margaret Edds. Chapel Hill, NC, Algonquin Books, 1990. 273 pp. $18.95.*

On 7 December 1989 Virginia's L. Douglas Wilder scored one of the great victories in black politics as he became the first-ever elected black governor. Wilder's success was even more surprising for its setting in the state that had led the South's massive resistance to school integration. Margaret Edds's excellent *Claiming the Dream* traces the campaign and searches for its significance in American politics. She writes for the Norfolk *Virginian-Pilot/Ledger-Star* and obviously knows the state political scene inside and out. She interviewed campaign strategists from both sides. Edds effectively incorporates political science research on racial politics. She writes very well, and has produced an accessible, informative story.

The author's major theme is the evolution of Virginia politics from its segregationist past into a more contemporary, moderate stance. A thorough introduction by Paul Duke is very helpful in vividly portraying the Old Virginia. The New Virginia, bolstered by thousands of upwardly-mobile newcomers, became the key to Wilder's election.

The campaign's clear turning point was the Supreme Court decision on 3 July

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1989 that reopened the issue of abortion by allowing some state limits. Republican nominee Marshall Coleman, who in the Republican primary had staked out a strongly pro-life stance, was immediately caught in the pro-choice counterattack. Edds shows that Wilder made Coleman pay the price, effectively framing the issue as "who decides?" rather than the morality of abortion. Coleman's unwillingness to support abortion in cases of rape and incest (a position, Edds notes, to the right of President George Bush) cost him dearly, as Wilder draped himself in the mantle of Thomas Jefferson. The abortion issue helped mightily to mute the power of race and strongly attracted New Virginians in the northern part of the state.

Of course, as Edds indicates, race still mattered. Bolstered by the abortion issue, Wilder ran on a popular party ticket against divided Republican opposition; even so, he just barely won.

Wilder himself emerges as an outstanding electoral strategist, keeping his adversaries on the defensive, raising huge sums of campaign money, running terrific commercials stressing values, deftly handling the race issue, and debating even the strongest opponents toe-to-toe. Edds also shows some less attractive qualities—a streak of opportunism and a willingness to undercut his allies. Edds's book certainly begins to paint a fuller picture of an emerging national leader, often portrayed as an alternative to Jesse Jackson in the Democratic party and as a member of a future Democratic national ticket.

One concern remains. The Republican Justice Department, building on one of Jesse Jackson's campaign issues, is pushing to end run-off primaries in the South. This would create black Democratic nominees without a majority base among Democrats. (Wilder was himself nominated in a party convention.) If Wilder is an exception and there is not yet a New South, the end of run-off primaries could prove a huge boon for Republicans. Since this book came out, Andrew Young in Georgia (gubernatorial primary) and Harvey Gantt in North Carolina (Senate) have lost statewide races. The South still has a long way to go, and we still have much to learn about the statewide black candidacy. *Claiming the Dream* makes a significant contribution to that process.

RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN
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The Rich Get Richer: The Rise of Income Inequality in the United States and the World *by Denny Braun. Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 1990. 383 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $17.95.*

With the country and the media now reasonably receptive to theories and information on the rise of income inequality, Braun's book should fall on fertile soil. The caveat is that he has produced an uncertain packet of seeds. The book's

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weakness, especially in its first half, lies in its venture into grand economic theory on the interaction of the weaknesses of capitalism, the world recession of the early 1980s, and the escalation of worldwide income inequality. The turgidity quotient is too high. A chapter on ideology is particularly hard slogging. For example, this phraseology: "In the end, however, it is the very isolation of such leftist movements within the semi-periphery that works to stabilize the exploitation of the periphery by the core. According to Wallerstein, the contamination is then quarantined to an area where it can do no harm while still keeping in place the overall status quo of world economic inequality. In this way, periphery countries remain rigidly locked up within a system of subordination and subservience" (p. 35).

Prose like this can squelch incipient in the bud. Moreover, sociologist Braun has no particular credentials in the economic arena, and his attempts at dispassion are hardly improved by regular dismissals of Reaganomics loaded with sentences like "'[t]rickle down' does not work!" (p. 71). Truth is not necessarily a *literary* defense.

This is unfortunate, because Braun does have some things to say and some points to make. First, the book has its scattered nuggets of intriguing information on income and wealth inequality, ranging from citation of one study establishing a correlation between income inequality and political violence to another indicating that the top 1 percent of Americans owns 60 percent of the corporate stock.

Second, parts of the volume are useful, and not surprisingly they are pages where former Census Bureau consultant Braun steers away from economics and zeroes in on census data and statistics. His most interesting chapter, despite its somewhat ridiculous name, is "Sunset in the Sun Belt," which lays out detail, including county-by-county demographics, on patterns of U.S. income inequality. The Sun Belt, he shows, is a center of income inequality, not just in the rural counties of the Old Confederacy. Metropolitan centers like Atlanta, Dallas, Miami, and Los Angeles have household income disparities greater than the levels prevailing in India. That, presumably, is where the "Sunset" comes. By contrast, old-line heavily unionized manufacturing counties—many now hemorrhaging jobs and population—have been strongholds of relative income *equality*. Braun is at his best in these kinds of analyses.

Perhaps the most inappropriate part of the book is Chapter 7, which includes Braun's own proposals for change. These range from environmental commitment to a series of recommendations to readers for personal actions that include subscriptions to alternative publications and embracing social investing "to combat economic injustice" through organizations like Working Assets (which also offers a Visa card). Braun observes that "[e]ach time I use the card I know at least some of my money is going to work against the injustices an unrestrained market system has spawned" (p. 281). Parochialisms like this seem likely to minimize the book's influence and reach.

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The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair *by Harold Hongju Koh. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 340 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.*

Harold Koh's admirable and ambitious work examines the Iran-contra affair in the context of a larger, systematic analysis of the adequacy of our *National Security Constitution.* Iran-contra represented a "fundamental assault" (p. 5) on constitutional norms governing the conduct of American foreign policy, but it was not an isolated incident. Rather, it fit a consistent cold war pattern of executive abuse of foreign affairs powers.

Koh's book is essential reading for scholars engaged in issues of national security and foreign policy, for it offers an insightful analysis of a recurrent problem in American politics: congressional and judicial acquiescence in the presidential corruption of the constitutional design for foreign affairs. What should be done about this? Koh proposes a "reinvigoration" of the basic concept of "balanced institutional participation in national security decision making" (p. 5). Koh's proposals, principally procedural in nature, are attractive and familiar. They include increased executive accountability, vigilant congressional oversight, and judicial willingness to check the presidency. These remedies are imperative. He also recommends additional framework legislation that reflects legislative-executive cooperation and implements concurrent powers, an example of which, according to Koh, is the 1973 War Powers Act.

The overall excellence of Koh's treatment of a complex area is only slightly diminished by its occasional lapses. Fundamentally, Koh maintains that the constitutional vision of the 1952 *Youngstown* (steel seizure) case—which asserts the theme of a shared powers arrangement for the conduct of foreign policy—continues to prevail in spite of the resurgent challenge of *Curtiss-Wright* (1936), the ill-conceived opinion that gave birth to the pernicious doctrine that the president is the sole organ of American foreign relations. This, regrettably, exaggerates the impact of *Youngstown.* In fact, *Curtiss-Wright* has become an oracle of foreign affairs jurisprudence before which the Supreme Court has consistently bowed in the past half-century in order to sustain constitutionally doubtful presidental action. Koh notes that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have routinely invoked *Curtiss-Wright*; he might have added that the Court had done likewise under both Earl Warren (*Zemel v. Rusk*, 1965) and Harlan Fiske Stone (*United States v. Pink*, 1942). It is principally on the basis of *Curtiss-Wright* and its progeny that presidents have enjoyed a virtually unfettered hand in foreign affairs. Unfortunately, *Youngstown* was but an aberration. If, in fact, it did project a clear vision of the conduct of foreign policy, which is by no means certain, that vision has been obscured by subsequent judicial decisions.

Other remarks are troubling. Koh cites the War Powers Act as an example of framework legislation. But this act is hardly a paragon of interbranch cooperation. Congress was forced to override President Richard Nixon's veto of the legislation and to this day no president has faithfully complied with its requirement. Moreover, in a chapter that traces the history of American foreign policy,

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Koh adheres to unreliable interpretations that seek to assert an early pattern of presidential abuse of constitutional authority. For example, he states that in 1798 John Adams "led the country into its first undeclared war with France" (p. 60). This is a familiar charge, but it is baseless. Adams took no unilateral action, and the Court held in *Bas v. Tingy* (1800) that the hostilities represented an example of a congressionally-authorized "imperfect" war. Koh attempts to draw the teeth from this charge by noting that leaders were still aware of legislative and public opinion. But recitation of these erroneous assertions is dangerous, since apologists for presidential aggrandizement invoke early incidents in an attempt to lend an aura of historical legitimacy to presidential usurpations since *Curtiss-Wright* that have been manifested, for example, in war-making, executive agreements and covert action.

The unmistakable trend toward executive domination of U.S. foreign affairs in the past fifty years represents a dramatic departure from the basic scheme of the Constitution. Koh's prescription of procedural remedies is unlikely to curb congressional acquiescence in presidential unilateralism. The problem is one of substance, not process. The failure of Congress to assert its constitutional powers and responsibilities is a failure of the political psychology underlying No. 51 of the *Federalist Papers*. For a variety of reasons, the interests of the individual and the institution are no longer connected when it comes to a congressional role in foreign affairs. The result is a constitutional crisis in the conduct of foreign policy that threatens the foundation of democratic government and the rule of law.

DAVID ADLER
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American National Security: A Presidential Perspective *by Cecil V. Crabb and Kevin V. Mulcahy. Pacific Grove, CA, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991. 208 pp. Paper, $17.75.*

This is a tightly focused book about the National Security Council (NSC) and what the authors refer to as the ANSA—the assistant to the president for national security affairs. They consider the NSC to be the principal forum for the making of foreign policy decisions of the highest order and for their implementation. They also consider the ANSA to be the equal of—and sometimes the superior to—the secretary to state.

After chapters which briefly discuss the concept of national security and the transformation from isolationism to cold war containment, the authors move briskly to their field of inquiry. The core of their inquiry involves characterizing and categorizing the roles of the ANSA. In that sense, this book does for ANSAs what Richard Rose's work did for presidents: it creates several two-dimensional, four-celled typologies by which one can described the behavior of the principal under investigation.

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It turns out that the ANSA can have high or low policy-making responsibility and high or low implementation responsibility. Low-lows are administrators (Colin Powell), low-highs are coordinators (Robert McFarlane), high-lows are counselors (Walt Rostow), and high-highs are agents (Henry Kissinger). Although there is undoubtedly some use for these typologies, it is all reminiscent of Dean Acheson's complaint that a study of Korean War decision making had referred to him as a "dependent variable."

Having analyzed the roles of the ANSA to their satisfaction, the authors continue with a chapter on the lessons of Iran-contra. They assume that Ronald Reagan was a detached, passive, and remote president who was shielded by his aides from decision making in the Iran-contra affair. They accept the conclusions of the Tower Commission, which focused on the NSC as a decision-making instrument and called for improvements in the policy-making machinery. They conclude that their typology does not cover a case in which the ANSA can strike out on his own and therefore refer to this exceptional role as "the ANSA as insurgent" (p. 181). It is a clever formulation, but to accept it one has to accept the conclusions of the Tower Commission. Nowhere do the authors admit the possibility of alternate theories to explain Iran-contra: that Reagan was behind it and has hid behind plausible-deniability (the theory on which Oliver North's defense has operated); that Reagan accepted plans brought to him by others, according to standard staffing procedures; or that Reagan and William Casey operated in tandem to set up a CIA-sponsored operation and used North and others on the NSC staff as their fronts. Indeed, there is only one reference to Casey in the entire book (not in this chapter), and only three pages devoted to the CIA and the entire intelligence community.

If the authors' hindsight is flawed by tunnel vision, their foresight in a concluding chapter on George Bush's management of national security affairs is flawed by the limits of social science in making valid predictions. Taking the first year of the Bush presidency, they engage in an implicit Newtonian calculus to track the activities of the administration over a four (eight?) year term. Their final chapter is filled with descriptions and characterizations of Bush's "incremental" and "pragmatic" foreign policy. They talk about an end to American superpower status, the development of a more interdependent world, and the replacement of military force with economic performance as a measure of Great Power status. In a season of repression in the Soviet Union and military confrontation in the Persian Gulf, their concepts and language seem an artifact of a brief season of hope that opened the decade but that probably will not characterize it.

The middle chapters of this book can provide students with a useful summary of the development of national security machinery. As a guide to the formulation of presidential foreign policy, however, it suffers from its narrow focus and the inability of the authors to go beyond the NSC machinery to other corridors of power and influence.

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The ABCs of the Soviet-American Nuclear Arms Race *by Ray Perkins, Jr. Pacific Grove, CA, Brooks/Cole, 1991. 241 pp. Paper, $20.95.*

This is a useful text for undergraduate students. It is fairly comprehensive, although the discussion questions at the end of each chapter sometimes require that the instructor provide additional information not included in the text. The presentation is organized by analytical theme—strategic doctrine, defenses, nuclear war: how devastating? how likely?—rather than by chronological history. It provides a generally competent and useful basis for discussion, illustrating such matters as the limitations of more quantitative beancounting; the importance and limitations of intelligence information; and differences in Soviet and American perspectives. The author is an unabashed advocate of arms control, but in only one chapter does this bias impair his presentation. In a chapter on nuclear deterrence, the author argues that there is a compelling legal as well as moral case against any use of nuclear weapons, and even against their possession.

The scope of the book includes not only economic burdens of the arms race, but also political, psychological, sociological, and environmental costs. This broad approach is good, although there is far less comprehensive treatment of the politico-military rationales that have sustained an arms competition.

While the general reliability of the information is good, there are unfortunately many exceptions. There was no Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 1972 limiting missile launchers (pp. 13–14 and 217). The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks led in 1972 to an Interim Agreement (not a treaty) limiting those launchers and to the ABM Treaty—which, when mentioned (p. 210), is not identified as a product of SALT I. More serious, a number of historical incidents are described in categorical terms without adequate foundation and in some cases in error. On a single page (p. 120), eight cases of "noteworthy" nuclear threats and near uses are listed, all of which are at least questionable as having been bona fide threats and none of which qualifies as a "near use" (Harry Truman over Iran in 1946; the Strategic Air Command in Central America in 1954; John Foster Dulles over Dien Bien Phu in 1954; Nikita Khrushchev against Britain and France over Suez in 1956; Dwight Eisenhowever allegedly over an Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1958; Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to North Vietnam over the war there in 1969; the Carter Doctrine in 1980; and Ronald Reagan over Middle East oil in 1981). Some of these are simply mythical, such as the contention that, "In 1954 SAC bombers armed with tactical nuclear weapons were sent to Nicaragua to bolster the CIA-led coup that overthrew the government of Guatemala," or that in 1958 "Eisenhower ordered the Pentagon to use nuclear weapons, if needed, to stop the antimonarchist revolution in Iraq from spreading to Kuwait."

The ultimate authority with nuclear weapons release in the Soviet Union is not the Politburo, but President Mikhail Gorbachev (p. 129). John F. Kennedy did not know there was no missile gap before his election in 1960 (p. 11). The United States did not have plans for deployment of Pershing II missiles six years before the SS-20 appeared (p. 95); it had an early research and development program

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then, but no decision on deployment. Soviet Civil Defense was not placed under the Council of Ministers in 1961 (p. 76), but on the contrary under the Ministry of Defense. There are quite a few minor errors of fact, but on the whole the data base is adequate to the purpose.

Curiously, there is no reference to the Gorbachev-Reagan and Bush summits and the reversal of trend in U.S.–Soviet relations in the 1985–1990 period; arms agreements of these years are noted without their context. An appendix presents George Bush's views on nuclear war from an 1980 interview, without noting changed views expressed in later years.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
The Brookings Institution

Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism *by Ralph Miliband. New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. 277 pp. $35.00.*

I confess to liking countercyclical thinking. All around us stands evidence of the multiple crises of the Left. Depending on the person, this circumstance is an occasion for pleasure or regret. Either way, the situation on the ground has been a goad to rethinking.

Ralph Miliband, long one of the most intelligent and toughminded critics of capitalist politics and society from within the Marxist tradition, has provided a timely contribution to the reconsiderations now under way. Against the tide, his message and analysis point to divisions of interest between social classes as the deepest fault line within capitalism, to struggles between classes as the motor of history, and to a renovated Marxism as the master social theory of modernity. Each of these orienting positions has been battered in recent times. It is immensely useful to have them restated lucidly as a best-case brief for an important political and intellectual position, as a pole in current debates, as a foil against which to test alternative perspectives and arguments, and as a reminder at a time of celebration that for all their attractive qualities, Western liberal societies continue to be underpinned by constellations of class and state power.

Confidently unfashionable, Miliband roots his account in a reconstruction of the classical texts of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, from which he draws sustenance and analytical punch. The structure of his argument goes like this: In capitalist countries antagonisms between classes are grounded in fundamental features of the economic order and its distributive profile. These produce clashes of interest and perspective, though never expressed in pure form. These differences and tendencies to conflict are mitigated in all kinds of ways, including the role played by parties and unions that represent and channel working class interests.

Class struggle takes two forms, from "below" and from "above." The first kind continues apace in strikes, class voting, community protests, and other

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manifestations of unease or resistance to the status quo. The second type of class struggle, from above, is conducted on many planes—by the use of police power, in the media, and in the classroom, among other venues. The Left remains a target of capital and the state. Miliband's chapter on struggle from below uncharacteristically has something of a utopian ring, for he strains to find convincing confirmation of working class insurgency in the face of quite overwhelming evidence of a popular accommodation to capitalism and the enclosure of class conflict within its bounds. By contrast, the chapter on the ways dominant classes and the state act to suppress class-based assertiveness is better grounded and more persuasive.

Miliband well understands that class divisions and struggles are not the whole story. Western social structures have become more complex. New social movements focusing on diverse subjects, including those of ecology and gender, have mobilized assertive populations. The history of left-based political parties and trade unions are fraught with disappointment. There is an ill-understood relationship between domestic politics and international relations. And there are considerable dissimilarities in the experiences of working classes in different countries.

Though Miliband knows all this and takes it into account in his rendition, he is not uniformly successful in integrating complexity into his attempt to enrich the core Marxist position. In part this is the inevitable result of his choice to write about what all the Western countries share in common in spite of their differences rather than the reverse. But some of what disappoints me is the result of aspects of the book's argumentation. As an empirical matter, *Divided Societies* acknowledges nuances and disenchantments in working-class history; it handles the linkages between the situations of working-class people and the shaping of their political dispositions and patterns of collective action as implicitly teleological. Further, while the book is very suggestive in the ways it marries elite theory and Marxism in its consideration of the holders of strategic positions in structures of class and political power, its treatment of the vast majority of the population it labels working class understates such internal differences within this category as the division between members of the active labor force and the majority now outside of it.

Throughout, *Divided Societies* is marked by an unresolved tension in its treatment of the communist experience, East and West. The book oscillates between incorporating communism within the ambit of the progressive Left and recoiling from it as a sour caricature of a desirable Left. By not resolving this tension, Miliband leaves us with insufficiently persuasive accounts of just how much at risk communism has placed his preferred project of fusing democracy with socialism and of why anticommunism has elicited support across the class spectrum of capitalist societies.

A good deal of rethinking about Marxism, the situation of the Left, and future prospects mark this volume. Especially in the concluding chapter, it insists on a long-term horizon. To the question of whether the reevaluation in *Divided So-*

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cieties goes far enough, it seems fully appropriate to respond that time, surely, will tell.

IRA KATZNELSON
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The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel *by A.F.K. Organski. New York, Columbia University Press, 1990. 315 pp. $30.00.*

Calling his a revisionist analysis, Organski sets out to destroy what he believes are myths about the strong United States support for Israel over the last twenty or so years. The author posits a number of provocative and generally unsupported conclusions: American Jewry has virtually no influence in determining U.S. assistance to Israel; there is no direct relationship between the size of Jewish constituencies and financial contributions and support for Israel in Congress; Israel has not been treated differently than other key "allies" in terms of aid (once one redefines the term); Israeli "obduracy" and "apparent intransigence" are actually good for U.S. interests; and the United States has control over its "client" Israel on all strategic matters.

Organski's analytical job is made easier because he has the answer before he begins. He believes influence in foreign policy flows from the top down, not the bottom up. Interest groups, Congress, public opinion, and the mass media are no match for the president and his advisers. Strategic interests, not domestic politics, are the primary determinants of U.S. policy. In fact, widespread belief that the Jewish lobby is politically powerful has permitted U.S. policy makers to use Jewish influence as a self-serving excuse for policies unpopular with Arab governments.

The critical assumption of the entire effort is that the devotion of the American Jewish community to the Israeli cause makes it much easier for policy makers, already convinced to back Israel for reasons of their own, to pursue a course favorable to Israeli interests. How does the author come to this key judgment? In a revealing early statement, he recalls the failure of the Jewish community in the 1930s and 1940s to pressure the Roosevelt administration to save European Jewry from extermination. Organski then transforms this lesson of presidential dominance fifty years ago into a premise that he believes holds today: the power of the American Jewish community can only be a reflection of decisions already made by executive branch leaders. He summarily dismisses all his interview data concerning the acknowledged impact of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and other pro-Israel groups as "anecdotal" and "downright gossip" (p. 19). Notions that the relatively small Jewish population could actually impact American national policy are rejected as "absurd" and "red herrings."

Organski is so convinced of his fundamental premise that he rejects all docu-

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mented accounts that the Six Day War was a watershed for American Jews in openly displaying support for Israel by noting that public opinion polls before 1967 showed that over 90 percent of U.S. Jewry already supported Israel. Ignoring the step-level increase in pro-Israel activity and increasingly supportive U.S. policy from 1967 onward, the author doggedly contends that there was no basic shift in U.S. policy until President Richard Nixon decided in 1973 that the U.S. would not tolerate Arab client states armed by the Soviet Union winning against America's client, Israel. Starting with the preconceived answer that American Jewry is irrelevant to the foreign policy process, the author is forced to resort to tortured logic and statistical manipulation of suspect data bases (1950–1983) in vain attempts to refute the conventional wisdoms that Jewish groups, like other interested parties from the body politic, can and do play a legitimate role in the political process, and that partly as a result, the U.S. has been relatively more generous in providing aid to Israel than most other states.

What is particularly unfortunate is that the author did not test his hypothesis about the relative influence of the executive branch, Congress, and interest groups by examining cases where the U.S. administration and Israel have had fundamental disagreements: West Bank and Gaza settlements, the Pollard affair, Jerusalem, the Liberty incident, the Lavi, nuclear weapons, the *Intifada*. Had he done so, he might have found much more of political substance to discuss and less reason to argue so vehemently on issues about which it appears he has little first-hand knowledge.

ROBERT H. TRICE
McDonnell Aircraft Company

As Moscow Sees Us: American Politics and Society in the Soviet Mindset *by Richard M. Mills. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 308 pp. $23.95.*

In a work whose preface is dated October 1989, Richard Mills of Fordham University makes the striking claim that there have been "comparatively minimal changes made so far during the Gorbachev era in Soviet interpretations of American domestic politics and American society" (p. 5). In this respect, "the Soviet mindset has doggedly persisted" in adhering to the essentials of the paradigm of state-monopoly capitalism. "The changes that have occurred have been incremental." Though Gorbachev's reforms make further modifications possible, they will remain circumscribed "within the limits permitted by Gorbachev's vision of socialism" (p. 252).

Mills bases these claims primarily on an extensive review of writings by Soviet Americanists, especially works by scholars at the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s. The bulk of the book describes "mainstream" scholarly analyses of U.S. class politics, governmental structure, public opinion, and the like, interspersing quotations from the Khrush-

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chev and Brezhnev eras with only slightly evolved assessments from the early 1980s. A shorter, less developed section attempts a "sociology of knowledge," which mentions some intellectual and political forces shaping the output of the Americanists. Only a few books and articles from 1988–1989 are cited, and these ignore the radical commentaries appearing in journals more daring than that of the USA Institute.

In the wake of the resignation by reformist Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev's apparent realignment with conservative forces in the military, KGB, and Communist Party apparatus, an analysis of orthodox ideological continuity in perceptions of the United States would be timely. Unfortunately, Mills's slighting of the dramatic ideological changes of the 1988–1989 period risks minimizing the significance of the current struggles. He barely mentions the Americanists' downward reevaluation of the American threat, which played a central role in justifying the Soviet retreat from empire. Mills cites a 1988 book edited by Alexander Yakovlev, a key Gorbachev ally at the height of the reforms, which was quite traditional in its ideological view of American society. But Mills ignores the sharp debate in the summer of 1988 in which Yakovlev and Shevardnadze argued that class conflict could no longer serve as the basis for analyzing international relations.

Perhaps Mills sees these debates about foreign policy as tangential to his own focus on Soviet perceptions of American domestic politics and leaves them underanalyzed for that reason. But the state-monopoly capitalism paradigm, which Mills sees as alive and well among Soviet Americanists, posits an inexorable connection between domestic politics and foreign policy. Even if Mills is right in his description of scholarly Soviet writings on American politics and society, his book does not offer a fully satisfactory account of how Moscow sees us, especially in the period after 1988.

JACK SNYDER
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Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR *by Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda. New York, The Free Press, 1990. 432 pp. $29.95.*

Hoping to overcome decades of economic stagnation and mass political alienation, Mikhail Gorbachev promoted *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and democratization to reinvigorate the legitimacy of the Soviet state and Communist Party. But by raising popular expectations and relaxing political orthodoxy, he lowered the threshold of instability among the non-Russians, who constitute nearly half the Soviet population.

Since 1985 the frustrations of the heretofore politically compliant non-Russians exploded in mass demonstrations, clashes, and riots. This non-Russian assertiveness is just the tip of the iceberg. With 128 separate nationalities (22 of them

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numbering more than one million) the possibilities for conflict between Russians and non-Russians—and among the non-Russians themselves—are myriad. The future of the multinational Soviet Union in its present form is now open to question.

This rich and detailed survey of the nationalities problem in the USSR places recent events in historical perspective. Tracing the history of the national problem from the Russian Revolutions of 1917 through January 1990, it concentrates on the relationship between the Russians and the non-Russians. Co-written by Bohdan Nahaylo, a British-born senior research analyst for Radio Liberty in Munich, and Victor Swoboda, an honorary research fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London, this study is nearly encyclopedic in scope. Swoboda wrote the first eight chapters dealing with developments until the death of Stalin; Nahaylo wrote the remaining ten chapters covering the post-Stalin years.

The authors persuasively argue that by 1923 the predominantly Russian, urban, and proletarian Communist Party offered the non-Russians an implicit "national contract": "In essence, they were promised 'sovereign' statehood and equality within the federal structure. Specifically, they were guaranteed the right to develop their cultures and make full use of their native languages, as well as to train and rely on native cadres in their republics; in short, to complete the process of building their nation states within the Soviet federal framework. Furthermore, the imperial Russian legacy was to be disowned, Russian chauvinism kept in check, and Russification prohibited" (p. 352).

This national contract existed until the early 1930s, when Stalin changed the rules and recognized Russia as the leading nation in the USSR. Since Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign in 1956, the non-Russian elites attempted to restore this national contract. They were unsuccessful. Under Gorbachev, they radicalized their demands. Fourteen of the fifteen Soviet republics have issued declarations of sovereignty; Lithuania has declared its independence. Others plan to do the same. Gorbachev's efforts to renegotiate this national contract and to create a decentralized, but politically-integrated Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are doomed to failure in the long run. This well-written book explains why. Chronicaling the twists and turns of Soviet nationality policy and the decades of insensitivity to and violations of the national contract by the center, this political history emphasizes the mistrust and hatred that have evolved between the non-Russians and the center.

The authors successfully describe the central paradox inherent in the results of Soviet nationality policy since 1917. Instead of integrating the non-Russians into the USSR, Soviet policies unleashed powerful centrifugal movements, which will thwart the necessary Soviet economic and political reforms. Although this book might have provided a deeper analysis of the interplay of these policies, it is a very good introduction to understanding the current Soviet nationalities crisis.

GEORGE LIBER
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Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political, and Economic Ferment in China *by Chu-Yuan Cheng. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 256 pp. $29.95.*

In this well-written background study of the 1989 democracy movement and Tiananmen massacre, Chu-Yuan Cheng explains how Deng Xiaoping's commitment to reforming China without sacrificing his or state socialism's hold on the country led to protest and bloody repression.

In the early 1980s impressive gains were made by Deng and his team of reformers. De facto decollectivization allowed farmers to become more productive; the growth of a legitimate private sector encouraged a modicum of entrepreneurship and visible gains for consumers; a measure of professional autonomy for intellectuals resulted in bursts of creativity in scholarship, film, literature, and journalism; a new emphasis on rule of law reflected the regime's commitment to more humane treatment of its citizens (with continued exceptions made for anyone suspected of "counterrevolution"). However, as Cheng shows, the limited nature of the reforms meant that debits would soon begin to match credits. Higher prices paid farmers and questionable monetary practices fueled inflation. Officials took advantage of their positions to siphon state funds into their own pockets, extort money from entrepreneurs, speculate on differences between fixed and market prices, and provide lucrative jobs and opportunities to relatives and cronies. Conservative cadres, high and low, harrassed those who took advantage of the official policy of openness by writing a daring novel or making a private fortune. Cheng does a fine job explaining how reformist intentions went awry as a result of structural features of the Chinese system such as an addiction to fixed prices that subverted market reforms and a gerontocracy that made conservatism and patrimonialism pervasive.

By the mid-1980s, economic reforms soured as urban residents saw their living standards stagnate or fall. Periodic crackdowns on expressions of pluralism and dissent emboldened conservatives and alienated liberals. As economic and social tensions mounted, factional conflict among the highest echelons of the political elite intensified. Deng was an old man, and no clear procedures existed for choosing a successor. His stated desire to see hand-picked supporters Premier Zhao Ziyang and General Secretary Hu Yaobang take over from him did not prevent his sacking Hu in 1987. Zhao's transfer to Hu's vacated post as party chief made Zhao the new target of younger, well-connected rivals like Premier Li Peng.

Cheng convincingly argues that this combination of growing popular discontent and escalating elite power struggles made the events of 1989 likely, if not inevitable. All that was missing was a catalyst and that was supplied with Hu Yaobang's death on 15 April. In the demonstrations that followed, widening circles of students and other city people (including many middle and lower-level officials) were able to express grievances stored up for years and, ironically, made more bitter by expectations previously raised by Deng himself.

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The strength of Cheng's analysis lies in his attention to both elite politics and larger social forces and trends. After reading chapters on the economic, political, intellectual, and military context of Tiananmen, one is well prepared to understand such details as Li Peng's struggle to discredit Zhao Ziyang in the eyes of Deng, and Zhao's half-hearted, botched attempt to mobilize public opinion. Deng's oft-declared wish for an orderly succession could not brake the ambitions of officals like Li, who stood to gain from the purge of those who had pushed Deng's reform agenda most vigorously. The unsettled social atmosphere of Chinese cities, receptive as it was to antiregime sentiments, made a play to the crowd a tempting strategy even for someone like Zhao, whose own policies were at least partly responsible for the corruption and economic hardships that so angered people.

Once Cheng shifts from elite politics and the larger social and economic context of these machinations to the democracy movement itself, his account becomes sketchier. But then his decision to introduce the myriad of historical and contextual factors that help make 1989 intelligible in the broadest sense leaves little space to reconstruct the movement as it unfolded on the ground. Cheng does give one a powerful sense of how the regime lurched toward the 4 June massacre, driven by internal quarrels, blindness as to what the movement represented morally and socially, and Deng Xiaoping's "deep-seated intolerance toward any form of social unrest or other political challenges to his authority" (p. 132). Cheng's matter-of-fact rendering of the massacre, widely accepted at the time, has since been thrown into doubt by disputes among all parties concerned over how many died in Beijing and when and where the killings took place. His gloomy assessment of the government's ability to recover from the debacle politically and economically must now be adjusted to take into account the effect of the Persian Gulf crisis and war on the regime's international position. But all in all, Cheng has been very successful in writing a study that is both timely and likely to remain a useful introduction to the issues germane to the crisis of 1989.

DAVID STRAND
Dickinson College

China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality *by Steven W. Mosher. New York, Basic Books, 1990. 260 pp. $19.95.*

It is not suprising that Steven W. Mosher writes a book that exposes individuals who have helped to spread myths about China to the American public. Mosher was expelled from China in 1983 for misconduct and subsequently denied his Ph.D. in Chinese studies from Stanford University. In this book, he discusses his personal biases in terms of his conservative political orientation and his basic mistrust of university professors, many of whom he believes are out of touch with reality. And then he describes how individuals who pursue careers in jour-

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nalism and academia abandon telling the truth by presenting a neat, narrow view of China to the American public.

Mosher uses President Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1972 as a starting point for answering a challenge put forth by commentator William F. Buckley, who believed that Mao's China was treated too gently by the Nixon press corps. He wanted someone to investigate the reasons for this occurrance. Mosher answers the challenge by describing the ways prominent journalists, including Edgar Snow, James Reston, Harrison Salisbury, and Theodore White, developed super stories about China. But he does not stop there. Mosher asserts that both American journalists and academics allowed themselves to be manipulated by the Chinese leadership, at times to the surprise and consternation of the Chinese leadership. He describes the specific misperceptions nurtured by a wide range of sinologists including John King Fairbank, Edward Friedman, John Gurley, Maurice Meisner, Michel Oksenberg, Leo Orleans, Ross Terrill, and Ezra Vogel. Some of these specialists based their academic careers on advocating a Maoist-type of socialism, whereas others developed a professional niche by analyzing China primarily in the context of Sino-American relations. In both cases, the specialists eliminated the possibility of analyzing China on its own terms with respect to why the Chinese leadership clearly is not focused on providing basic human rights to the Chinese people.

Mosher states that American perceptions of China were thrown out of kilter in 1972 when President Nixon visited China. He discusses the probability that Nixon used the Sino-American relationship as a tool for his own political survival. Mosher describes the ways many Western (primarily American) sinologists in the professions of journalism and academia developed perceptual barriers by: ignoring mass starvation in China, especially in the 1960s, either because it was personally repellent or professional considerations required them to maintain relationships with Chinese information sources; using the communist paradigm instead of the more appropriate totalitarian paradigm to analyze China's distant past and present; fitting the Chinese Cultural Revolution into the American ideological framework; assuming that Chinese society was somehow transformed because Chinese officials under Mao were polite and civilized; neglecting to provide a balanced picture of Zhou Enlai's leadership abilities and intentions; and portraying China's modernization attempts as representative of a society that was more noble and just than American society.

In this context, Mosher also identifies those who accurately portrayed the intentions of the Chinese leadership, including Fox Butterfield, Juergen Domes, Ivan and Miriam London, and Martin King Whyte, as well as those who never departed from their criticisms of Chinese communism, including Simon Leys, Richard Walker, and Karl Wittfogel. In my view, Mosher does present an accurate account of how misperceptions about China developed, which reveals a very dark side of American academia. He concludes that those who are more or less immune from creating perceptual barriers tend to be detail oriented. While this particular conclusion seems to be incomplete, the book taken as a whole is ex-

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tremely valuable. Mosher forces the reader to take a hard look at the field. This is especially important to those who are interested in pursuing a career in Chinese studies.

PEGGY S. CHRISTOFF
University of Cincinnati

East Asian Dynamism: Growth, Order, and Security in the Pacific Region *by Steve Chan. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 134 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $10.95.*

This volume is a "succinct treatment of the political economy of the Pacific region for both advanced undergraduate students and beginning graduate students" (p. xiii). Thus does the author establish the audience for the first book in the Westview Press's Dilemmas in World Politics series—an intriguing and ambitious effort to summarize the general domestic and international development of the Pacific Rim countries. Using concepts common to contemporary political analysis, Chan explicates the policy choices and trade-offs of the Pacific Rim countries. He makes use of various techniques to highlight the chapter developments: key terms are italicized; charts are inserted; there is a glossary plus supplementary readings to both facilitate further research by the student and remind readers of ideas central to the conceptual arguments of the volume.

The Pacific Rim occupies 55 percent of the book. The initial chapter defines the area, its physical characteristics, population, etc. In the second chapter, "East Meets West: The Historical Background," Chan moves at breakneck speed through about four hundred years of history, including the role of imperialism and post-World War II developments.

Regional specialists will be uneasy over the compromises that such compactness imposes. For example, the Japanese decision to move into Southeast Asia in World War II does not include a reference to the policy division over whether to attack the Soviets. The Japanese did recognize the difference between their strength and that of the Americans in the pre-1941 period, but believed (incorrectly) that the lack of real national interest would lead to negotiations. The American reconsideration of the future of Japan precedes the Korean War. In sum, historical sequence does not get its full due.

For the reader interested in contemporary affairs, the chapter "Convergent Goals, Divergent Conduct" is likely to be the most interesting and perhaps the most frustrating. In thirty pages, the author discusses, first, alternate strategies for economic development, commencing with import substitution and the transition to export led production; second, control of the command economy—mostly the Peoples' Republic of China's experience serves here; and third, the regulatory state contrasted with the developmental state. The chapter concludes by considering how and why there have been differences in strategies. Chan lays stress on the passivity of labor (and unions), the strength (or weakness) of landlords, and the role of foreign firms. There is also a discussion of Japanese security, noting the Japanese definition of comprehensive national security.

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In chapter four Chan discusses the "accomplishments and failures of selective [sic] countries in the Pacific Basin" (p. 66). Such a phrase leads the reader to expect a focus on specific states' experiences. In fact, the text is composed of a thoroughly interesting, very densely written, and often minimally linked series of arguments about the connections between population, economic growth, and political stability; and "regime instability, human rights, and strategic alignment" (p. 72), where Chan summarily assesses the Tienanmen events of June 1989. This is followed by a discussion of political pluralism, income inequality, defense burdens, and public good, to name only a few of the subheadings. The sections are intrinsically interesting and the issues raised are relevant for development in most countries of the world. So many ideas are sketched out and so many different terms highlighted that the reader will learn much about Britain in the nineteeth century, the West German recovery, and the equality of national income distribution for various states, including the Pacific Rim countries. The arguments in chapter four, as well as the brief concluding remarks, suggest that the decline of the United States as a hegemonic power may perhaps lead to the Pax Nipponica, in which the characteristics of the hegemonic state are to be restructured.

What to make of the book? A well-informed general reader will find the book worth purchasing, at least in paperback. One is certain to differ with Chan at some point, but his analysis is insightful, and his theoretical approach is very useful. His capacity to summarize and clarify stands him in good stead. An instructor who uses this book (as this reviewer has) must look carefully at Chan's statements in the historical segment up to the Vietnam war. Chan would do well—when he revises this text—to settle more clearly on the terrain of his analysis. Is he studying the basin or the rim? Might it not be more useful to focus more clearly the area for analysis than has been the case in this initial version of a very useful text?

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade *by Shireen T. Hunter. Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1990. 256 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.*

In an age when image and reality are exceedingly indistinguishable, Iran's foreign policy is often portrayed as irrational and extremist, formulated by fanatical *mullahs*. This prevalent view has been challenged by such scholars as James Bill, Richard Cottam, and R. K. Ramazani. It is, however, Ramazani's pioneering book, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, published in the mid-1980s, which for the first time systematically identified the emerging pragmatic tendencies in Iran's foreign policy.

In *Iran and the World*, Hunter argues that Iranian policy has moved toward moderation. She also contends that Iranian conduct and the response to it by the

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major powers are in keeping with the history of revolutions. Hunter maintains that "Shi'i fanaticism, irrationality, an inordinate love of martyrdom, or Iranian xenophobia" cannot explain the basis of Iran's policy (p. 5). But exporting Islam has "competed and conflicted with its state interests," generating contradictions which are exacerbated by the power struggle between the moderates and radicals (p. 29).

The book's most important contribution is the chapter that deals with U.S.–Iranian relations. For Hunter, U.S. policy toward Iran has been shaped by two factors. First, because the U.S. has no "intrinsic interest in Iran," its policy is shaped by "other more important priorities globally and in the Middle East" (p. 51, 52). But Iran's proximity to the Soviet Union, important U.S. interest in Iranian oil, Iran's status as one of the main purchasers of U.S. weapons, and the presence of over 100,000 Americans had turned Imperial Iran into a valued U.S. ally. Hunter's claim that the United States had "intrinsic value" for Saudi Arabia and not for Imperial Iran appears flawed: If a cheap and safe substitute for oil would have been discovered, Saudi Arabia's value for the United States would have been diminished much more substantially than Iran's.

The second factor shaping the bilateral relations is the incompatibility of Iran's interests as a regional power with those of the United States as a global power. Thus, when Iran sought to unify the Islamic world by spreading fundamentalism, Washington identified fundamentalism, not Soviet communism, as the greatest menace to its interests. Iran had to be contained; hence, the decisive tilt toward Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.

In the eyes of the Europeans, Hunter perceptively argues, Iran has at times been a potentially dangerous regional force whose power had to be contained. Iran has historically used one European nation to either neutralize another Western nation or a superpower. The Islamic Republic's collaboration with Europe to neutralize the United States illustrates the point. But until the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, the West was cautious not to push Iran toward the Soviets. Unlike Washington, Moscow has maintained congenial relations with Teheran. Iranian policy, on the other hand, has been based on "a mixture of deep suspicion . . . , occasional provocative rhetoric, and keen awareness of the need to accommodate Soviet power and proximity" (p. 97).

Iran's relations with the Arab world are also discussed, even if such critical issues as Iran-PLO relations receive little attention. Iran's ties with Israel, she argues, have minimal importance in shaping the character of Iran's relations with the Arabs. Despite Iranian support for the Palestinians, the Arabs have been lukewarm toward Teheran because Arab nationalism, with its "irredentist and romantic dimension," regards Iran as an obstacle.

Hunter concludes that Iran's move toward moderation has been slow because of the "emotionalism and unrealism" of Iranian political culture (p. 186) and because of the Iranian engagement in terrorism. Although she offers no convincing evidence justifying such a stereotypic depiction of Iranian political culture, she does make a pertinent point that radicals have relied on terrorism to weaken the moderates.

The book suffers from some shortcomings. Because the author has the ambitious

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goal of discussing Iran's foreign policy toward the world, she has produced a volume that is unbalanced. Some chapters are well researched, while others are not: the chapters about "Iran and the Third World" and "Iran and International Organizations" are each slightly more than three pages, hardly sufficient to cover such important issues.

The author is inconsistent in application of certain terms. While she argues that such labels as moderates and radicals "do not adequately define different tendencies" (p. 42), she consistently uses them throughout the book. Some of her conclusions are also not reliably substantiated. For example, based on a *Washington Post* article, she concludes that Iran was involved in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. And her claim that the Tudeh party organized the oil strikes that paralyzed the shah's regime is not properly documented.

Despite these problems, Hunter has written a timely book that can be used in courses dealing with Iran and should be of interest to the general readers.

MOHSEN M. MILANI
University of South Florida

The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences *edited by Mary O. Furner and Barry Supple. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 477 pp. $44.50.*

Three questions arise repeatedly throughout this conference volume. First, to what extent have academic economists affected policy decisions in the United States and the United Kingdom? Second, to what extent have the questions posed by policy makers and the data produced by government shaped the academic research agenda? Third, what sort of academic discourse occurs within government? The volume is historical with only rare excursions into contemporary policy issues. An essay by John Larson takes us back to John Quincy Adams, but most papers consider events occurring from the late nineteenth century to the early 1950s.

Of the three questions posed above, the first is hardest to answer. As Donald Winch points out in an essay that begins with Adam Smith and David Ricardo, it is almost impossible to differentiate situations in which economists are truly influential from those in which policy makers justify preconceived notions using economists' ideas. Jose Harris identifies another problem. The impact of economists is often subtle. It rarely consists of the direct application of specific theories to societal problems. Far more often, economists are influential indirectly through their collective impact on the wider climate of economic and political culture.

Although the influence of economists is difficult to document, the volume's analysis is often too limited. There are long discussions of the ideas of economists, but few references to the attitudes of politicians. Moreover, the American essays

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focus on the executive branch and the Congress is barely mentioned. That is where most American economic policies must be ratified.

The volume's strongest point lies in its descriptions of how government stimulates academic research by posing questions and providing data. Mary Furner provides an interesting history of the Bureau of Labor statistics. Ellis Hawley describes the contributions of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and of the first privately supported think tank, the National Bureau of Economic Research.

In a particularly interesting paper, Robert Collins describes the efforts of the first Council of Economic Advisers to emphasize long-run growth over short-run stabilization. They persuaded much of government to adopt this emphasis but then found that academics had few theories of growth to help shape policies. The episode did, however, stimulate a surge of academic research on the topic.

Essays by William Barber on the United States and Peter Clarke on Britain describe the vibrant intellectual discussions occurring within the civil services of the two countries in the 1920s and 1930s. Barber notes that those economists migrating to Washington in the 1930s experienced "a life akin to a full-time graduate seminar" (p. 137). Civil servants, such as Milton Friedman and Carl Shoup, later became eminent academics. In Britain in the 1920s, J. M. Keynes and R. G. Hawtrey battled intellectually.

How relevant is the historical analysis in this volume to today's policy battles? Certainly, the questions remain the same. But today, many more economists work in government. Jose Harris notes that before the 1960s, data was irrelevant to most British social policy decisions. Now, in the United States, data can be everything. Policy initiatives rise and fall depending on the cost estimates provided by anonymous technicians. Perhaps our obsession with numbers has gone too far. It is a question meriting another conference.

RUDOLPH G. PENNER
The Urban Institute

Nuclear Ambitions *by Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 450 pp. $54.00.*

This is the fifth in Leonard Spector's series on the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. As did the previous four studies, this book offers a great deal to the reader and thus belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in arms control. The book is very well written and exhaustively researched, with the footnotes and bibliographical citations alone being worth the price. Spector and his associates can be counted upon to have missed none of the numerous reports and allegations of nuclear weapons ventures around the world, and this has caused these books to be regarded as the definitive treatment of the subject since 1985. The newest volume offers a valuable updating as of the middle of 1990. Consistent with the trends of our worries, it now

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addresses some nonproliferation concerns that are not directly nuclear—on missiles and other delivery systems, and on chemical and biological weapons.

The ensuing year may, unfortunately, justify an annual review even more than did 1989–1990. Underscoring all of our concerns about nuclear proliferation, we now have to worry about such proliferation within the Soviet Union, if unitary command and control is not somehow maintained as the USSR fragments. And we, of course, have had to focus on Iraq. Spector's next book will surely address these countries in detail, along with the changes of administration in Pakistan and India, and the recent, somewhat positive developments in Brazil and Argentina. But could it be that the positive possibilities get the less attention?

Producing a book almost every year on so important a subject is a major feat that poses a few problems. To make the book useful for anyone who has not read the earlier works (and perhaps to have a full book's worth of story to tell), some of the previous story is retold for each of the cases. Consistent with the volume of effort, moreover, Spector's tone has to be generally pessimistic. Any good news, for example about Argentine and Brazilian cooperation to avert nuclear weapons, is stated less resoundingly than the bad news. Some of the many press reports cited of moves toward nuclear weapons inevitably have to be premature and too pessimistic; the press needs news to sell newspapers, and news on this subject almost *has* to be bad news.

The authors' premises are surely correct that the spread of nuclear weapons is bad for all the world and that the net trend is toward further spread. It is only on the pace and magnitude of this bad trend that the tone and implications of these books might turn out to be misleading.

GEORGE QUESTER
University of Maryland

The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent *by Robert A. Caro. New York, Knopf, 1990. 506 pp. $24.95.*

The second volume of Robert A. Caro's highly acclaimed biography, covering Lyndon Johnson's career from 1941 to 1949, is dissatisfying on many counts. But where it succeeds, it succeeds so brilliantly that everyone interested in recent American history will want to read it.

The book fails as philosophy: while Caro asserts that Johnson's life raises the question "to what extent are ends inseparable from means?" (p. xxxiv), the book makes virtually no attempt to discuss that complex relationship. Caro simply shows that Johnson's means of winning elections were decidedly immoral, even by the loose standards of Texas politics in the 1940s. The book is not much better as political theory. Caro argues that an in-depth study of one election, in this case the 1948 Democratic senatorial primary contest between Johnson and Coke

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Stevenson, will produce "universal truths about campaigns in a democracy, and about the nature of the power that shapes our lives" (p. xxxi). Yet as Caro shows, the bribery and theft in that campaign were of such Brobdingnagian proportions as to be hardly typical of American elections.

The book is weak, finally, as psychology, for its analysis of motivation and behavior is too simplistic. Johnson is depicted as the embodiment of all that is coarse, vicious, and brutal. Caro has him lying brazenly about his combat record in World War II; treating his wife, Lady Bird, as if she were dirt; using his political muscle to win favorable rulings for his radio station from the Federal Communications Commission, and, thereby, becoming a millionaire; demanding total subservience from his subordinates; and running a sleazy primary campaign marked by misrepresentation and innuendo. His rival in the primary, Coke Stevenson, is portrayed by constrast as a man of honesty, courage, and integrity, the antithesis, that is, of Lyndon Johnson. Widely read, intrepid, devoted to rugged Jeffersonian ideals, Stevenson commanded respect by his very manner. "When Coke Stevenson spoke," Caro tells us, "men listened" (p. 161).

However serious the book's weaknesses, its strengths far outweigh them. A gifted writer and story-teller, with a remarkable ability to recreate scenes, Caro breathes life into the past, transporting the reader to a bygone time and distant places. The book, rich in texture and description, is also an artistic triumph. Caro creates an acute tension between the compulsive Johnson and the scrupulous Stevenson that is satisfyingly resolved at the end of the book: while Johnson wins the primary and is then elected senator, his opponent, according to Caro, finds true happiness and is in any meaningful sense the true winner.

Caro is a superb investigative journalist. Not only did he consult all the appropriate written sources, including oral history memoirs at the Johnson Library, but he also conducted many of his own interviews; and they form the heart of the book. One interview led Caro to uncover an unpublished autobiographical memoir that proves, as conclusively as anything ever will, that the 1948 primary returns from Precinct 13 in Jim Wells County were falsified: the tally of 765 votes for Johnson was changed by the stroke of a pen to 965, thereby providing him with the infamous 87-vote margin (out of nearly 1 million votes cast) that earned him the nickname Landslide Lyndon. Caro also brilliantly analyzes Abe Fortas's successful efforts to overturn a federal district court judge's injunction that would have blocked placing Johnson's name on the ballot until the allegations of fraud were fairly investigated.

Robert Caro may not have written a perfect book. But he has written a fascinating and superbly informative one.

RICHARD POLENBERG
Cornell University

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Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security *by Elizabeth D. Sherwood. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 245 pp. $25.00.*

Elizabeth D. Sherwood, a Rhodes Scholar and foreign and defense policy specialist, has written a study of the NATO alliance concentrating on developments beyond the official treaty area, and it could not be more timely or appropriate. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has undoubtedly been the most successful American foreign policy triumph in the postwar era, even before the recent collapse of communism in the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe. Ironically, the very success of the alliance within the European theater has meant that most of the significant crises affecting the NATO allies have occurred outside of Europe.

The conventional wisdom is that the Atlantic alliance has handled these out-of-area crises poorly or been unable to address them at all. Sherwood makes a convincing case that the conventional theory is incorrect and does a very thorough job of documenting how the alliance has successfully coped with most of these out-of-area challenges. She deals with the "delicate balancing act" required to solve these out-of-area crises and describes alongside the official, formal NATO organization a "shadow alliance, an informal, globally oriented partnership of Western nations" (p. 1).

There have been three main out-of-area issues that have had to be repeatedly dealt with since the founding of NATO. The first concerns the fundamental question of whether or not it was in the interests of the alliance to deal with an out-of-area issue. As might be expected, the NATO members have tended to define what they perceive as their own national interest as synonmous with the interests of the alliance. The French attempted to make the case that their interests and those of NATO were parallel in Indochina in the early 1950s, just as the Americans would make the same basic argument in Vietnam in the 1960s. The British tried to justify their actions in the Suez in 1956 in the same way by making the case that the British national interests served the broader alliance interest. Sherwood concludes that the allies have all sought NATO support for their non-European causes through this same general argument. Therefore, the pattern has been to seek alliance cooperation if the NATO partners supported their cause, but to act unilaterally if joint action would inhibit the policy already decided upon.

A second set of issues flows naturally from the first: the never solved problem and, therefore, continual debate over the question of how to best allocate finite resources. Before NATO's first year was completed, the European allies were concerned that the United States had vastly overextended itself in Korea, even to the point that European security might be threatened. By the late 1980s many NATO allies expressed the same fear over the U.S. commitment to protect the Persian Gulf. In contrast, the United States since Vietnam has lobbied alliance partners for a larger share of the collective defense burden, whether through

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financial or other means. After the 1991 American actions against Iraq, this issue of burden-sharing will probably remain.

The third set of issues is a product of the hierarchy of the nations within the alliance, which has ultimately been what determined how an out-of-area issue would be addressed. Obviously, the United States, as the dominant superpower within NATO, has been the most influential in determining the out-of-area agenda. The British have been the secondary alliance partner because of their "special relationship" with the United States and their remaining commitments of empire in the non-European areas. The French, as might be expected, have always thought of themselves as deserving of coequal status and have attempted to exercise this role. The fact that they have usually been third in the pecking order of power and influence within the alliance led the French to seek their own nuclear capability and ultimately to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command structure.

It is not surprising that NATO has been continuously involved in out-of-area issues. At the original NATO signing ceremony, President Harry Truman stated: ". . . its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world" (p. 29). Rather than set up any formal mechanism to deal with these out-of-area issues, a practice of informal coordination among the interested and involved NATO members has evolved over the years and has usually served the alliance well. Sherwood's study is the best, most complete study of these out-of-area issues from the founding of NATO up to the 1990–1991 crisis over Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

HUGH M. ARNOLD
Clayton State College

Human Rights in Iraq *by Middle East Watch. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 164 pp. $19.95.*

This book is the first in a collaborative series between the New York-based private monitoring organization, Human Rights Watch, and Yale University Press. *Human Rights in Iraq* is a timely and extremely valuable exposition of the repressive apparatus that keeps Baghdad's government in power. It presents graphic and detailed testimony from those who have suffered the regime's horrible tortures. No thoughtful reader will remain unmoved.

Residents of Iraq—including non-Iraqis—are subject to arbitrary arrest and gross physical abuse. Sometimes, as in the case of a British businessman, no reason is given for the arrest, nor is any apparent. The bodies of those who die during imprisonment are often returned to the families of the victims horribly mutilated in order to instill even greater fear among Iraq's citizens and inflict gratuitous pain. Infants are tortured in front of their parents to extract information. As one witness testified, "Infant children are kept in the detention center

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together with their parents. Usually they keep such children in a separate cell next to the mother in order to force the parent to confess. I saw a five-month-old baby screaming in this state" (p. 48).

This, as *Human Rights in Iraq* explains, contrasts starkly with the formal rights provided by Iraq's laws and interim constitution; twenty-two years after the Ba'ath seized power Baghdad lacks a permanent document. By Iraqi law, the accused is innocent until proven guilty; collective and retroactive punishment are prohibited. All that and more are routinely violated by the government.

While presenting an astonishing view of Baghdad's horrors, the book has some shortcomings. The historical section, while not the book's central focus, contains too many errors. The assertion that Sunni Arabs "made up the majority of the population of Baghdad" (p. 1) has never been true in modern times. In the early twentieth century, the largest Baghdad community was Jewish, while over the years, rural migration into the city made it predominantly Shiah. The Sunnis were not the traditional intellectual elite of Arab Iraq, the Shiah were. The claim that the Shiah showed "no inclination to rebel in mass" against Sunni Arab domination (p. 2) is belied by the mid-Euphrates tribal revolts of the 1920s and 1930s that constituted one of the greatest challenges to the authority of the newly installed monarchy.

Even some aspects of the analysis of Saddam's Iraq contain questionable assertions. Iraqis may say that a picture of Saddam Hussein on the living-room wall is a household necessity, but in the Baghdadi homes I have visited, not one had a picture of Saddam. Although it is claimed that "families name children after him and young men imitate his walk and manner of speech" (p. 15), I rather doubt it. These points may give the impression that Saddam's cult of personality has been more successful in instilling loyalty among the population than would seem to be the case. It is largely a regime of terror. The March 1991 revolts against Saddam Hussein in the Shii South and the Kurdish North demonstrated how detested his rule is.

In the end, *Human Rights in Iraq* raises a disturbing question. Saddam's brutalities are more than amply documented. The director of Human Rights Watch, Andrew Whitley, has charged correctly that human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein are worse than those of any other regime in the Middle East. How is it that such a man has become a hero to not a small number?

LAURIE MYLROIE
Harvard University

In the Time of the Tyrants: Panama 1968–1990 *by R.M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez. New York, Norton, 1990. 430 pp. $29.95.*

What kind of book should one expect from authors, one Panamanian, the other American, each an accomplished journalist and novelist? One expects and gets

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a splendidly written, muckracking account, full of colorful, intimate details about the personalities and events that brought Panama first to military dictatorship, then to economic ruin, and finally to U.S. military intervention. Although not a work of academic scholarship, the book contains much information of potential use to scholars. The text contains no footnote markers, but many of its assertions are supported in twelve pages of notes at the back of the book.

Almost no personality or institution emerges unscathed in this account. The authors devote considerable space to debunking the mythology of progressivism surrounding General Omar Torrijos. Citing names and dates, they convincingly portray him as a coward, thief, and murderer, and somewhat less convincingly as an intellectual mediocrity. On economic grounds, Torrijos's reforms are dismissed as a sham; his ideological discourse, as shallow, demagogic and self-deceptive. Apologists of every political persuasion for Torrijos's bogus revolution are flayed: U.S. officials Robert Pastor and Ambler Moss, Spain's Prime Minister Felipe González, Panama's own Archbishop Marcos McGrath, and the writers Graham Greene and Gabriel García Márquez. Indeed, most of the kind words in the book are reserved for dead victims of the post-1968 regime, such as the priest Héctor Gallegos and the adventurer Hugo Spadafora.

As for the United States, the book depicts its conduct as for the most part arrogant, dishonorable, and uncoordinated, but above all, stupid. Panama before 1968 is described in almost Edenic terms: free, democratic, and largely peaceful; original sin was introduced by U.S.-financed military training and equipment programs. "Whoever it was in Washington who decided to give the Guardia Nacional guns and bullets ought to have been submitted to psychiatric evaluation . . ." (p. 58). Some of the book's most appalling (and salacious) allegations are hardly proven—for example, that the CIA supplied Torrijos information on the private lives of U.S. members of Congress, or that Manuel Noriega blackmailed his CIA handlers by filming their sexual indiscretions. Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the authors' interpretation—that Noriega betrayed, more than he served, his U.S. intelligence colleagues—is not implausible.

After reading the account of Noriega's private life and business dealings, one develops a certain sympathy, not only for the Panamanian people who endured his tyranny, but also for the American officials charged with the responsibility of trying to remove him. With men like Noriega, half-way measures do not work. The authors give sensible advice: "Do your best to make him happy. Then, the first chance you get—you'll never get more than one—kill him" (p. 270). But, alas, this sage counsel is inconsistent with Executive Order 12333, which prohibits American officials from involvement in assassinations. Although the authors do not admit it, the reluctance of American officials to order an invasion, with its inevitable American military and Panamanian civilian casualties, is fully understandable.

One weakness of the journalistic approach to politics is a tendency to overly emphasize the role of individuals and a relative neglect of general underlying forces. Did Panama become a haven for narcotics trafficking and all other

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manner of criminal dealing, because soldiers in power corrupted all the rest? Would a democratically constituted civilian government have proven more resistant? Nowhere do the authors address the likelihood that the U.S. market's voracious demand for drugs, together with Panama's geographic and historical role as a hemispheric crossroads, created opportunities that would have corrupted any polity not constituted by angels. This question has considerable importance, now that the United States has invaded Panama with the objective, among others, of suppressing the drug trade.

RHODA RABKIN
Cornell University

Beyond Nuclear Thinking *by Robert W. Malcolmson. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. 141 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

The author challenges the "present-centredness" of thinking about nuclear weapons in recognizing that in moving towards the post-cold war future we must remember the past and must also overcome it. He finds nuclear thought to be immune to current global change and, more significantly, to be engaged in a dialogue that is "self-sustaining" and "self-legitimating"—propelled by the "dogmas" and "entrenched interests" of policy and the "esoteric" and "inward-looking" arguments of academia. The author responds by spurning nuance and promising "to stick to fundamentals and not to become absorbed in arcane details of technology and strategic doctrine, the importance of which has been chronically overvalued" (pp. ix–x). He delivers on this promise with a rich, well-written, and fast-paced narrative that takes the reader through the history of nuclear thought and sets the stage for a post-cold war reevaluation of policy.

The author focuses on the early years of the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations. He depicts Eisenhower and Reagan-era policy makers as committed to nuclear/technological answers to the intense insecurity of the times—the first, by toying with preventative war and directing a weapons build-up for a potential first-strike attack on the Soviet Union and, the second, by investing in new weapons, strategic defense, and preparations for fighting a protracted nuclear war. He thus portrays these policy makers as oblivious or indifferent to the consequences of U.S. policy in increased Soviet insecurity. He has made a good choice of periods for analysis and recognizes the origins of contemporary U.S. policy in a much earlier time period. Though he lets other administrations off the hook—for instance, the policies of the Reagan period certainly had origins in the countervailing doctrine and weapons developments of the Carter years. In presenting more recent history, the author paints a vivid image of the nuclear/Soviet obsessions of the Reagan administration, and his words are given added potency by the global changes that have exposed the fallacious underpinnings of Reagan policies. His book is not without its limits, however.

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First, the author does not hold his own arguments to the same standard of proof by which he evaluates arguments that he discounts. He can, therefore, assert that there is no evidence that U.S. nuclear threats have deterred the Soviet Union, even as he argues that there is "*no doubt*" (emphasis added) that U.S. nuclear weapons and policies "gave Moscow the strongest possible incentive to build its own nuclear arsenal" (pp. 90–91).

Second, the author gives too much attention to extreme points of view and has no use for the subtle tensions of nuclear strategy. He therefore associates arguments for maintaining a nuclear arsenal with those for a counterforce capability, nuclear superiority, and maintaining the appearance of resolve. He conspicuously neglects the doctrine of assured destruction—not only as a major innovation of the Robert McNamara period, but as the long-held view of the U.S. policy mainstream (that the United States can deter the Soviet Union by assuring the capability to impose a minimum level of retaliatory destruction upon Soviet society). He also neglects, though less conspicuously, the distinctive arguments of limited nuclear option and warfighting enthusiasts, which admittedly often combined in practice.

Finally, the author assails deterrence as an "'overwhelmingly negative policy'" that is "inherently retributive, not creative" (p. 92). But he does not offer a substitute, except to encourage U.S.–Soviet cooperation and the recognition of common interests. Even then, he equivocates: "In the future, nuclear threats should have a much lower profile: the nuclear threat posture, rather than being accentuated, ought to be reduced and eventually minimized" (p. 117). Given his claim that nuclear weapons have been counterproductive, why they should be retained at all is a mystery, only deepened by his failure to explore policy alternatives.

JAMES H. LEBOVIC
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Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947–1989 *by Frank J. Smist, Jr. Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 1990. 336 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $24.95.*

Frank Smist was my teaching assistant at Georgetown University a number of years ago, and he very kindly credits me with having interested him in studying the role of the U.S. intelligence community in national security. Since then Smist has learned a lot about intelligence functions and processes. Now he has published an extremely useful book on how Congress oversees the intelligence agencies. It is a remarkable study of the tricky business of harnessing a dynamic intelligence system to the fundamental democratic procedures of an open society.

The main value of the book is in the nitty-gritty research that reveals the variety

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of structures and personalities involved in successive phases of congressional oversight. The author also makes clear that the American Founding Fathers built into the United States Constitution a separation of powers between the president and the Congress that guarantees political conflicts between these two branches of government.

The *Federalist Papers* indicated that "the business of intelligence" is primarily the prerogative of the President (p. 1). On the other hand, the control of the budget by Congress insures it an important voice in all legislation, including the establishment of intelligence agencies and the amount of money they receive. For the most part, starting with George Washington, the president had a great deal of leeway in conducting intelligence activities secretly without detailed accounting to Congress.

This book is the only detailed account of legislative oversight beginning in 1947, when the Central Intelligence Agency was established and other elements of the intelligence community were coordinated by the CIA. It covers a few years more than four decades and focuses on the extraordinary inquiry into intelligence by the Senate Committee chaired by Frank Church in 1975–1976 and details the evolution of the permanent select committees of both Houses of Congress.

If you want to know about the leadership of Daniel Inouye, Birch Bayh, Barry Goldwater, and David Boren in the Senate and the more checkered roles of Lucien Nedzi and Otis Pike and subsequently Edward Boland, Lee Hamilton, and Louis Stokes in the House, here is the book that lays it out. The story of fifteen years of legislative history, 1975–1990, supported by many and lengthy interviews with members of Congress and their oversight staffs, is remarkably clear.

My only reservation about Smist's account is his enthusiasm for the benign role of Congress as an investigative agent prying out intelligence mistakes and scandals. His description of the Iran-contra inquiry is entirely favorable to the exposure of infinite detail about the way intelligence agencies conduct their business.

In my view, useful future intelligence options may have been foreclosed by the flood of information tabled by the Iran-contra inquiry at the expense of the national security and the president's authority. Just because powers are separate does not mean they are equal, and it seems to me the occasional intrusive micro-management by Congress does limit legitimate presidential power to conduct the intelligence business in a way conducive to national security and foreign policy. It has the potential of damaging the overall national interest.

Whatever your view of this issue may be, Smist's research makes an important contribution to history. He gives us an impressive accumulation of objective facts about the evolution of congressional oversight and the pros and cons of congressional demands for regulating presidential authority.

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U.S. Global Strategy Council

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The CIA and American Democracy *by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 338 pp. $25.00.*

In a manner somewhere between serious journalism and scholarly exposition, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, a former broadcaster and journalist, now an historian at the University of Edinburgh, briefly chronicles CIA history. The author focuses on the familiar theme of how a secret intelligence organization and a democracy can coexist.

The book briefly traces the beginnings of U.S. intelligence from the American Revolution through World War II and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), whose veterans formed the nucleus of the new intelligence agency in 1947. It details the four eras of CIA existence: the so-called Golden Age (1950s), the turbulent 1960s, the decline of the CIA (1970s), and the resurgence of the agency in the 1980s under Ronald Reagan. Each chapter examines the actions of the CIA and includes many of the debates between the director of the CIA and governmental leaders, providing an excellent look at the political relationship required for an effective intelligence organization in the American system of shared executive-legislative responsibilities.

Two themes run throughout the book, each reflecting a widespread concern for the CIA as a new agency of central government. First, the idea that the CIA might become an "American Gestapo" reflects the *Zeitgeist* of the immediate postwar years, but it also points accurately to a recurring source of troubled reflection for some American politicians and their constituents.

President Harry S. Truman realized this and kept the CIA out of domestic intelligence, control of which went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The effect of this separation led to a persisting CIA/FBI feud over some elements of jurisdiction. Relations between the two agencies have waxed and waned over the intervening years, and Jeffreys-Jones mentions this relationship frequently, noting how this has often hampered intelligence operations.

The second recurring theme relates to the matter of executive responsibility and the practice of scapegoating, each of which stem from the symbiotic relationship of the chief executive and the CIA and points to some uniquely American intelligence management characteristics. As the president's private source for intelligence operations, the president must be responsible for its actions while ultimately receiving the credit for successful operations. When there is an intelligence failure, however, it is the CIA, its director, and senior personnel who must shoulder the burden.

The Bay of Pigs operation is a case in point (and the Iran-contra affair another) where a debacle led the president to fire top CIA staff. John F. Kennedy is quoted as saying to Richard Bissell, then deputy director for plans at the CIA: "If this were the British government, I would resign, and you, being a senior civil servant, would remain. But it isn't. In our government, you and Allen [Dulles, director of the CIA] have to go, and I have to remain" (p. 127). Jeffreys-Jones examines this presidential scapegoating at great length, noting how virtually every president uses it at one time or another.

Unfortunately, the book spends too much time on covert action and not enough time on the other elements of intelligence such as collection, analysis, and counterin-

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telligence. Although covert action is an important part of the CIA's responsibilities, to overemphasize it represents too much of a nod toward journalism.

Overall, this is an sympathetic and well-written book. While it contains an excellent bibliography, the book does not contribute anything special to the collection. This is an enjoyable volume that will inform the general or novice reader but does not offer any fundamental insights about the Central Intelligence Agency or its operations.

DALTON A. WEST
National Intelligence Study Center

The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times *by Michael A. Genovese. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1990. 280 pages. $42.95.*

Richard Nixon's presidency is by now more thoroughly studied than any since that of Franklin Roosevelt, and it is among the most exhaustively researched in American history. Watergate is, of course, a major source of this scholarly and journalistic fascination, but the Nixon administration's foreign and, to a lesser extent, domestic policies have also been intensively probed. It is tempting, therefore, to call for a moratorium on Nixon studies until time permits the development of some fresh perspectives. Conceivably, however, a new Nixon book might even now be justified.

An author, for example, might uncover significant new material that would shed fresh light on the Nixon presidency. Michael A. Genovese's book on Nixon and his time in the White House offers a few snippets from notes taken by H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Nixon's principal aides, that help round out our understanding of their boss's methods and character. Other than that, Genovese relies almost entirely on previously published sources, including long extracts from the Watergate tapes. There is probably some value in being reminded once again of the squalid moral atmosphere that prevailed in the Oval Office as the Watergate noose tightened. But most of the material that Genovese quotes is all too familiar.

Perhaps approaching Nixon from a fresh point of view might provide a useful book—Nixon, for example, as he was seen from the Soviet Union, or reflections on Nixon from an unusual philosophic or religious orientation. Genovese tests the Nixon record by the standards of contemporary American liberalism, hardly a novel frame of reference. He gives more attention than has been usual to the administration's domestic initiatives outside macroeconomic policy and fully recounts its approaches to the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam. His findings are intellectually defensible and will be satisfying to many who share his ideological outlook. They do little, however, to expand our knowledge or comprehension of his subject.

Fitting the Nixon administration into a larger theory of the presidency or of political ideology might also justify a book. Genovese does examine Nixon's management style against the backdrop of some generalized theories about White House

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administration and develops some interesting insights. He does not, however, carry this discussion very far.

Genovese has a lively style, but he has been poorly served by his editors. There are a good many mixed metaphors and errors in spelling, and when he produces a clever turn of phrase (Nixon "hit the ground stumbling") he is allowed to repeat it a few pages later. This book serves well enough as a relatively brief and reasonably full account of the Nixon administration written from a strongly liberal point of view. But it does not serve much larger purpose.

A. JAMES REICHLEY
The Brookings Institution

Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy *by Christopher F. Edley, Jr. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 270 pp. $30.00.*

At the center of concern here is the relationship between judicial review of the administrative process and the effectiveness of public policy in this country. Edley argues that the way in which the courts now use their oversight power has a significantly negative effect on "the quality of program outcomes" (p. xi). In its stead he advocates a review process that would contribute to what he describes as "sound governance."

Edley's analysis rests on the premise that judicial oversight of administrative decisions faces the constant possibility of replacing "the *objectionable discretion of the administrator* with the *objectionable discretion of the judge*" (p. 7). In the past, he says, judges have relied on a trichotomy of paradigms—adjudicatory fairness, expertise, and politics—in choosing whether to uphold or reverse administrative decisions. He believes that this strategy has been ill-advised, and much of the book is thus devoted to a critique of this trichotomy.

Edley contends that the trichotomy's various elements do not always provide judges with useful guidelines for scrutinizing discretionary decisions by administrators. The need for adjudicatory fairness has long been recognized as a major justification for having such judicial review. However, excessive reliance on this paradigm can breed "stultifying, dehumanizing proceduralism" (p. 27), and this can interfere with effective operation of highly useful government programs. If the need for adjudicatory fairness is the traditional justification offered for close judicial monitoring of agency decision making, the presence of expertise within administration has long had the opposite effect. It has led the courts to accept the need for restraint in exercising their review power. But as a standard for determining whether or not a judge should defer to a bureaucrat, such administrative expertise also raises problems for Edley.

There is, for one thing, the fact that bureaucracy's "expertise may not be so expert" (p. 51). Some of the agencies whose decisions the courts review, such as the Social Security Administration and the National Labor Relations Board, suffer the reputa-

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tion of having only "fictional" expertise. But even when an agency's expertise is felt to be genuine, judges still have to determine whether a decision it reached was in fact based on such expertise or on some extraneous factor.

Similar problems confront judges in deciding how to weigh political factors in evaluating agency decisions. Political influence on agency decision making may be regarded as a reprehensible interference with the rule of law. Or judges may choose to view it as a necessary and proper feature of administrative operations in a democratic society, where bureaucrats are expected to be responsive to the policy preferences of elected officials. In a dissenting opinion in *Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.*, Justice William H. Rehnquist once noted that a perfectly reasonable basis for an agency decision can be found in "a change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes."

It is the weaknesses he perceives in these existing paradigms that lead Edley to propose his sound governance model to guide judicial review of agency action. This model would require the courts to consider the effects of their intervention on governmental outcomes. Judges would thus become partners rather than mere overseers in the process through which the government forges its policies. As Edley recognizes, this governance model, while intriguing, is hardly bereft of the ambiguities that surround the three traditional paradigms that he criticizes. The ideology of many current judicial appointees suggests the possibility that sound governance might come to mean no governance at all in significant sectors of national policy.

This short review can hardly do justice to the richness and versatility of Edley's analysis. It is a dense book, not always clear, and sometimes redundant. But it has one transcendent virtue. It ties administrative law very closely to the discourse and concerns of the social sciences.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
The Johns Hopkins University

The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988 *by Gary C. Jacobson. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1990. 152 pp. Cloth, $38.50; paper, $15.95.*

Congress has been under seige during the past several years, demonized in the popular press as an ossified institution whose permanent Democratic majority has rigged the rules to perpetuate its hold on power and frustrate any serious efforts to deal with pressing national problems. The national movement to limit the terms of members of Congress (and of state legislators) is portrayed as the only means available to overcome the advantages of incumbency and restore some measure of competition in legislative elections.

Gary Jacobson, the political science profession's most prolific and respected student of congressional elections, believes this national handwringing over the ostensible breakdown in representative government is woefully misguided. In this compact

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and highly readable volume, he presents a compelling case that the failure of the Republican party to capture the House of Representatives during a period in which they have dominated presidential elections and drawn even with the Democrats in terms of party identification expresses, rather than thwarts, the popular will. His systematic investigation of the evolution of competition in postwar House elections leads to the conclusion that divided control of the federal government results primarily from political factors (candidates, issues, electoral coalitions, and voters' reactions to them) and not from structural changes in the electoral process associated with incumbency, gerrymandering, and campaign finance.

Republicans have remained a permanent minority in the House because they have fielded inferior candidates on the wrong side of issues that are important to voters in House elections and because their notable success in presidential elections has deprived Republican challengers of any credible basis for arguing that voters should throw the Democratic rascals out of Congress. The Democrats, on the other hand, have much more effectively exploited the opportunities presented by the partisan disintegration of electoral politics over the last forty years; they have thrived in this candidate-centered environment in which personal constituencies have largely replaced partisan ones.

Jacobson supports his argument with an impressive array of evidence, much of it directly relevant to a number of scholarly controversies in the study of congressional elections. As a consequence, the book will be of interest to specialists in electoral research as well as to general readers concerned about the persistence of divided government in the United States.

Some of the latter, however, will take little comfort from Jacobson's conclusion that the partisan division of government is likely to persist for the foreseeable future or from his implicit argument that institutional reform (to reduce incumbent perks, constrain partisan gerrymandering, or equalize campaign funds of incubents and challengers) will do little to lift House Republicans out of their seemingly permanent minority status. Yet nothing in Jacobson's analysis rules out the possibility that a major restructuring of the campaign finance system could itself increase the quality of challengers and thereby improve the prospects for unified government.

THOMAS E. MANN
The Brookings Institution

Urban Politics, New York Style *edited by Jewel Bellush and Dick Netzer. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1990. 467 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $11.95.*

While New York City's size and history as America's premier metropolis make it somewhat exceptional, the contributors to this volume make a convincing case that the city's experience during the last thirty years provides valuable lessons of theoretical and practical relevance for understanding the politics of other large cities.

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The take-off point for this work is the publication in 1960 of Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman's *Governing New York City*. The latter not only described the complexities of New York City's governance, but it also advanced a pluralist theoretical interpretation of the city's political dynamics. Consequently, Sayre and Kaufman's book helped precipitate years of debate among social scientists over the nature of power in urban politics. The Bellush and Netzer volume reviews what has happened to New York City during the three decades since Sayre and Kaufman, and they evaluate whether the pluralist understanding of the city's politics is still very useful.

Urban Politics: New York Style achieves most of its purposes very nicely. Unlike many edited volumes that claim to follow a common theme, the thirteen contributors to this volume actually do pursue the objectives articulated by the editors. There are chapters on economic development, the mayor and top elected officials, the city's huge bureaucracy, public authorities, intergovernmental relations, party politics, interest groups, charter reform, ethnics, and other topics. While the quality of essays in a volume of this kind is invariably uneven, none of them seriously disappoints, and most are excellent.

In general, the authors find serious flaws in the earlier positive view of New York City's political system. That view stressed that despite problems related to the city's size, complexity, and diversity, it was governed in a reasonably responsive and efficient manner. The Bellush and Netzer volume suggests that pluralism has not worked exactly as its proponents hoped. For example, the race issue has proved to be polarizing and difficult to resolve through coalition building and compromise. The decline of the city's party system has weakened the ability of mayors to exercize leadership. These and other flaws in the reality of pluralism in New York City raise questions about the accuracy and conclusions of pluralist theory.

Because such criticisms of pluralism are not entirely novel, it would have been interesting if the authors had considered more recent alternative theoretical interpretations of urban politics. Nevertheless, the evidence and argument here will still interest many readers. The most novel achievement of this book, however, is its vivid description of how radically New York City's governmental order—and by implication those of many other large cities—has changed during the last three decades, creating new problems and power relations in urban politics.

In one of the most elegant essays in the volume, Richard C. Wade describes how the withering away of the city's party system has gone on unimpeded, giving rise to new power brokers, especially the media and other image-makers. Several other contributors describe how issues of economic development—an area of policy that Sayre and Kaufman barely touched upon thirty years ago—have become a focal point in the city's political system; as is the case with many other central cities, New York's faltering economic performance has made its political leaders more attentive to attracting capital investment and has enhanced the power of developers, bankers, and other business interests.

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Other essays describe how New York City has been part of a governmental revolution that has also touched other cities. The massive growth of intergovernmental programs has permitted state and federal actors to establish new roles in New York City's governance, while the creation of independent public authorities to finance and operate public services has eaten away at the power and authority of the general-purpose elected government in the city. This book also suggests how New York City is spearheading some social changes that may be duplicated in other urban communities. New York City has recently absorbed large numbers of new immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere as a result of New York's position as a gateway city at a time of increasing immigration. This has revived New York's City's traditional function of assimilating immigrants, revived the politics of ethnicity, and boosted the competitiveness of the city's labor force. Perhaps other large cities are or soon will be witnessing similar effects.

This is a fine book for anybody who is interested in learning about the social and political transformation of New York City and exploring its meaning for the rest of urban America. Both students and professionals in urban politics ought to find it essential reading.

PAUL KANTOR
Fordham University

Administering the Taylor Law: Public Employee Relations in New York *by Ronald Donovan. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1990. 264 pp. Cloth, $32.00; paper, $14.95.*

New York's landmark law on public employee relations is now nearly twenty-four years old and likely to remain in force for years to come, despite organized labor's continued opposition to the law's ban on the right of public employees to strike. The law is known nationally as the Taylor Law for George W. Taylor, a pioneer in private sector collective bargaining and chairman of a five-member committee named by Governor Nelson Rockefeller to recommend changes in public employee relations in the wake of a devastating bus and subway strike that tied transportation in New York City in knots for eleven days in 1966.

Administering the Taylor Law by Ronald Donovan, a professor emeritus in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, is an informative and perceptive account of the Taylor Law's birth and growth. It is based on first hand knowledge Donovan acquired in working with public unions and public managers as a member of the panel of mediators and fact finders appointed by the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB), the agency created to administer the law.

Donovan's assessment of the law, which has led to a vast expansion of union representation of public employees in New York State, is positive. He pays special tribute to the Taylor Committee and to Robert D. Helsby and Harold R. Newman, successively chairmen of PERB during its entire existence to date. Under their

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leadership, a system of public employee relations has developed ranging from such essential matters as the appropriate unit for bargaining purposes to the appropriate subjects of bargaining.

The ban on the right to strike necessarily led to the inclusion of penalties on employees as well as their unions for violations. Since the strike pressure on public employers to bargain in good faith was removed, procedures for resolving disputes in the event of impasses also became necessary. They include mediation, fact-finding, and, in some cases, compulsory arbitration. PERB, which also devised penalties for bad faith bargaining by public employers, has performed admirably in developing and refining these many procedures.

Taking into account the tremendous expansion in union organization spawned by the law, the strike ban has undoubtedly lessened the number of likely strikes. But it has not eliminated them entirely. From 1967 when the law was passed through 1988, there were 313 strikes of public employees in New York State including another crippling transit strike in 1980.

I am correctly identified by Donovan as a critic of the law. This review is no place for me to justify my criticism. But an explanation of my reasoning might be helpful in assessing the law's effectiveness. My criticism was based primarily on my belief that collective bargaining, which the Taylor Law promoted, cannot work effectively in the absence of the right to strike and the corollary right of the employer to lock out or unilaterally impose rejected contract changes. It is in these ways that the parties say no, an essential ingredient in all forms of negotiation. Without that ability, either or both parties are mere supplicants in talks over changes in the status quo; and third party procedures, an anathema of collective bargaining, become necessary.

Actually, the Taylor Committee recognized that the negotiating process without the right to strike differed from collective bargaining by labelling the process it recommended collective negotiations instead of collective bargaining. But the difference was never clearly explained, and the terms have always been used interchangeably by everyone including the law's administrators.

I recall a relevant conversation with Bob Helsby, who challenged my criticism of the law by citing the vast number of disputes that had been voluntarily settled through so-called collective negotiations. I had to admit that the process was working in that respect despite the strike ban. But, on reflection, I subsequently concluded that it was the unbanned threat of unions to strike that infused the process with incentives to negotiate similar to the strike and unilateral imposition of terms in the private sector.

But for good or bad reasons, the process is working and it is highly unlikely that any modification of the right of public employees to strike would be supported by New York's legislature or the public. In the circumstances, I wish now to join Donovan in praising the Taylor Committee as well as Helsby and Newman for a job well done and to add a separate and special ecomium for Donovan and his book.

THEODORE W. KHEEL
Battle, Fowler, Jaffin, and Kheel

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Under God: Religion and American Politics *by Garry Wills. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1990. 445 pp. $24.95.*

The major theme in this collection of loosely related essays about the 1988 presidential campaign is that American elites and especially the national media do not understand the importance of religion in American life. Author Garry Willis, professor, columnist, and commentator, is particularly concerned about the obvious importance of right-wing fundamentalism in the nation's politics and the belated and inadequate attempts of journalists covering national politics to understand this phenomenon. In effect, Wills is telling these commentators that the unimportance of religion in their own life does not prove that religion is unimportant to every one else.

The point is well taken. Those readers who find Wills's contrarian literary style appealing will surely enjoy this book. Those who think that he is often wrong-headed and sometimes deliberately wrong-headed will be less amused. Religion was NOT an important factor in the 1988 election. The pro-life and fundamentalist vote has been solidly in the Republican camp for decades; the Reagan/Bush political beguilement did not win these groups for the first time. Wills does not seem to comprehend that the newcomers to the Reagan/Bush coalition were not the religious right but Democrats who continued to vote for Democratic congressional candidates, although they could not stomach their party's presidential nominees.

The notable fact about the 1988 election was that more than half of these defectors returned to the Democratic presidential coalition—not enough for Michael Dukakis to win, but enough to suggest that the Democratic coalition migh recapture the presidency some day if it can find the right candidate and the right issues.

Moreover, the significant religious phenomenon of 1988, which Wills misses entirely, is that among the 1984 ticket splitters (Ronald Reagan, but Democratic congressional candidate), Catholics were disproportionately likely to return to the Democratic coalition. In the ABC exit poll data, 62 percent of the 1988 Catholic ticket splitters "came home" in 1988 as opposed to 46 percent of other ticket splitters; and among those who didn't come home, Catholics were more likely to display unease with a vote for George Bush than were others. This was a phenomenon that ought to make the much publicized antics of New York's Cardinal John O'Connor pale into insignificance.

Perhaps Wills is not to be blamed for missing this true story of religion and the politics of 1988. Most other commentators have missed it too. But for a man who arrogantly claims to understand the role of religion in American political life, this failure is striking; it suggests that, while Wills's insights are impressive and his style stimulating, he may not know what he's talking about.

ANDREW GREELEY
University of Arizona

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The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-1990 *by Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1990. 430 pp. Paper, $18.00.*

"The presidents made the highlights of American history, and when you tell about them, you've got it," Harry S. Truman once remarked. This history of the presidency is at one level a thumbnail political history of the United States; at another, it is the history of the development of the office as an institution. Neither daring nor highly original, it is nonetheless a good narrative synthesis of the scholarship on its subject.

A historian, admittedly, will find the story line dated. The author's view of the American past appears rooted in a rather uncritical acceptance of the broad historiographical assumptions of the 1950s, although their survey of some specific presidencies draws on more recent work and on their own research. Their discussion of the constitutional convention and the early nineteenth-century presidency, for example, makes no reference to the concept of a pervasive republican ideology that has drawn so much interest among more recent scholars. Nor is there much to indicate that they are aware of the ways in which pluralist and organizational modes of analysis have eroded the once-conventional view of American politics as a struggle between liberalism and conservatism.

The account of the institution likewise proceeds in a rather predictable, but informative, fashion, singling out presidents who in one way or another enhanced the power and authority of the office. Here, as in most surveys of the subject, those chief executives typed as "active-positive" by James David Barber inevitably receive more attention and implicitly greater approval, the authors' determined effort at objectivity notwithstanding. Rather surprisingly, however, there is no reference to James MacGregor Burns's venerable, but still useful distinction between the Jeffersonian and Madisonian models of the presidency.

The authors argue that the modern presidency was the creation of Theodore Roosevelt, who took a broad interpretation of presidential power, shrewdly employed the mass media, established himself as a "steward of the people" advocating the common interest, and founded "the rhetorical presidency." After the Taft interregnum, they argue, Woodrow Wilson followed TR's example and built on it, thereby establishing the general outlines of an office that would be revived by FDR after a dozen years of Republican passivity. Well, perhaps; but perhaps also the second Roosevelt and his immediate successors made the presidency into something so different in degree that it was different in kind.

The final segment of the book—covering the rise of the personal presidency from JFK to Nixon, its decline after Watergate, and its resurgence under Reagan—is in many respects the most stimulating. One wishes, however, that the authors had made more explicit links to partisan dealignment, the impact of television, the increasingly ideological character of the remnants of the party system, and the ebbing of electoral participation. It seems to me, moreover, that

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they pay too little attention to the role of the post-World War II media as an independent variable capable of sustaining or damaging a presidency. I am also inclined to question whether Ronald Reagan, effective though he was as a presence, left behind him a stronger presidency.

A critical bibliography would be more useful in a work of this sort than the endnotes that accompany every chapter. One could compile a long list of eminent scholars not cited and thereby not called to the attention of the many students who will use this book and seek suggestions for further reading. But what is more important is the authors' achievement in crafting a presidential history that will be read with great profit by anyone seeking a solid, readable introduction to the subject.

ALONZO L. HAMBY
Ohio University

Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand and Shape Society *by Charles E. Lindblom. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990. 314 pp. $29.95.*

Those who believe that the guiding values and standards of society have been shaped by school, church, family, and government to preserve the advantages of the elite, and that social progress depends principally upon a populist reconsideration and reformulation of those values and standards will love this book.

The initial chapters develop some of Lindblom's highly insightful and commonsense ideas that are his trademark. He demolishes the traditional concept of a citizenry possessed of innate wants and preferences, which it is the task of social scientists to discover, as the first step in devising the means for want satisfaction and the institutions for mediation of conflicting interests. Rather, he points out, preferences are not innate, but created. And social progress occurs most often not so much through the reconciliation of conflicting innate interests but through a process of inquiry and "probing" whereby millions of ordinary people modify their wants (or to use Lindblom's term) their "volitions."

According to Lindblom, "'Wants' and 'interests' appropriate to guide social problem solving consist of those that each person, with more information, thoughtfulness, and discourse than guide present choices, would choose, formulate, or will (as a result of inquiry, reflection, discourse and other social interchange)" (p. 21). This process of inquiry or probing needs to be carried out by the ordinary citizen, not to achieve the degree of certainty that is the goal of social science research, but to gain enough information that people, knowing their fallibility, can choose volition A rather than volition B—for example, high environmental quality rather than cheap consumer goods (my example, not Lindblom's).

The problem, says Lindblom, is that the necessary probing of society's funda-

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mentals by the mass of ordinary people is severely impaired by the forces of society and authority along lines designed to preserve the advantages of the elite classes. He decries "the often simple minded endorsements given by masses of people to their existing political and economic institutions" (p. 69) and the "ill-probed submissiveness to arbitrary authority 'learned' from parents by each generation of children" (p. 69). "In the emphasis on docility, obedience, authority, inferiority of the lower classes, piety, and faith in providence, education appears to have intended to put a low ceiling over probing the advantages of the advantaged" (p. 93). The Founding Fathers did their bit, as they "designed a system to curb popular control over the state and keep control of it disproportionately in the hands of political and economic elites" (p. 286).

It is not hard, of course, to fault important components of received values—race and gender stereotypes, for example. But Lindblom's unrelenting interpretation of the socialization process as a means by which the elite perpetuate their advantages can best be characterized by the remark John Jacob Astor is reputed to have made in the bar of the Titanic just as the ice from the iceberg began crashing on the deck: "Waiter, I know I asked for ice, but this is absurd."

Social scientists, says Lindblom, suffer from the same impairing forces as do ordinary people. Moreover, they are dependent on government and other powerful institutions for funding and for access to data; they tend towards orthodoxy and do not suffer innovations gladly; and too often they take an intellectually elitist viewpoint toward the ability of the ordinary person to pursue social inquiry effectively. While these chapters contain useful insights and warnings against professional hubris, Lindblom often seems intent on constructing a straw man—the pseudoscientific believer in the ability of social sciences to provide answers to social problems.

With one exception, Lindblom's prescriptions are very broad and reformist in nature. He does suggest, but only in passing, that there might be an alternative to reform: "Perhaps, in fancy, a nonpluralist, elite-led, revolutionary democratic overthrow of the entire political system" (p. 238). He goes on to note that, of course, the postrevolutionary order, if it intends democracy, has no alternative but to let pluralism flourish. (We all know how eager successful revolutionaries are to do that!)

The book concludes with a number of chapters spelling out the virtues of the "self-guiding society," characterized chiefly by vigorous lay probing, organized in pluralistic advocacy groups and modestly helped by social scientists who choose their research topics with the idea of professional advocacy in mind. Everyone can learn much from the first 55 pages of this book. And many others will find the remainder highly effective in getting their blood racing and their adrenaline pumping.

CHARLES L. SCHULTZE
The Brookings Institution

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To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism *by Jerome L. Himmelstein. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990. 290 pp. $25.00.*

Jerome Himmelstein has done a good job of bringing all the artillery of political sociology to bear upon the conservative movement's vicissitudes over the past four decades. Arguing against both conservatives and their critics, he concludes that the movement's successes do not indicate a revolutionary break with older incarnations of the American right; nor do they augur a lasting political realignment.

Stated in these general terms, the argument is plausible enough and backed by sufficient evidence to make this work a genuine, if modest, contribution to the growing scholarship on the subject. However, the book is not without problems. The most serious errors all stem from the same source—Himmelstein's lack of first-hand experience with his subject. Emphasizing the capitalist strain, he dismisses Russell Kirk's depiction of an Anglo-American right permeated with Edmund Burke, thereby overlooking the New Humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, a movement that still claims prominent followers on the academic right. He is similarly unable to place Richard Weaver in the context of his mentors, the anticapitalist southern agrarians, or to acknowledge the important part played by European Catholic rightists and their American disciples. This failure to understand the noncapitalist stream of conservatism partly explains his misconstruction of Frank Meyer's "fusionism" as a "religious defense of pristine capitalism" (p. 59). Such a definition might fit Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, who defend Christianity as the necessary pre-condition for democratic capitalism, but not the fusionist alliance of Christian traditionalists and libertarians.

When he comes to the New Right, Himmelstein is even more confused. He cannot distinguish between R. Emmet Tyrell (a William F. Buckley disciple who turned neoconservative in the 1980s), Howard Phillips (a hard-line anticommunist/small government conservative), and Richard Viguerie, who consistently represents himself as a populist. This confusion is all the more misleading, since it is the populist strain that distinguished the New Right from mainstream conservatism. The New Right's strongest ally, the religious right, is the subject on which Himmelstein has done the most work. And yet even here he misses the crucial distinctions between evangelical groups with a long tradition of political (often progressive) activism and the antipolitical Southern Baptists, the largest Protestant denomination in the United States.

These are all venial mistakes, compared with his discussion of "corporate conservatism." Himmelstein sees an unbroken tradition of business support for conservative politics but cannot apparently see the trees for the forest. The isolationist right was supported by some large corporations, but by and large the older right of the 1940s and 1950s was funded by entrepreneurs and family-held businesses. However, as success moderated the movement's hostility to big government and corporate internationalism, new money started coming in; the

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largest part came from foundations now dominated by neoconservatives. Himmelstein fails even to mention the largest of them, the Bradley Foundation, and cannot see the irony in the transformation of the Smith-Richardson Foundation from a staunch Old Right supporter, whose founder contributed to the America First Committee, into a major source of revenue for the democratic globalists.

Most major conservative organizations have embraced some form of political globalism and routinely defend economic internationalism. It is hardly surprising that they are now receiving support from multinational corporations, international banks, and oriental business interests that appreciate the new conservative opposition to protectionism. Himmelstein's penchant for seeing continuity has blinded him to the reality of a conservative movement that—for good or ill—has reversed nearly every one of its major positions.

THOMAS FLEMING
Rockford Institute

After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State *by Cass R. Sunstein. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1990. 284 pp. $25.00.*

Over the past decade Cass Sunstein has emerged as one of the country's most prolific and provocative legal scholars. *After the Rights Revolution* is a rich discussion of how the courts have handled—and should handle—the plethora of regulatory statutes enacted since 1932. It deserves to be read widely by students of politics. But it also needs to be read with caution, since Sunstein makes extensive prescriptive arguments on the basis of premises he never explicitly defends.

The first half of the book is an essay on government regulation of the economy. Fearing that libertarian Huns are storming the fortress of environmental, consumer, and civil rights legislation, Sunstein provides a spirited and largely convincing defense of public regulation. At the same time, he offers a sobering analysis of why *in practice* regulation often produces a wide variety of unintended and unwanted consequences. Although this section of the book goes over ground familiar to students of regulation, it provides a succinct and useful account of current debates.

The second half of the book focuses on courts' interpretation of statutes. Sunstein is particularly good at showing the policy and institutional consequences of various methods for divining legislative intent. Some approaches expand the scope of government, others contract it. Some centralize power, others disperse it. Readers unfamiliar with statutory interpretation will find this analysis both accessible and illuminating.

Not content merely to describe and explain, Sunstein outlines "a series of interpretive principles" to help judges decide real cases. His grand design is to create a synthesis of eighteenth-century constitutionalism (which he considers anachronistic in important respects) and the New Deal's commitment to energetic government.

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Here the reader needs to be on guard. For Sunstein is quite promiscuous in his borrowing from the Founders and the New Deal. On the one hand, he radicalizes the New Deal's programmatic commitments. This is most evident in his attack on private property. "There is," he tells us, "no antecedent entitlement to distributions based on market orderings" (p. 205). So much for the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, he rejects New Deal institutional arrangments, most notably a powerful president, a restrainted judiciary, and a bureaucracy with broad discretion. Although New Dealers were adamant about making administrative agencies a central and normal part of government, Sunstein remains troubled by "the awkward constitutional position of the administrative agency" (p. 224). His New Deal has a heavy dose of Henry Wallace, but very little of Felix Frankfurter, James Landis, or even FDR himself.

What links the first and second halves of the book is the assumption that courts can use the medium of statutory construction to strengthen regulation when it is justified and to curtail it when it is counterproductive. Sunstein calls on the courts to (among other things) coordinate regulatory policies, take into account the "complex systemic effects of regulation," and avoid "irrationality and injustice" (p. 171). This, he readily admits, requires practical judgement, not mechanical application of legal rules. That Sunstein would expect judges do to all these things well is quite remarkable, especially in light of the many studies showing that courts frequently contribute to the regulatory failures he decries.

Sunstein's insistence on an active judiciary is based above all on his often-repeated claim that "constitutional norms are underenforced" (p. 155). Although he never explains this surprising assertion, it soon becomes clear that he means that judges have not gone far enough in promoting egalitarianism. Nowhere is this more evident than in Sunstein's discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in the *Weber* case, which upheld the use of "voluntary" racial quotas. To support his claim that *Weber* was "correctly decided," Sunstein converts the 1964 Civil Rights Act's ban on racial discrimination into a general principle of "nonsubjugation," which in turn justifies discrimination in favor of disadvantaged racial groups. Such "hospitable construction of statutes" allows judges to protect disadvantaged groups "in a relatively unintrusive manner" (p. 167). Unobtrusive, perhaps, but unintrusive? Hardly.

When Sunstein reaches into the hat of New Deal and Great Society legislation, he feels free to pull out whatever rabbit fits his policy and institutional preferences. Sunstein's method of justifying his prescriptions has the virtue of alerting us to a central fact about the politics of statutory interpretation: behind seemingly bland principles of statutory interpretation lurk powerful ideologies and policy preferences.

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The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State *by Philip G. Cerny. Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 1990. Cloth, $47.50; paper, $18.95.*

This book is going to have a difficult time finding the audience it deserves. In my view, it is the best introduction available in English to contemporary academic discussions about the purpose and prospects of applying the comparative method to political science. In my opinion, the best substantively-oriented introductory text in comparative politics is, alas, only available in French: Bertrand Badie et Guy Hermet, *Politique Comparée*. Cerny's book is comprehensive in scope and accomplishes three, quite rare tasks: it brings together material on North America, Western Europe, and Japan (Third World experiences, however, are virtually ignored); it combines theories of comparative politics and international relations; it pays equal attention to systems of party competition and of interest intermediation, although its primary focus is upon the state.

The book is also unfortunately written in a dense, almost impenetrable style that is only rarely relieved by empirical examples and never by convincing proofs. It is literally obsessed with the concept of structure, which appears itself or in cognate forms as often as twenty times on a single page. It is hard to imagine an undergraduate who could struggle through such a morass of abstract terms and academic quarrels. Its modal audience is likely to be graduate students preparing their comprehensive examinations, and that is hardly a large enough group to make the book an academic bestseller. I even suspect that most of my tenured peers would balk at struggling through such a conceptual thicket, especially when they discover that it is long on theoretical discourse and short on testable, substantive hypotheses.

Nevertheless, the effort is well worth it. Cerny does have a central theme: the state—or, better, the modern differentiated state—through a process of omnipotent and omnipresent "political structuration" (*vide* Anthony Giddens) forms and deforms, not just power relations, but also the processes of identity and interest formation in civil society. The state becomes the nodal point around which all economic and social relations revolve. Cerny would not only "bring the state back in," but he would put it everywhere! Occasionally, he backs off from this and admits that the "centrality" of the state can be contingent, but also that it can be weakened by independent processes of endogenous and exogenous change, which would be the exception rather than the rule. Like most statists, Cerny tends to dismiss the autonomy of what goes on beneath as well as beyond it. Contrary to the assumptions of democratic theorists, social contractarians, and enthusaists of rational choice, the games of politics are always "directly or indirectly structured by and through the state" (p. 188).

In my opinion, this is excessive. It may even seem ironic to some that just as national states, especially in Western Europe, have revealed their intrinsic weakness to intervene coherently through fiscal and monetary policies, industrial

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subsidies, and trade protection to sustain economic growth and full employment, and have devolved much of these capacities to a supranational bargaining process, Cerny discovers their omniscience. There is hardly an advanced industrial state that is *not* currently suffering from a scarcity of resources, under pressure to deregulate or privatize its activities, and finding it necessary to modify well entrenched policies in response to increases in international competitiveness and penetration. Admittedly, Cerny is aware of the existence of such transnational processes and what he calls the "de-differentiation" of the state. But he interprets these as merely requiring changes in public policy—"an equal and opposite process of redifferentiation of the state" (p. 197)—not a fundamental modification of "the architecture of politics."

Philip Cerny has produced a tour de force, an intelligent, erudite, and comprehensive text that cuts decisively through artificial barriers within the discipline. One need not even agree with its central assumption that the state structures all of political life to learn a great deal from it. Too bad that the book is written in a style that seems destined to deny it a sizable audience.

PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER
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Beyond the Constitution *by Hadley Arkes. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990. 278 pp. $24.95.*

The heroes in this stirring book are the politicians and jurists whom Hadley Arkes calls "the Founders" of the American republic, and a few others, such as Abraham Lincoln—statesmen who knew and practiced the vocation of principled government. Most modern jurists, however, have lost this calling; they "find it hard to establish the principled ground for their judgments, since they are not entirely sure that they can recognize a principle when they see it" (p. 79). The Founders aspired to make themselves dispensable insofar as they expected that the torch that guided them would have been passed successfully from generation to generation.

Today, Arkes laments, "lawyers and judges no longer know, uniformly, what the Founders assumed that any literate man of the law would know" (p. 56). He bristles at contemporary American legal culture, and he does not mince his words: Our current legal culture "is more likely to produce a Justice Blackmun or the typical lawyers of the American Civil Liberties Union and . . . is less likely to produce lawyers like Abraham Lincoln and John Marshall" (p. 80). The towering Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is cast as a thug, who ventured to think of law and morality as very separate enterprises.

The problem Arkes sees derives from "a radical separation between the jurisprudence of the Founders . . . and the jurisprudence offered by conservatives and liberals in our own day." Positivism and moral relativism have been increasingly

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infused into modern American jurisprudence, displacing moral judgment; yet "the jurisprudence of the Founders was built on the connection that was traditionally understood between morals and law." The Constitution that they produced cannot be understood or justified if severed from morality. Contrary to positivists and moral relativists, both liberal and conservative, Arkes believes that there are right answers in the "moral . . . understandings that were never written down in the Constitution," the first principles that preceded the document and with which the Founders were well acquainted (p. 16–17).

Arkes yearns for a jurisprudence openly confronting questions of right and wrong, good and bad; these inquiries into natural justice beyond the Constitution's text were common among the lawyers of the Founding generation and, according to Arkes, are the only inquiries that facilitate the resolution of constitutional questions. "[T]he discipline of moral reasoning . . . *is* the discipline of jurisprudence" (p. 172). He illuminates his thesis with illustrations of moral judgment that permeate constitutional questions, particularly where the judiciary has expanded constitutional rights and has augmented the constitutional power of Congress to further justice and equality. The judges and justices who have engineered this change have produced a jurisprudence that depends on the principles of moral judgment, and "yet almost all of these judges have been taught to doubt there are in fact such knowable principles of right and wrong. . . . The result is that our jurists have reached decisions untethered by the traditional formulas in the Constitution, but without having the least comprehension, themselves, of the moral philosophy that would render this whole enterprise intelligible" (pp. 110-111). This is eminently true, he says, in the myriad of fakes and fictions that saturate the modern constitutional justification of federal regulatory power.

It may be unrealistic to expect even life-tenured judges explicitly to bank their legal reasoning on moral grounds, especially when critics are quick and eager to exploit a judicial explanation that an action is morally unacceptable. Positivist incantations may serve to insulate a conscientious judge who is sure that something is morally wrong but who is vulnerable to political attack.

Arkes makes a convincing argument that the resort to positivism by judges who nonetheless are (sub-)consciously driven by concerns of natural law derives from a fundamental misunderstanding about the Constitution, namely, that its reach extends only as far as its text. "Equity," he says, to which the judicial power constitutionally extends, meant to the Founders that courts ought not to be confined to the words and letters of the text; on occasion, judges would be obliged to "disregard even the explicit provisions of the Constitution" (p. 50). The Ninth Amendment endorses the supposition of going "beyond the Constitution" insofar as it states that text-based rights are not the only constitutional rights. And surely "the dangers of a Bill of Rights itself" (the title of a chapter in this book, dangers that were foreseen and debated by the Founders)—that is, a state of mind that what is not mentioned must not exist—can be felt in the power wielded on the Court by the literalist Justice Hugo L. Black and in the shadow of doubt that

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shrouds advocates of substantive due process. Arkes develops a powerful argument that the existence of the Bill of Rights has helped both to miseducate the public and to promote the positivist doctrine of textualism.

This stimulating and very well written book is certain to provoke controversy from every quarter. For instance, though many of the Founders abhorred slavery, what do we do with those who thought that slavery (shielded in the Constitution) was morally defensible? Also, Arkes seems to take the position that in the field of incorporation the states are bound to comply with whatever is morally right (as is the federal government), regardless of a specific textual mandate; he further argues that the federal government ought to be authorized directly (and not through a charade of fictions) to regulate any subject which the law (as moral precepts) can control. Does federalism disappear? Others who venerate the Founders are not likely to agree. Finally, Arkes is well aware of, though he makes no reference at all to, the problems of establishing the Founders' intent; some see that search as illusory. The thesis of this book rests on the accuracy of his account of the minds of the Founders; we should expect some epistemological skirmish with scholars who doubt that such accuracy is possible.

JAMES MAGEE
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Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication *by Harry H. Wellington. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991. 196 pp. $22.50.*

At one level, this first volume in a new series devoted to contemporary and controversial legal topics examines approaches to constitutional interpretation in the context of the explosive abortion issue. At another level, it is a critique of originalism and other modes of constitutional construction designed to limit judicial intrusion upon majoritarian institutions, as well as a defense of what the author labels a common-law approach to judicial review.

Wellington argues that originalists fail to appreciate the inherent ambiguity of the historical record and the irresistible pull of personal preference on the constructions given constitutional provisions by even the most ardent advocates of language and the Framers' intent as the primary legitimate guides to the Constitution's meaning. A recent study by H. Jefferson Powell (based ironically—though the irony apparently escaped Wellington—on a search of historical records) has convinced him, moreover, that the Constitution's Framers did not themselves intend that their own intentions govern future generations.

Faring only slightly better with Wellington is the view of John Hart Ely and others that the Constitution's due process and other open-ended provisions should be used primarily by judges only to assure maximum participation in the

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policy process, with the choice of substantive policies (such as those in the abortion field) left largely to the political branches rather than the courts. Such a position, like that of the originalists, is based, Wellington observes, on an assumption that judicial review is a deviant institution inconsistent with democratic principles and thus ignores the many other institutions in our system that also run counter to majority rule. Those who embrace extreme forms of judicial self-restraint as a means of resolving the inherent conflict between majoritarian institutions and judicial review make the same mistake, according to Wellington.

For Wellington, the only mode of constitutional construction that is consistent with the character of adjudication generally is one analogous to that associated with the common law. It is a judge-made body of law based in part on precedent but partly on appeals to contemporary public values (what Wellington calls the "public morality") and which can gradually be modified over time to reflect changes in such values. Since judges have no way of assessing precisely the contours of contemporary public morality, Wellington concedes that such an approach is vulnerable to the contention that it is inconsistent with democratic principles. He contends, however, that the "noisy" public dialogues that controversial judicial interpretations of the Constitution generate can provide the Court with information about contemporary public values relevant to its positions—information which may prompt a later change in the Court's stance. Such popular input helps to diminish the force of the antimajoritarian complaint against judicial review.

Applying this common law interpretive mode to the abortion issue, Wellington concludes from the broad range of state abortion laws in effect when *Roe v. Wade* was decided that the *Roe* Court's reading of the scope of the abortion right perhaps exceeded what the public morality of the time would have recognized. He argues, though, that the vigorous public debate that *Roe* aroused is a source of law that the Court should weigh in determining how much of a mistake *Roe* was. At the same time, he opposes any substantial weakening of *Roe*, claiming that any increase in the death rate of poor women resulting from substantial relaxation of the ruling would conflict with the contemporary public value requiring equal treatment of the rich and poor.

As a critique of certain approaches to constitutional construction and defense of another, Wellington's work is far less satisfying than the more systematic efforts of Michael Perry, Ronald Dworkin, and other opponents of a values-based jurisprudence. His notion that the public dialogue that controversial decisions provoke can help to blunt the antimajoritarian impact of judicial review fails to take into account, for example, the failure of most exercises of judicial review to arouse the public debate that *Roe* generated. Thus, there is a paucity of information about public reaction to most constitutional decisions that according to Wellington's thesis might prompt the Court's reevaluation of its stance. He does raise a number of arguments that others have not, though. More important, he states his position in a highly readable, conversational style well suited

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to the general audience for which his book and others in this new series are intended.

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A Fragile Power: Scientists and the State *by Chandra Mukerji. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990. 253 pp. $24.95.*

The title is somewhat misleading. This study aims to contribute to the sociology of science by advancing several themes. The major theme does indeed deal with the relationship between scientists and the state, but mainly as it is perceived by certain researchers and as their views are construed by the author. The minor themes, addressed in chapters six through nine, aim to show that although basic researchers tend to disparage engineers as inferior in status, their own laboratories nevertheless often depend on some technological innovation; and because science is a form of human discourse, it is rife with possessiveness (based on an "alienation of nature" for the purpose of science), rhetoric (including such vulgarisms as "gotta" and "gonna"), rivalry, and interdisciplinary struggles over territory. Sociologists like Mukerji presumably hope to shock positivists and bring high falutin' natural scientists down to their own level with these attributions.

Although the minor themes raise interesting questions, as much about contemporary sociology as about the natural sciences, this review will be confined to the major one. Mukerji's analysis is based on observation and interviews, conducted mainly at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO), which is attached to the University of California, San Diego, where she teaches. Her thesis is that scientists like those at SIO receive public support not because the powerful elites who control the state care about scientific findings but because these elites want cadres of experts upon whom they can call for advice.

In order to assure themselves of state support, Mukerji contends, scientists in effect must agree to become an "elite reserve labor force" (p. 6) a la Marx's "reserve army of the unemployed." Like Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward's underclass, which is kept on welfare because it is politically unstable, "scientists are kept in funds in part to keep them from upsetting the balance of power" (pp. 8–9). As nineteenth-century women were left to run their households, scientists are left to run their laboratories. The price they must pay for this apolitical autonomy is to acquiesce in whatever public policies the other elites lay down.

One of Mukerji's own comments points to more complex realities that belie this simplistic iconoclasm. When the American state put money into the Manhattan Project, she notes, it was in order to get hold of atomic bombs and not just to assure itself of policy advice. She neglects to mention that the director of this very project, Robert Oppenheimer, got into a peck of trouble precisely because he offered unwanted policy advice. Similarly, investments in all kinds of scientific research,

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basic as well as applied, have had major benefits not just for military power but for economic growth, medical care, space exploration, environmental preservation, and other public goals. In numerous instances, scientists whose work provides these benefits have used the prestige their expertise confers to enter controversies like those over fallout from nuclear testing, the development of the ABM and its successor, SDI, civil nuclear power, the supersonic transport, the use of pesticides, experiments in biotechnology, etc. Ocean scientists have been outspoken in trying to defend the freedom of the seas and influence law of the sea negotiations.

It is certainly true that because they depend on soft money for research support, scientists are vulnerable to cutbacks in government support. But the American state is not a black box full of money dispensed by some political boss; for better or worse it has a constitutional, representative government. Science policy, like other public policy, results from the interplay of interested parties with different objectives, all of whom must be sensitive to political agendas and claim to be serving some vital public interest. Scientists, like others in pursuit of public subvention, learn to play this game in applying for grants and contracts. Those who have teaching appointments (unlike some of the SIO researchers, who depend exclusively on soft money) can afford to be more outspoken on public issues. Any skilled group dependent on public subsidy could be called a reserve elite labor force, but to do so would not begin to explain how such a group pursues its interests in the political process. When the group enjoys the kind of devolution of authority basic researchers do through peer review and as a result of the influence they exert over "the state's" main funding agencies, the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, the notion borders on caricature.

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The New Europe Asserts Itself: A Changing Role in International Relations *edited by Beverly Crawford and Peter W. Schulze. Berkeley, University of California International and Area Studies Research Series/Number 77, 1990. 433 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

What are the prospects for a greater role for Europe in the international system after the distintegration of the communist bloc in 1989-1990? And what are the origins, goals, and limitations of the current movement toward greater monetary and political integration in the European Community? These are the two fundamental questions addressed by the fourteen papers collected in this volume.

The editors have organized the book around three major themes that are each in turn explored from different perspectives in a number of essays. The first three contributions deal with the broad questions about European security after the cold war; the following seven papers discuss economic and political aspects of West European self-assertion; and two final essays are dedicated to the topic of

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changing national identities in Europe. Beverly Crawford's introduction and conclusion guide the reader through the book, collecting the insights gained from the various detailed analyses.

The book's exploration of the changing European security environment after the cold war begins with B. R. Posen's analysis questioning the supposed inadequacy of NATO military spending in Western Europe. F. Mislivetz adds a view from Eastern Europe and argues in favor of what he calls a "pan-European Entente." M. R. Lucas's chapter provides the reader with a detailed account of the history and mechanics of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process and its relevance for the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990.

The discussion of important aspects of Europe's current economic self-assertion starts with S. Freedman's informative essay about the European Community's efforts to build a single market without internal barriers by 1992. E. Holm contributes an analysis of the important topic of European monetary integration. Following these two chapters, which endow the reader with technical and historical information about two central issues in contemporary European affairs, K. Busch discusses the conflict between nation-states and economic integration in the European Community. P. Schulze's chapter deals with the importance of Europe-wide research and development programs for the preservation of European independence in high technology.

Possibilities for and limits to Western Europe's political self-assertion are discussed in three excellent essays by J. Joffe, B. Crawford, and J. Halfmann. Joffe analyzes the continuing struggle between France and Germany about the distribution of the costs and benefits of greater Franco-German and European interdependence. Crawford's chapter gives an account of the differing European and American views about East-West trade and their evolution during the postwar period. And Halfmann has dedicated his essay to some speculation about the future direction of post-reunification German politics.

Finally, E. B. Haas and Ch. Schoefer contribute two chapters investigating the extent to which the changing political identities of West European citizens allow for the emergence of a European political identity as an indispensable precondition for the development of a viable political authority on the European level. Haas focuses in his analysis on the future of liberal nationalism in Western Europe; Schoefer, on the other hand, concentrates on the history of the development of a national identity in postwar Germany.

Taken together, the fourteen essays collected in this volume provide an excellent introduction to some of the most important issues related to the development of Western Europe since the end of the cold war. As an early shot in the debate about the place and weight of Western Europe in tomorrow's world, the book succeeds admirably.

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Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States *by Ian Budge and Hans Keman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1990. 256 pp. $55.00.*

This important book confronts head-on two of the most pronounced political science phenomena of the 1980s—the decline of parties literature and rational choice theory. In attempting to assess how parties operate in government, the book vindicates the continued consideration of parties as the central institutions of representative democracy, while simultaneously formulating a theory of government formation that stands opposed to previous coalition theories.

Parties and Democracy adopts the motivations of political parties as its main explanatory variable and attempts to delineate the parties' aims in the setting up and running of governments. Budge and Keman propose an integrated theory of democratic party government in parliamentary systems: a formal policy-based model, or "core theory," is elaborated; initial assumptions are stated; implications are deduced; and the entire systematic relationship is checked against actual party behavior.

In the majority of the book the authors test their assumptions of government formation against the actual behavior of approximately four hundred governments in twenty postwar democracies. In addition, they also propose theories, raise further assumptions, and test other issues such as distribution and allocation of ministries, where they show that particular parties have substantial preferences for particular ministries; policy making and performance, where their findings clearly strengthen the case for regarding parties as consistent and important actors; termination of governments and its effects on future governments, where their results are relatively similar to those of rational choice theory.

The two most unique aspects of their approach are the manner in which government formation is defined and the emphasis placed by parties on democracy in this formative process. Parties do not enter government for its own sake—that is, the pure office-seeking approach. "Parties seek to form that government capable of surviving legislative votes of confidence" (p. 34). Coalition theory, according to the authors, now shifts from a focus on a *winning* coalition based on spatial and numerical theories, to a *viability* coalition. Parties may choose to form a government larger and less close in policy positions than previous coalition theories would have assumed, because this type of government is expected to be more effective. For example, a party may choose a coalition partner based on governmental experience, not size or adjacency.

The second intriguing aspect, the emphasis on democracy, introduces the parties' ideological motivations, which in turn generates a hierarchical ordering of coalition preferences. The first criterion for setting up any government is to counter threats to the democratic system. Thus, only prosystem parties have coalition potential. Once this hurdle has been passed or is contextually irrelevant, the second criterion is based on the pervasive and general socialist-bourgeois cleavage that splits the parties into two opposing camps, sinking all other differences that at other times

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might have separated them. Finally, once the two preliminary concerns have either been addressed or do not hold, parties pursue their own specific group-related preferences. This allows for a more flexible presentation of issue concerns by parties over time. At different times any specific party system might form a coalition based on just the first, the second, the third, the first two, or all three preferences. Parties are therefore no longer postulated to occupy an invariant position on a unidimensional continuum for an entire period.

Parties and Democracy addresses an important issue of major significance and presents a systematic, comparative, and comprehensive account of democratic party government. The authors successfully bridge between rational choice, historical, and spatial approaches and utilize logical, coherent, and clearly understandable statistical arguments. *Parties and Democracy* demonstrates that despite the decline of parties literature, parties still do make a difference and it is necessary to "bring parties back in."

REUVEN Y. HAZAN
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The Politics of International Law: U.S. Foreign Policy Reconsidered *by David P. Forsythe. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1990. 181 pp. Cloth, $34.00; paper, $15.95.*

International law must be viewed within the political context of foreign policy to be really appreciated. In the United States, however, conventional mythology often wants to believe that the country can do little wrong in its foreign relations. When democracy is on America's side, so too is truth, justice, and the American Way. Consequently, armed with such a moral imperative, the myth presumes that what the U.S. executive does in its foreign policy dealings, so long as it aims to promote these ideals, tends to be lawful and proper. In sum, convinced of America's moral purpose, realizing its national interests, U.S. might makes right, irrespective of constraints purportedly imposed by international law.

In this slim volume, Forsythe dashes this myth as he scrutinizes U.S. foreign policy during the Reagan administrations. He examines the role of international law in U.S. government institutions and finds that during the 1980s the Reagan administration treated international law as little more than a "self-serving afterthought to policy decisions" (p. 3). In cogent, concise, comprehensible fashion, this study aims to expose the political reality of how international law converges with the policy-making process in Washington. In commendable measure, it succeeds.

The analysis rests on five case studies, each constructed within the framework of seven key questions: What were the relevant facts of the case? What were the executive's main policy objectives? What were the executive's principal legal claims to support U.S. policy? What was the domestic response to the policy? What was

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the foreign response? What outcomes were produced for the United States? What outcomes were produced for world order? This methodology proves to be a very effective manner of probing the political motivations for policy initiatives and exposing the ends-justifies-the means approach taken by the Reagan administration.

Forsythe methodically takes the Reagan administration to task for its overtly manipulative attitude toward international law. The effort to reinterpret the ABM treaty "was a blatant attempt to violate the traditional understanding of the meaning of that treaty" which "treated international law in a most cavalier manner" (p. 27). Regarding the "covert" intervention in Nicaragua, the Reagan administration evidenced "an extreme form of crusading moralism and hubris that is difficult for law to control" (p. 56). In the case of Grenada, the executive's legal claims were "shifting and ill considered" (p. 70). The Reagan administration's tendency to apply ideological standards for refugee status "tarnished the image of the United States as having a law-abiding (and truthful) government committed to offering at least temporary safe haven to those fleeing persecution" (p. 111). And, while the Reagan administration actually moved over time to defend U.S. financial assessments to the United Nations, U.S. willingness to pay obligatory dues became a lever to induce United Nations reform.

Fans of the Reagan administration will find fault with this volume, and understandably so. It is a balanced, compelling indictment of that government's tendency to use international law as a convenient means to achieve policy ends, rather than as a guide for proper international conduct. But the work is much more than merely a penetrating incrimination of the Reagan administration's indifference to the rule of law. It is a critical analysis of why and how national interests are perceived such that policies are deemed necessary to circumvent legal rules and undermine international standards. Great intellectual value resides in this undercurrent of Forsythe's examination.

True, five selected case studies are insufficient evidence to confidently substantiate the Reagan administration's composite attitude toward the rule of law in international society over eight years. Forsythe's thoughtful and carefully crafted treatment of these cases, however, does furnish ample reason to rethink recent U.S. foreign policy and the motives for making decisions. Moreover, it prompts the real need to assess just how well the results of U.S. foreign policy square with aspirations for a more stable and just world order. Given the Bush administration's rhetoric to create a new, post-cold war international order, *The Politics of International Law* should be required reading for all serious students of contemporary international politics, as well as for those interested in where American foreign policy may be headed.

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Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France *by James M. Jasper. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990. 327 pp. $39.50.*

How could three democratic countries with similarly strong commitments to nuclear power in 1973 diverge so sharply in their use of nuclear power since then? As oil has now become a source of war in the Middle East, this question takes on added importance. Nuclear power is a substitute for oil in the generation of electricity, and electricity can replace oil to some extent in heating, transportation, and certain industrial applications. Yet, of three countries heavily dependent on imported oil and vulnerable to the political instability that plagues Middle Eastern suppliers, only France has sustained its early commitment to nuclear power. Sweden has committed itself to eliminating nuclear power by the year 2010, and the United States, with no explicit commitment in either direction, will not find it easy to expand nuclear power in the near future. How could three countries starting from much the same position and facing much the same challenge arrive at such different destinations? According to James Jasper, there is no easy answer.

This conclusion will surprise and probably disappoint readers attracted to Jasper's book by its theoretical orientation. As the book's subtitle indicates, Jasper focuses his attention on the state—on the institutions that comprise the government and that structure the influence of the various political, economic, technological, and moral interests at play in energy debates, and that exert independent influences of their own. One might expect the disparate forms of government organization in France, Sweden, and the United States—federal vs. unitary, parliamentary vs. presidential, and more specific political structures—to have clearly different consequences for nuclear power. However, Jasper does not believe such tidy expectations can be supported.

In Jasper's view, institutions provide a framework within which politicians and other state officials act. Although this framework constrains official action, it does not determine such action, and the framework itself is susceptible to change. Other explanatory factors are consequently necessary. The factors that Jasper relies on most are what he calls "cultural meanings" or what might more commonly be labeled ideologies. Jasper also utilizes the personal histories of political actors and a bit of psychology to explain their behavior and decisions.

In criticizing institutional analysis, Jasper is attacking something of a strawman. Institutionalists do not generally deny the importance of individual values and preferences or the malleability of institutions. Indeed, institutional development is a major topic for the "new institutionalists." The importance of the state and its formal organization has no doubt been exaggerated by some scholars, but most institutionalists would probably agree with Jasper that institutional explanations have their limitations.

Institutionalists may wonder, however, whether Jasper has adequately tested the limits of such explanations with his comparative analysis of nuclear policy. Cultural explanations loom very large. Decisions are often cast as ideological battles among

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technological enthusiasts (engineers), believers in cost benefit analysis (economists), and environmental moralists (antinuclear activists). Political conflict is viewed in terms of major partisan cleavages—in the United States, for example, free markets vs. government intervention. Jasper is correct, I think, in emphasizing the ideological fervor that often seems to distinguish nuclear policy making from government as usual. But he carries his ideological explanations too far. I doubt, for example, that ideology was at the root of Gerald Ford's energy policy.

More importantly, however, I do not believe Jasper takes institutional explanations far enough. Most striking in this regard is how little attention Jasper pays to the U.S. Congress, a legislature of distinct power and independence and the source of the administrative structures that implement U.S. nuclear policy. Perhaps the advantages that the congressional structure provides for geographically concentrated interests, the multiple points of access that it provides to all interests, the conflicting oversight it provides administrative agencies, and the opposition it provides presidents for control of national policy do not distinguish the American experience with nuclear power from that in Sweden and France. But Jasper does not adequately explore these structural explanations.

To Jasper's great credit, however, he has assembled from a wealth of original documentary sources and interviews fascinating and detailed political histories of nuclear policy making from 1960 to 1989 in three countries with major nuclear programs. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the book's conclusions, most of the facts are there for the reader to evaluate independently. As energy rises once again in importance and the nuclear option is inevitably debated, Jasper's book is must reading for those who want to understand the political limits on energy policy.

JOHN E. CHUBB
The Brookings Institution

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

In "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect" (PSQ 105 [Fall 1990] 435–454), David Forsythe implies that President Jimmy Carter's policy towards the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was a positive accomplishment of Carter's "human rights foreign policy." In reality, this episode was one of its most notable and shameful failures.

As Walter LaFeber has explained, the Carter administration under some congressional pressure asked Anastasio Somoza Debayle to ease the repression, believing that this would weaken the revolution and keep the regime in power. When this failed, Carter sought to ease Somoza out by using mediators from the Organization of American States (OAS) to propose a regime to include the murderous National Guard. This was done as the guard was "bombing slums, murdering unarmed people in the streets, and looting the cities."[1] This attempt to achieve "*somocismo* without Somoza" was unsuccessful.

In a further defeat, the United States could not obtain OAS approval for intervention to install a suitable regime.[2] Somoza was then supported with economic and military aid that was finally cut off in early 1979. However, the International Monetary Fund then offered a loan with U.S. support, while Israel and Argentina stepped in to supply arms. When the Carter administration at last concluded that further weapons would hinder its efforts to replace Somoza with a government suitable to the United States, Israel agreed to a U.S. request to halt shipments.[3]

David Forsythe's account is too charitable: he gives the Carter administration credit where it deserves none.

RODERICK HILL

[1] Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions* (New York: Norton, 1984), 230, 234.

[2] James Dunkerly, *Power in the Isthmus. A Political History of Modern Central America* (London: Verso, 1988), 255, 259.

[3] Jane Hunter, *Israeli Foreign Policy. South Africa and Central America* (Boston: South-End Press, 1987), 140, 245.

LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, 231, 233.

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Dr. Forsythe replies:

From my overview of U.S. human rights policy abroad, Roderick Hill picks up on one sentence about the Carter administration and Nicaragua to argue that that administration deserves no credit for policy toward Managua. His criticism goes too far, although I suspect we share some perspectives.

The Carter administration, unlike previous administrations, displayed a serious interest in human rights in Nicaragua. At a certain point the Carter team said publicly and privately that Anastasio Somoza Debayle had to be removed from office and that one of the fundamental reasons for his removal was his poor human rights record. (Human rights was mixed with security concerns; Washington saw Cuba as meddling in Nicaraguan instability.) Making this clear in public were Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, Ambassador to the OAS Gale McGhee, and Assistant Secretary Viron Vaky.[1] Public and private policy were the same.[2] Thus the Carter team clearly moved to replace a brutal dictator, whereas so much U.S. policy in the western hemisphere supported repressive regimes, both before and after Carter.

I agree that Carter's policy was vacillating and indecisive in the months leading up to the final decision to offer Somoza asylum in Miami if he would leave Managua. The reasons for this zigging and zagging have been well captured in general by Abraham F. Lowenthal.[3]

I agree that in the power vacuum following Somoza's departure, Carter policy under the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski sought a military caretaker government, just as Washington sought the same in Iran in similar circumstances.[4] It should also be noted that when the military government failed to materialize, the Carter team did not try to impose its will by force but sought to moderate Sandinista policy through a $75 million foreign assistance program, for which it fought the Congress doggedly and successfully. (Carter later suspended the aid program in response to Sandinista policy.)

Neither a shifting policy before nor a search for a temporary military government after changes the central fact that the Carter team successfully sought the ouster of Somoza, motivated to significant degree by the dictator's human rights record.

DAVID P. FORSYTHE

[1] See U.S. Department of State Bulletin no. 2029, August 1979, 55–61.

[2] Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[3] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Jimmy Carter and Latin America" in Kenneth A. Oye, et al., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (London: Longman, 1979), 295.

[4] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), esp. 358.

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

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

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

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

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